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Arni r reform in. late Victorian Britain was influenced both by
observation of foreign armies and by Britain's experience of imperial
warfare. Immediately after the Prussian campaigns of 1866 and 1870-71,
most British army reformers became embued. with uncritical admiration for
the military organisation of Germany. Some tended to retain this
attitude throu,ghout the late nineteenth century. Rather more began to
adopt a detached stance towards the German and. other continental armies.
These rAformers sought to develop a British school of military thought
and organisation, based as much upon the needs of imperial defence as
upon the relevant foreign examples. The chief proponents of this view
were also close associates of Lord Wolseley. Critical of both the
continentalist and imperial reformers were numerous conservatives.
Their influence hampered the development of most reforms during the period
under rei,iew.
Planning for mobil5sation, foreign in concept, was shaped to
ritajn peculiar form of localisation and to warfare on a scale
demanding an expeditionary- force of no more than 70,000 troops. The
example of continental manoeuvres prompted their emulation in. Britain.
Tactical doctrine was transformed by progressive thinkers, who also had
a marked though B mited. effect upon training. Regular cavalry training
remained traditional, but experienoes in colonial warlare led. to the
formation of a mounted infantry corps. Higher education in gunnery was
developed, in response to observation of foreign armies, while concern
for imperial defence produced a reorganisation of the Royal Artillery at
the end of the century. Debate concerning the logistics of conventional
and irregular warfare bore fruit in the formation of the Royal Amy
Service Corps and a relatively sophisticated organisation of cotnurunica-.
tions. These reforms exeniplified the growing professionalism and
modernity of the late Victorian Army.
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Army reform in Victorian Britain has engaged the serious attention
of scholars only in the past two decades. Many areas, however, have
already come under examination.
Short service and. the localisation system have been considered by
Brian Bond. and other writers. 1 The abolition of purchase has been
studied in meticulous detail. 2
 Those "shadowy automata", the rank aM
file, have found an exc3llent historian, whose work comprehensively
analyses the recruiting problem. 3
 For all practical purposes, the
Staff College has received its definitive history lix a study which also
illuminates much of the military professionalism of the period.4
A Lull-scale exazninatio.x of the War Office is still needed, although a
good institutional study by W. S. Ranier has gone some way towards filling
the gap. 5 The pioneering work of Hew Strachan has reconsidered the
I. B.T. Bond, "The introductioi' and operation of short service and
localization in the British Army, l868l892", (Land. LA. thesis 1962).
For other writings by the same historian on connected themes, see the
final bibliography. Aian Skefley, The British Army at Home The
Recruitment and Terms of the British Regular,_1859-1899 (Lond.d
Toronto 1977); W.S. Hamer, The British Army Civil-Military Relations
1885-1905 (o.u.P. 1970).
2. N.H. Moses, "Edward Cardwell's abolition of the purchase system in
the British Army, 1868-1874: study of administrative and. legislative
processes", (Land. Ph.D. thesis 1969); T.F. Gallagher, "Cardwellian
Mysteries': the fate of the British Army Regulation Bill, 1871",
Historical Journal 18 no. 2 (1975), 327-48 (valuable); A.L. Tucker,
"Army and Society in ngland 1870-1900: A Reassessment of the Cardwell
Reforms ", Journal of British Studies 2 (1963), 110-41 (a Somewhat
impressionistic piece on the social aspects of the abolition of purchase).
3. Skelley, op • cit.; quo • from review of Gwyn Harries-Jenkins , The
Army in Victorian Society (Land. 1977), by Professor Michael Howard,
Times Literary Supplement 5 Aug. 1977, 950.
4. Brian Bond ,The Victorian Army end the Staff College 1854-1914
(Lond. 1972). The story is carried on by John G,och, The Plans of Wa
The General Staff and British Military Strategy c. 1900-191 6 (Lond.
1974), 32-130.
5. Ranier, pp. cit. Its range is narrower than that suggested by its
title. The mid-Victorian War Office and. Horse Guards are examined by
Hew Strachan in "The Administration of the Army", an unpublished paper
kindly loaned to the present writer by the author. J. Sweetman,"The
effect of the Crimean war upon the administration of the British Army




	 In the field of nu.litaxy thought,
the work of Jay Luvaas is indispensable. 7
 Howard Moon has written in
some detail on the invasion scares. 8 Adrian Preston has been a devoted
student of Wolseley for many years and has cast light not only upon his
career but on some of the military politics of the late nineteenth
century. 9
 Finally, a recent study touches upon all these subjects,
but is m're concerned to formulate heuristic devices than to demonstrate
10the social character of the Victorian arnj from precise evidence.
Cumulatively, these writings tell us a good deal about the place of the
army in Victorian Britain, though major studies of civil-military
relation1 or of the social constitution of the army are still awaited.
This growing volume of historical deP'ate has compelled revision of
many assumptions about the military institutions of the period under
6. "The pre-Ci'imeanorigin3 of reform in the British Army", (aambridge
Ph.D. thesis 1976). Its argument is briefly anticipated in Olive Anderson,
A Liberal State at War English Politics and Economics during the Crimean
War (Loid. 1967), 51-54. Crimean strategy is reassessed in Strachan,
"Soldiers, Strategy, and Sebastopol", The Historical Journal 21 no. 2
(1978), 303-25.
7. The Education of an Army British Military Thought, 1815-1940 (Lond.
1964); and The Military Legacy of the Civil War (Chicago 1959); also
the subject of Adrian Preston "British Military Thought, 1856-1900
Army Quarterly and Defence Journal 89 (Oct. 1964-Jan. 1965), 57-74.
8. "The invasion of the U.K.: public controversy and official planning,
1888-1918", cha. 1 and 2. (Lond.. Ph.D. thesis 1968).
9. Introductions to The South African Diaries of Sir Garnet Wolseley, ed..
Preston, and. In Relief of Gordon Lord Wolseley's Campaign Journa]. of the
Khartoum Relief Erpedition 1884-1885, ed.. Preston. (Capetown 1971 and Loud.
1967 respectively); "British military policy and the defence of India:
a study of British military policy, plans, and preparations during the
Russian crisis, 1876-1880", (Lond. Ph.D. thesis 1966); "Wolseley, the
Khartoum Relief Expedition and the Defence of India, l885l90O", Journal
of Imperl and Commonwealth History 6 no. 3 (Nay 1978), 254-80.
10. Harries-Jenkins, op. cit. See the well-deserved, strictures upon
this book by Hew Strachan, "The British Army and Society", The Historical
Journal 22 no. 1 (1979), 247-51; Richard Clover, review in Social History]
Histoire Sociale 11 no. 22 (Nov. 1978), 509; Olive Anderson, review in
the English Historical Review 4' no. 370 (Jan. 1979), 221-23.
7.
review. To this reassessment the present study seeks to contribute.
Its central theme is the contrast between the continental models of
military organisation which provided a continual impulse to reform in
Britain, and the requirements of an empire with a naval first line of
defence and scattered geographical responsibilities. A prim-ry conc..ern
has been to combine the study of army organisation with the more abstract
aspects of military thought. To do so it has been necessary to examine
a wide range of issues, embracing the general organisation for war,
reforms affecting individual services, theoretical debates, and the
details of training.
The introductory survey seeks to Listinguish the main strands of
military thought in Victorian Britain as a backdrop to the detailed
arguments of the ensuing chapters. Mobilisation schemes and the way
in which they were modified to suit British conditions ara discussed in
the second chapter. Training of higher units is the subject of the
third. Debates about the role of infantry and artillery in modern war
and the inarmer in which new ideas filtered down to reforms at regimental
level are the concern of the fourth chapter. Cavalry and. mounted
infantry are considered in a similar fashion in the fifth. The pen-
ultimate chapter discusses the introduction of higher education into the
artillery and changes in its organisation. Finally, the performance of
the supply and transport system in two selected colonial wars is assessed
and the influence upon the home organisation of the experiences typified
by these wars is demonstrated.. 	 cigencies of space have strictly
abbreviated the study of army administration in this chapter. Our
starting and finishing points - tne Franco-Prussian war and the South
African war - were very real dividing lines. The campaigns of 1866 and.
1870 established Germany as the cynosure of the military world. The
subsequent decades saw reformers trying to work out the extent to which
8.
practices suitable to a great continental, power might be applicable to
a great imperial power, for which the overseas expedition or punitive
operation was its characteristic mode of warfare. Prom 1899,
strategic position in the world was profoundly altered.
By this date, much remained in the British army that was archaic,
and much }ad been accepted in principle that awaited adequate implemen-
tation in practice. Ncnetheless, our fundamental thesis is that, during
the period under review, the British army became a modern one in certain
precise aspects; namely, in the foundation of mobilisation schemes, the
higher education of officers, new principles of training, and the




Patterns of Thought in the late Victorian. Army.
9.
A standard. criticism of Victorian military planning is that,
apart from the Stanhope memorandum of 1868, it failed to define the
role of the army or prepare it to perform functions authoritatively
laid. down. The Stanhope meinoranduni itself has usually been seen as
a measure of pure econojr. This and. the succeeding chapter do not
deny the shortcomings of policy decisions on the role of the army.
Rather, they point to the considerable amount of debate amonpt reformers
concerning the purpose of their nation's military institutions. By
examining the whole spectrum of opinion on this issue, from off-hand
comments in the service press to informed, debate within the War Office,
it is possible to adumbrate the extent to which reforms were inf1uexred.
by differing preconceptions as to the army's functions. Likewise, it
is possible to discern the emergence of consensus on this vital issue
amongst a number of leading reformers. Intimately associated. with the
pxestion of tts rola was the pattern of military thought in the army.
Many reformers revealed their assumptions about its task while discussing
matters of less moment. Every ensuing chapter provides examples of how
advocates of particular points of view buttressed. their contentions by
insisting, according to their predilictions, that the army's primary
duty was to prepare for continental or imperial warfare. At this stage,
therefore, it is proposed to delineate the chief schools of thought in
outline.
Around the major questions of reform in this period three main
schools of opinion seem to have developed. The first group may be
called the continentalis. Their position was defined either by their
explicit conviction that the army should prepare for war in Europe on a
grand cale, or implicitly by their preoccupation with European develop-.
ments to the virtual exclusion of imperial warfare. The second group
may be called the traditionalists. Their hallmarks were, first,
10.
profound antagonism with the Cardwell reforms, and, second, an apparent
oblivion to the question of the role of the amy altogether. The final
group may be termed the British or imperial school. They were distin-
guished by their readiness to acknowledge the importance of colonial
warfare, sometimes by their overt belief that the army would never again
fight on European soil, and by their adherence to the principles of the
Card.well system.
Some qualifications may be introduced at this point. Allowances
must be made for shades of opinion and change over time. Many of those
who can be called continentalist in 1871 hardly merit the soubriquet by
the late l880s, when the Erptian question and. the growing Russian threat
had commanded attention to the problems of imperial defence. Frequently
two of the schools coincided upon certain issues. Continentalists and.
the imperial school agreed upon the necessity for short service, however
much they might differ over the form it should take in Britain.
Traditionalists and the imperial school were both, in a sense, "British"
in outlook, but whereas the first dwelt on past insular traditions, the
second were concerned with the modern empire. Although the Cardwell
system provided a general dividing line, different minor issues could
bring about different alignments. People could advocate change on one
matter but resist it on another. Moreover, many reformers seem to have
been wholly absorbed with the narrow subjects which engaged their
immediate attention. Not a few of those who carried out reforms in
circumscribed spheres were apparently unaware of the larger questions
of their age.
An acknowledgement of two major omissions in this study should
be made here. It has been impossible to consider, save in the
merest outline, the group of reformers associated with Lord Roberts.
The Indian army demands its own experts and the present writer has not
11.
1been competent to essay any part of its complex history.	 As for the
reformers with whom we are concerned., they were very much a numerical
minority in the army. Just how far the silent majority shared in the
opinions which the articulate minority recorded with such prolixity is
a question perhaps unanswerable, for obvious documentary reasons.
Nonetheless, the present writer has been constantly aware that the
most articulate were probably also the least representative. All
that may be said is that the minority was a large one, and. that its
influence seems to have been vastly d.isproportionateiD its numbers.
The Continentalists
That the Prussian campaigns should have InaAle a profound impact
upon all those concerned with military reform hardly requires explanation.
Those "strange, unprecedented, overpowering"2 victories were the great
event of their generation, the more so for those who had witnessed. their
conduct. Several of those who were soon in the vanguard. of army reform
were first-hand observers of the foreign scene in 1866 and 1670-71.
Charles Brackenbuiy, later Director of the Artillery College and. a
military writer of international repute, was correspondent for the Times
with the Austrian arnr.' in 1866, and. watched the battles along the Loire
in 187O.	 His brother Henry, Director-General of Ordnance during the
South African war, toured the battlefields of the Austro-Prussian. wax
1. I am, however, grateful to the guidance of T.A. Heathcote, The
Indian Army (Lond. 1974), and. Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour An
Account of the Indian Army Its Officers and Men (Penguin ad. 1976,
first pub. 1974).
2. Lieut. J.F. Maurice, The Syatem of Field. Manoeuvres best Adapted
for enabling our Thoos to Meet a• Continental Army (Lond.. 1872), 79.
3. Naj .-Geni. Sir Edward. May, Changes and. Chances of a Soldier' s Life
(Loud. 1925), 158; Archibald. Fortes, Memories and. Studies of War arid
Peace (3rd.. ed.. Lond.. 1895), 217-18 ; Gen. Sir Henry Brackenbu.ry,
Some Memories of my Spare Time (Ed.in. and. Loud.. 1909), 57-58.
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during the late 1860s, was in Prance in 1870-71, and immediately wrote
a book based upon his observations. 4 Initially, it seemed to many
reformers that no subject could hold more interest for soldiers than
the Prussian army, and no better model could be found. for British
reformers than its experiences and practices. As one commentator urged,
reflecting an attitude pervasive in the military literature of the early
1870s:
We must modify our dress, our equipment, our drill, our training,
our organisation, to meet the changes which are demonstrated to
us from day to day by the graphic descriptions of the war now
raging in Prance.5
For some years after 1866, an intense admiration for Pru.ssian
military- institutions tended to characterise reformers of every stamp.
What particularly ditingu.ished the reformers whQ have been called
"continentalist" was their adherence to this admiration throughout the
period, and their lack of interest in forms of warfare which did not
conform to the pattern typified 'by Koniggrtz, ?Iars-lar-Tour, Gravelotte,
or Sedan. It is proposed to discuss here two notable "Prussophile"
who were most illustrative of this school of thought. Many other
examples will emerge in the course of our consideration of specific
issues. The commentat',rs whose views are outlined here were far from
important in the development of practical reform. Indeed, their
significance was something of a negative one. They exemplify an
4. Ibid, 73-75, 87-167; and his Les Mar'chaux de Prance Etude de
leur Conduite de la Guerre en 1870 (Paris 1872).
5. Lieut.-Col. E.W. Bray, "The Prussian Mode of Conducting Large
Manoeuvres", Proc. R.A.I. 7 ( 1870-71), 349.
13.
approach which, novel and. innovative in the early 1870s, hardened. into
a sterile doina out of lxuch with the immediate problems facing Britain
as the century advanced..
Colonel Lonsdale Hale was a Royal Engineer of academic leanings,
first an instructor in military history at Chathazn and. then a professor
at Camberley. He was a prolix coi:nmentator at the R.U.S.I., contributed
on occasion to the proceedings of the R.A.I. and to the United Service
Magazine, and was one of the first British practitioners of the war
game. 6
 One looks in vain for any signs of his influence outside the
arena of theoretical debate. As a military historian, Hale specialized
in minute dissections of the great battles of the Fra'ico-Prussian war,
relying chiefly on the German official history, of which he was the
authoritative English translator. 7
 His Tactical Studies of Colunibey-
Noulily and. Vionville is a factual compilation of extraordinary aridityr
nelivened by any fLashes of wit or attempts to point the noat obvious
worals of the engagements. Evidently designed as a text for unfortunate
Staff College students, it testifies to the limitations of their
8lustorica]. instruction at that period.
6. A delightful stnnnivy of Hale's career will be found in Brian Bond,
The Victorian Army and. the Staff College (Lond. 1972), 293.
7. Ecpert opinion has differed drastically upon the German official
history. Sir Basil Liddell Hart called it "a masterpiece of varnish":
The Brit:msh Way in Warfare (Lond. 1932), 43; the greatest living
expert on the 1870-71 war has written with profound rtispect of the
scholarship of those military historians of a past generation; Michael
Howard ,The Pranco-Prussian War (Lond. 1961), pref.; after living with
the official history throughout his adult lifetime Maj.-Gen. J.F. Maurice
recorded iis opinion that in its volumes "... every technical detail was
pushed into an adventitious prominence till even for us the thing that
came to be called the history of the War was 1i cle other than a burden
to the flesh": The Franco-German War (Lond. 1900), ed. Maurice, pref.
8. (Lond. 1877). His ater wo&, The People's War in France (Lond.
1904), is slightly less incredibly boring. Also cf. Bond, op. cit.,
136, 154.
14.
As speaker and writer Hale was all of a piece. During a long
peroration at the R.U.S.I. on military study, he summed, up the whole
matter by advising his brother officers to master elementary tactics,
iiore theoretical treatises, and saturate their minds with the facts of
the Pranco-Prussian war. 9
 Somewhat at variance with this dictum was
his own tactical writing, in which he delighted to dwell upon abstract
schemes of attack arid defence unadulte,ated by any reflection upon the
facts)'0
 For him, as the artillery reformer Henry Hime remarked of
the school Hale represented, the art of war dated its birth from the
fourth of August, 1870.11 Evelyn Wood wrote in 1909 that "Lonsdale
Hale kno.is more details about the Pranco-Pru.ssian War of 1870-71 than
any other officer I have ever met"2 arid indeed be was always reluctant
to dwell upon anything else. A lecture he de1i-ered to the LU.S.I.
in 1876, purportedly surveying the use of military history, was in fact
a minute examiriatior of particular episodes of 1870, as eLpounded by
the German official history. Although a stimulating discu.ssion followed
the lecture, Hale himself paid no attention to the professional value of
military history. His prescription was simply that "It (the German
official account) should be studied paze by page, paragraph by paragraph,
sentence by sentence, line by line ..." 	 As for	 own military
9. Comment upon Col. C.B. Brackenbury, "The Latest Developments of the
Tactics of the Three Arms", J.R.U.S.I 27 (1883), 455-59.
10. E.g. Col. Londsdale Hale, "The "Spirit of Tactical Operations of
To-Day", Proc. R.A.I. 16 (1889), 449-64.
11. Lieut.-Col. H.W.L. Hime, Stray Military- Papers (Lond. 1897) 5-6
(A work representative of the Brttish school at it most explicit5.
12. F.M. Sir H. Evelyn Wood, Vinnopred Memories (Lond.. 1917), 235.
13. Maj. Lonsdale Hale, "The Study of Milttary History by the Regimental
Officers of the .Arny", J.R.U.S.I. 20 (1876), 508-23, quo. 522.
15.
experiences, he was convinced that they taught the student of war
nothing:
An officer who has seen service must sweep from his mind all
recollections of that service, for between Afghan, Egyptian,
and Zulu warfare and that of Europe, there is no similarity
whatever. To the latter the former is merely the play of
children.'4
Another distinctive example of the continentalist school was
P.N. Naude. He spent his early years in Germany, was educated in
Britain, commissioned in the Royal Eigneers, and later qualified at
the Staff College. His career as a soldier was decided.y tmdistin-
guished; he served twenty years in India without seeing active service
and returned to Britain with the rank of captain. But he was success-
ful enough with publishers, writing first for an.AmericaxL firm, +hn
contributing to Philip Colomb's famous prophecy of invasion, The Great
War of 189-, and in due course producing a series of books for the
house of William Clowes. After the Boer war Maud.e began to write
regularly for the natiora]. periodicals, controverting therein with none
other than Jean de Bloch, whose name W.T. Stead had made fam.tlia.r to
readers of his Review of Reviews. 15
 Maude also helped to introduce
14. Col. Lonsdale Hale, "The "Spirit of Tactical Operations To-Day",
Proc. R.A.I. 16 (1889), 450.
15. Biographical points from: Hart's Army List ( 1907); Roll of
Officers of the Corps of Royal Engineers from 1660 to 1898, ed. Capt.
E.P. Edwards. (Chatham 1898); pref. to Naude, Military Letters and
Essays (Kansas 1895); Faude, "Internal Organisation in Time of War",
Contemporary Review 81 (1902), 42. For Bloch: his articles "Some
Lessons of the Transvaa]. War", L.bA, 77 (1900), 457-71, and.
"Militarism in Politics", ibid, 80 (1902), 761-93; Naude, "N. Bloch
as a Prophet", National Review (March-Aug. 1901), 102-14; Review of
Reviews 25 (1902), 136-42, 160-61, 504.
16.
Clausewitz to the British public, editing in 1908 a reissue of Graham's
1873 transiation.16
I'!uch of Naude's writing w.s sterile and it is not proposed to
inflict upon the reader a prolonged exposition of his views. Nonethe-
less, as a tireless proponent of continental ideas in Britain he is at
least worth some mention. He was something of a stylist, and. works
such as his Lpzig (1908) or War and. the World's Life (1907), certainly
repay perusal. \That is especially Interesting in his writing is the
way in which an extreme rigidity of thought could be combined with all
the apparent features of the scientific soldier. Tactically, his faith
in the offensive and moral factors rivalled that of the most backward-
looking of those who sighed for the days of the long-service soldier and
even for Brown Bess. But there the resemblance ends. Maude believed
in study and professional debate; he could hardly have accepted the
editorship of the R.US.1. ou.rna1, which he held from February 1894 to
January 1896, if he had been convinced otherwise. He was contemptuous
of outward. trappings and show, regarding war as a profoundly serious
study which demanded a lifetime's devotion to master. Like Foch, Naude
believed that an uribridgeable gulf lay between the understanding the
commander should have of war and. the simple doctrines of complete self-
sacrifice which should be absorbed by the rank and. file) 7 All this
marked him as one of a very different breed from those who were identified
with the position held by the Duke of Cambridge. A cautious parallel
may be drawn between the rhetorical styles of Maud.e and J.P.C. Puller,
16. On War, tranal. Col. J.J. Graham and. revised by Col. F.N. Naude (Loud.
1908). Also see references to Naude's work in T.N. Maguire's edition of
General Carl von Clausewi±z on War (Lond.. 1909), This was a commentary
rather than a translation; Naguire, a prolific and. pietentious civilian
writer on war, overwhelmed the extracts with his own effusions. As his
daughter and amanuensis respectfully remarked, her father had improved the
original with some comments of bin own, "with which, as he says, Clausewitz
would have agreed, had not that man of genius died. in 1831." (introduction).
17. The Lepzig Campaign (Loud. 1908), viii-xx±ii; Marshal Ferdinand Poch,
The Principles of	 tranal. Hilaire Belloc 1 (Loud. 1918), ch. 10; Maj.-
Gen. Sir George Aston ,The Biography of the Late Marshal Pock (Loud. 1930),
92-93.
17.
though the two writers were not of comparable intellectual calibre.
Both were outside of the world of official arnr reform, both possessed
an almost urstical sense of the study of wax and tended to reduce all
questions to first principles, of the existence of which neither had
the slightest doubt.18
Maude's arguments may be easily s1,Tnmrized, In his view, most
British observers in the decade after 1866 fell into the fallacy of
"post hoc, ergo propter hoc", and. assumed that the great battles in
rance portrayed the art of warfare in its perfection. He was at one
with J.P. Maurice and other commentators who quickly became convinced
otherwise, but whereas those who concurred with Maurice argued that the
Germans had used the offensive to excess, Naude thought the precise
opposite. He was distressed, therefore, to find British doctrine
becoming nore and more influenced by what he called the "tactics of
timidity." His models were those continental writers who advocated
a return to massed formations and stressed the superiority of moral
factors. To Maude, this was the very latest in modern ideas. It is
abundantly clear that continental practices monopolized Naude's atten-
tion and. commanded his admiration at Britain's expense.
Despite lip-service to the special requirements of British
institutions, the Prussians for him were a model without peer.19
Instances of praise for Germany and denigration of current British
18. Fuller's tribute to Naude in preface to The Conduct of War may be
noted.
19. Letters on TaLtics and Organisaticn (Kansas 1891), 34, 116-36,
163, 214, 222; ilitaty Letters and Essays (Kansas 1895), 52-60, 67;
Cavalry-: Its Past and Future (Loud. 1903), 188, 227-29; "N. Bloch,
,..", on. cit., 106-08; "Military- Training and Modern Weapons",
Contemporary Review 77 (1900), 305-22; "National Military Reform",
ibid, 79 (1901), 249-50.
18.
trends abound in his writings. 20 Britain was on the highroad to disaster
in putting a premium on the conservation of manpower; a lesson, to him,
"written in characters of blood all over Europe."21 The superiority
of the German system was manifest to him in its officer education,
training at every level, and. the moral attitudes of the nation towards
its armed forces. In brief, as he wrote in 1891: "As the German Army
now stands, I believe it to be the most perfect engine of war ever yet
put together."22 Therein, he felt, was exemplified the true men1ng of
discipline, which, ceteris paribus, he understood to be "that quality
which is measured by the endurance of loss by troops under fire ..."
This was the mentality hich assessed commanders by the length of thE,ir
casualty liss. Maud.e'a view of the German arnr may have been very
much of his own imagining, but that does not invalidate the main point.
He portrayed the turu of mind which thought primarily in terms of a
bloody and decisive ar in a European theatre and . dismissed the small
war as unworthy of study.23
20. ?Taude's remark: "The writer's object throughout has been to present
or discuss English military institutions and. forms, from the point of
view and in the spirit of modern warfare as understood in Germany ...",
(Letters on Tactics, pref.), seems to have led Professor Luvaas to
include Maude amongst those who headed the reaction against the Pru.sso-
philes (The Military Legacy of the Civil War Chicago 1959, iii). It
will be clear that I regard this as a misinterpretation.
21. Lettrs on Tactics, 34-35.
- 22. Military Letters, o p. cit., 339; similarly ibid., 179-229, 260, 269;
Letters on Tactics, 109-215; "Military Training ...", op. cit., 314,
315; Cavalry Versus Infantry (Kansas 1896), 22-31.
23. Cavalry: Past and. Future (Lond.. 1903), 232, 265, and quo.,
Letters on Tactics, pref.
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1xnp1es of this approach may be multiplied. In his study of the
art of war Sir Reginald. Hart refused his colleagues' advice to include
a section on irregular operations; to him all warfare could be reduced
to the same few principles. 24
 A prize medallist of the R.A.I. argued
(with the reversal to muzzle-loading artillery in mind) that:
Our small campaigns, always succesaful, are the worst possible
experiences for us. They even do positive harm, by making us
think we have reached a high pitch of military excellence, when
as a matter of fact, we are far from it.25
C.B. Naync, author of the text book fox infantry officer eynrnations,
likewise insisted that Britain's colonial wars had reinforced her
tendency to lag behind the other great powers. Col. W.H. James,
whose Modern Strater was a standard work, concurred.26 Particular
mention should. be made of the rigid formaUsm of Sir Edwaril ffunley's
Operations of War, a Staff College text throughout the period. It is
significant that the most famous single work of military theory in
Victorian Britain should have had. almost nothing to say about the
immediate problems facing her
24. Pref. to Reflections on the Art of War (Lond. 1903, first pub.
1894).
25. Capt. E.R. Elles, "On the question whether any Development of the
Material of Field Artillery is Necessitated by the General Adoption of
Entrenchments ...", Proc. R.A.I. 10 (1877), 576.
26. Capt. C.B. Nayne, The Late Battles in the Soudan and Modern Tactics
A reply (Lond. 1884), 32-33, and Infantry Fire Tactics (Chatham
1885); comment by James upon Col. Lonsdale Hale, "The Professional.
Study of Military History ...", J.R.U.S.E. 4]. (1897), 717. Similarly:
comment by Sir Charles Shute upon George Saunders, "The Eknployment of
Large Cavalry Masses ...", J.R.U.S.I. 34 (1890), 836; Naj. E.S. Nay,
'.chievements of Field Artillery", Proc. R.A.I. 20 (1893), 107.
27. Professor Jay Luvaas has said all that is needed on Thmiley in
The Education of an Army (Loud.. 1965), 130-68.
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The Traditional School
Opposition to short service and. the linked battalion system has
been discussed by other historians and is illustrated in the subsequent
xiysis of niobilisation schemes. This brief survey is intended to
convey something of the frame of mind, in which the traditional school
mounted its defence of the old. ways.
Short service was introduced in 1870, battalions were linked in
1873, and territorial districts established in 1881.28 On these main-
stays of the Card.well system turned the criticism of its opponents.
As the evidence ]aid before the Wantage enquiry showed, the new organi-
sation found some of Its severest critics amongst regimental officers.29
That this should have been so is explicable in practical as well as
sentimental terms. The linked battalion arrangement turned the home
forces into a vast nursezyIbr the overseas battalions, and the labours
of regimental officers into the work of Sisyphus.' As soon as they had.
moulded. recruits into soldiers fit for war, the home trainers had to
relinquish the fruits of their labours to the colonies or India.
Domestic training resembled a treadmill, and was cordially detested
by most officers involved. in it.
During the 1870s, two military journals emerged as the public
voice of the traditional school: the United Service Magazine and the
Aniry and Navy Magazine. The journal of the R.t.S.I., the most impor-
tant military periodical of Victorian Britain, had such an eclectic
range of contributors that it is hard to discern any dominant group.
Nevertheless, it gave little room to aniinadversions on the Cardwell
28. Bond, pp. cit., 56-60, and. for comments upon opposition to there
measures, ibid, 59-60, Skelley, op. cit., 251-58, Ranier, pp. cit., 77-92.
29. Report of the Committee appointed to consJer the Terms and Conditions
of Service in che krn P.P. (0.6582, 1892), 19.
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system and much space to the latest technological and organisational
ideas. This was in definite contrast to the United Service Magazine
during the 1870s and 1880s. It may be surmised that because its
contributors rarely signed their names extra scope was given for
persona]. opinion; R.U.S.I. articles were never anonymous. These
early attacks upon the new system were mked by an absorption with
regimental interior economy and. the details of training. Little
appreciation of imperial needs existed. Egregious errors as to how
the system actually worked abounded, lending support to Wolseley's
judgement that the new organisation was very "little understood even
by Officers of the Arniy."3°
One of the few writers who revealed his iden±ity in the United
Service Magazine was Colonel W.W. Knollys (to be distinguished from
the reformer Colonel Henry Knollys). LW. Knollys constituted him-
self a major voice of the old school for the journal and revelled. in
continual attacks upon Wolseley and his professional associates. In
1885 he mused upon the near collapse of the army because of the work of
Cardwell:
We ere inclined to think that the evil is not past remedy,
that it is not too late to partially undo the mischief of
the last few years, but with Lord Wolseley in power at the
War Office, we fear that there is no chance of a frank re-
-	 tracing of the false road pursued.3'
Others wrote in a similar vein. Reformers were accused of making
the British army a bad imitation of continental modds. 32 Reverses
30. Ibid., minutes of evidence, 151.
31. "The British Army in 1885", tr.s.x. (1885), pt. 2, 496, and. much more
of the same in: "What Sort of an Army have we Got?" ibid (1883), pt 2,
59-73; "The Need of Military Organisation", ibid., (i884j, pt. 1, 247-59.
439-50, 531-47. Wolseley was A.G., 1885-90.
32. Anon "The New Organisation of the British Army. By one who served
for thirty years in the same regiment from ensign to colone1" ibid.,
(1881), pt. 1, 436-41.
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during the Zulu war of 1879-80 or the first South African war of 1881
were, of course, attributed to the lack of seasoned soldiers in the
ran]cs. 33
 The days of long service were seen througi a haze of
nostalgia; morale, one commentator felt, was disintegrating:
Not many years ago, when an officer approached any assemblage
of soldiers, every man, if sitting, rose, stood steadily at
attention, uttering no sound, and. reming thus until that
officer had passed out of earshot. Nowadays, and under like
circumstances, the men just lounge up with an effort, stand with
their aims dangling well to the front, and. grunt or make audible
remarks about him, lollopping into an attitude of rest before
he has passed them ... Any sergeant, any good soldier of ten
years service or more will unhesitatingly tell you that his
average comrade of today is neither so honest nor as manly as
his predecessor. 34	 *
Writers in the Army and. Navy Magazine, the first volume of which
was suitably adorned with a portrait of the Duke of Cambridge, indulged
in comparable rhetoric. Aspersions were cast upon the courage of he
short service soldier, and Wolseley and all his woiks were held to
account for the tragedy of Majuba. 35
 Various commentators repined
33. Anon, "Boy Soldiers", U.S.M. (1881), pt. 2, 1-7; Capt. C.W. White,
"Our Military Position. A Note of Warning", ibid, (1883), pt. 2, 499.
34. Anon, "Short Service Discipline", ibid., (1888), pt. 1, 393, 403.
35. "Service Gossip", Army and Navy Magazine 1 (Nov. 1880-April
1881), 95; Gi].bext Pickering, "Sir George Colley and the Intel)igence
Department", ibid., 673-89.
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at the sight of "raw, beardless boys to be seen staggering under their
rifles", dismissed the localisation scheme as laughable, accused
Wolseley of having devoted his life to the abuse of his own service,
and. declared every regiment to be "groaning and. writhing under the
wounds wtiich had. been inflicted upon it by the new organisation."6
There is little point in multiplying examples of an unvarying outlook;
one lengthy but entertaining quotation may speak for all:
A Military Catechism for 1884
Q. What is your regiment?
A. The 2nd. Battalion of the Royal South-West Piddlesex
(Wolseley t s own Weterans) Light Infantry Regiment.
(. Have you always been in that regiment?
A. No; before the British Army was transferred from the
service of the Queen to- that of the House of Commons, I
served in the glorious old 150th. Foot.
Q. What is the Mutual Admiration Society?
A. A small number of persons of the Staff who have obtained
rapid promotion by persistently blowing their own trumpets,
and knowing nothing about their own or anyone else's regiment,
and. who abuse all offenders who do not think as they do; but
their chief point is to unite at all times in belauding the
Founder of the Society expecially, and each othe.c in
particular.
36. ree Lance,
 "Act 3 of the Afghan War", ibid, 553; review of
Sir S.D. Scott's The British Army, ibid, 457; Aon, "Army Reorgaxisar-
tion", ibid, 2 (May-Oct. 1881), 819-30; H.B. Pranklyn, "Remarks on
Military Education", ibid, 3 (Nov. 1881-April 1882), 52-71; "Serriee
Gossip", ibid., 557.
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Q.. Perhaps things may improve?
A. Never, until political officers are stamped out of the
arnr, and the Commander-in--Chief is again allowed, to command
it ... and 'until the army is again the Queen's and not that
of the House of Commons ... Never - until ludicrous titles
to regiments, competitive examinations, and. short service
are abolished.37
Christian himself could hardly have bettered such faith in the old.
certainties. For the traditional school, as William Butler pointed
out, the short service soldier had. become the universal scapegoat.38
Their op.nions found. support in high places. Although Sir Henry
Ponsonby declared himself a fervent admirer of Cardwell, the Queen's
opposition to the new order of things was interxsE. 39 As professional
head of the aimy, the Duke of Cambridge found. it inadvisable to oppose
government policy publicly, although he did inform the Wantage
committee that he had never been a "great advocate" of short service.40
But there was as little doubt as to his true sentiments towards this
as to most other reforms of the period. Wolseley recorded a long
conversation 'with him during the vital time when the system was being
tested by two wars, the Zulu war and the Afghan. In Wolseley's
colourful version of events, Cambridge launched into a long tirade
37. Ibid., 8 (May-Oct. 1884), 140-144 (excerpts only). Cambridge was
not entitled C.-in-C. until 1887. The "mutual admiration society" is
the Wolseley ring.
38. Col. W.F. Butler, "The New Army and the Old Test", Portnightly
Review 33 n.e. (Jan.-June 1883), 
.53-70, espec. 158.
39. Ponsonby to Cardwell, 21 Dec. 1e70, Cardwell Papers, P.R.O. 30/48/3,
if. 252-55 Ponsonby to the Queen, 13 March 1880. Repr. Henry Ponsonby
Queen Victoria's Private Secretary His Life from his Letters, ed. Lord
Ponsonby of Shuibrede, (Lond. 1943), 182-83.
40. Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Terms ancL Conditions
of Service in the Army Ninutes of evidence, 7,8. P.P. (C.6582, 1892), 19.
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against the short service system and. the state of the arxgy until obliged
to pause for want of breath. Wolseley then. felt compel1d to eipress
views which would, he wrote delightedly, "stink in royal nostrils".
He assured. the fluke that tampering with the reserve would cause
national downfall and doubtless precipitate revolutioi:
for a moment h3 was dumb, evidently lost in horror at the
very dream of an angry mob, crying for his blood, or at the
horrible spectacle that his great body would present if hung
from a lamp-post. 	 hat I said. made an. impression on him for
a moment; but I knew it would be of only momentary influence
I have long put him down in. my mind as past cure, and.
have long felt with those of the Young Arur School that we
can never hope to have an efficient army until he is either
gathered into Abraham's bosom or retires into private life
The Imperial School
Reformers who identified themselves with the basic principles of
the Cardwell system were in a somewhat anomalous position during the
late nineteenth century. On the one hand. short service was prfmrily
a continental import, although the greater length of the British
contract and the freedom of the reserve from training were
important modifications. On the other hand, the salient feature of
this school was their preoccupation with organisation and training for
41. "South African Journal 1879-80", entry 8 June 1879, interview 23 Nay,
W.O. 147/7. A good. example of Wolseley's ironic sense of humour, often
underestimated. by historians who ha'e written on him. Another distinctive
example of the old school was Viscount Chelmsford, a conservative oii every-
thing from tactics upwards. He advocated an unqualified return to long
service and confessed that the loss of regimental numbers to regiments
filled him with "dislike and dread". "Discussion on Sir E. Warde's
lecture, and on Recruiting, which formed the subject of the Essays wrilten
for the Gold Medal", J.R.U.S.I. 19 (1875), 156; Hansard. ,3rd. series,
260 (5 April l88, col. 702.
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imperial warfare. They were therefore assailed by their critics on
two counts; for upholding a system based upon foreign principles
unsuited to British needs or sentiments, or for deluding themselves
that the arny-'s chief role was one of imperial defence. Nevertheless,
the imperial school insisted that their position was a coherent one.
Their viewpoint was distinguished. by some change over time. First,
a.fter sharing in the imttiaUy universal wave of admiration for the
Prussian achievement, they developed a critical and selective attitude
towards continental models. This was certainly not a rejection of
the importance of foreign examples, but a careful exition of them
in order to discern what was, and. what was not, applicable to Britain.
Secondly, te imperial school espoused a doctrine of the army's role
which stated that this was chiefly imperial policing and. home defence,
and. that action on the European mainland was a remote contingency and.
would at most involve limited. aid to an ally. Some of the British
school, notably Wolseley, did not assume even the last qualification.
As a corollary to this presupposition, they set high store by the
lessons to be derived, from small wars. Thirdly and. generally, they
were progressive, particularly with respect to officer education and
technological innovations. As Wolseley remarked typically, "I confess
I am one of those who believe in novelties 	 ,,42
rUcit statements on the role of the army before the 1880s were
rare, and authoritative guidance on the matter non-existent. It ia
not, however, quite accurate to say that the question was ignored
during tne first years of the period, and., as Dr. Hew Strachan has




shown, the concept of a British way in warfare had been formulated as
early as l854.
Writing to the Times in 1871, Earl Russell appealed for a
definition of the reasons for which Britain mntained an arur and
navy. His own opinion was that they had. a fourfold function: to
protect her dependencies and colonies (the notion of colonial self-
defence being as yet in its infancy); to maintain national honour;
to uphold engagements with foreign powers (therefore to defend Belgian
neutrality); and to secure the United Kingdom against invasion.
The penultimate provision begged the question of what engagements
should be entered into and was, in the immediate con.ext, an academic
one. In 1871 and at least until 1878, both major parties accepted
that Britain should avoid formal alliances in 1±a continental style.44
With Russell's vague summary obscure' writers agreed, though, like
him, their chief coicern was to publicise the need for an authoritative
stand on the issue.45
Others, with more assurance, confidently supposed that the British
army would never again be called upon to intervene in Europe. Major
Arthur Griffiths, in his standard surey of British military
43. "Soldiers, Strater, and Sebastopol", The Historical Journal
21, no. 2, (1978), 307.
44. Times 21 Jan. 1871; Dame Milieu Penson, "The New Course in
British Foreign Policy, 1892-1902", (Read LH.S. 19zt2). Repr. Essays
in Modern History, ad. I.R. Christie (Lond. 1968), 313-14; C.J. Lowe,
The Reltetant Imperialists British Foreign Policy 1878-1902 (Lond.
1967), 19-22; Kenneth Bourne , The ?oreign Policy of !ctorian Engiand
(o.u.P. 1970), 123-33. Christopher Howard, Splendid Islation (Lond.
1967), harmonises with the long-established view.
An Officer, A Practical Scheme for the Reorganization of the
sof England (Jan. 1871) Tracti 1870-72; Maj. J.B. Edwards,
iorial Army; or, How to Solve the Problem of the Day (Lond.
1871) Tracts 1870-75; Col. Sir William Russell, A Scheme for the
Reorganisation of the Land Forces (M.D.) ibid.
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institutions, considered. that the arny should function abroad purely
as an imperial police force, and. at home as a nursery to the overseas
battalions and. to the reserve. 6
 Some writers clearly anticipated
the blue water school of the 1890s and. early 1900s by regarding the
army as a projectile to be fired by the navy anywhere in the world.47
In a work of didactic fiction, first published in Blackwood's
Edinburgh Magazine and chen in standard three-decker form, Sir George
Chesney entered a plea through his protagonist for the policy makers
to define the nation's military liabilities. Once they had. been laid.
down (his hero emphasized before a rapt House of Commons) an effective
overall organisation could be framed. George Chesney was one of tke
earliest and most explicit proponents of an "English" school of
military thought, envisaging a snill, highly professional arnr which
should be excellent on its own terms and not in direct competition
with its foreigo coiiterparts. 48
 Speaking to similar effect after a
lecture by Chesney's relative C.C. Chesney, the artillery reformer
Ea.rdley-Wilmot pleaded for a new departure in British military
thought:
If we want to make any military change, we go to Prussia or
Prance, or some other place, for our models, and we never had
46. The English Arnzsr ±s Past History, Present Condition, and Piture
Prospects (Lond.. 1878), 1-2.
47. A General Officer,"Arniy Reform", Army and Havy Magazine 2 (May-
Oct. 1881), 807; Naj. H. Le Geary (a distinguished artillery reformer),
"Au Endeavour to Determine a Tactical Basis for the killexy of England.",
Proc. R.A.I. 8 (1371-74), 232.
48. A True Reformer (3 volumes Loni. 1874), I, 317; Gen. Sir George
Chesney, "The English Genius and Arny Organisation", Lecture of March
1874, repr. J.R.U.S.I. 44 (1900), 5361f.
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a man rise amongst us to take into consideration the peculiar
features of our country, our national character, constitution,
and requirements, and cause our arwy and. national defence to
rest upon one basis (applause).49
Most of these statements were made by influential individuals.
Russell, of course, was a leading mid-Victorian statesman and a former
prime m.thister. 5° Eardley-Wilmot was a distinguished artillerist.51
The R.A.I. to which he spoke boasted. 1385 members in May 1871, many of
whom presumably read its proceedings. 52 Chesney was a famous soldier
and gave his name to the chief honour which the R.U.S.I. still bestows;
the Chesney Gold Medal. It may be iri.ferred that a good market was
anticipated for his propagandist fable if it warranted publication in
book-form. Arthur Griffith's anatony of British military power held
the field between C.M. Clode's (far more erudite) The Military Forces
of the Crown (1869) and The Army Book for the British Fknpire (1893).
Moreover, such books are like dictionaries; designed to be descriptive,
they tend to become prescriptive.
Despite appeals for its definition, official attention to the role
of the army remained minimal until the mid-1880s. Well before that
49. Comment by Maj.-Gen. rederick Eaxd.ley-Wilmot upon Lieut.-Col. C.C.
Chesney, "The Reform of Prussian Tacti's", Proc. R.A.I. 7 (1870-71), 247.
50. John, First Ear]. Russell (1792-1878); Whig M.P. 1813-61, and, inter
alia, P.M. 1846-52, 1865-66.
51. Mmoria1s of redk. M.Eardley-Wilmot, N j -
Gen.,R.A., and P.R.S., ad. 14rs. F.N.Eaxd].ey-WilIltOt. (LoncI. 1879). pssim.
52. List of members of the R.A.I., April 1871 and. A.C.M. of 23 Nay.
Proc. R.A.I. 7 (1871), 320-27, 299.
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time, the British school had developed a critical attitude towards
the continent which had implications for the role of the army even if
they were not spelt out. Those who assessed foreign models for their
relevance were at least aware that differences in styles of warfare
must be allowed for. This outlook gave a direct impulse to proposed
reforms which should equip the British army for imperial warfare as
well as European. There was much sympathy for those who reacted
against what Henry Rime perhaps unfairly called "the comedy of
imitation".53
Thus, the artillery reformer Lieut.-Colonel P. Young raised cheers
in the R.A.I. by criticizing Colonel Ciar].es Brackenbury (the elder
brother of Henry) for excessive advocacy of German practices.54
Another gunner of note, W.S. Wolfe, called for an end to the
"pernicious system of always crying down our own army to the
extolling of other riationaiities ••t•55 The author of a Royal
Engineer prize essay in 1877 pointed out that an uncritical accep-.
tance of the Germans as a model would be to ignore Britain' a imperial
position and. to assume that her military role would. be a European one.
This supposition, he wrote, "would be an extremely presumptuous one".6
Britain must, Henry Brackenbury wrote in 1869, build up her own
military literature and no longer draw from the "poisonous wells of
53. Lieut.-Col. H.W.L. Rime, Stray Military Papers (Lond. 1897), 58.
54. Comment upon Capt. C.B. Brackenbu.y, "Autumn Manoeuvres: Considered
in their Place between J'rills and War", Proc. R.A.I. 8 (1871--74), 63.
55. Capt. W.S. Wolfe, "A Sketch of the Autumn Nanoeuvres of 17l",
Proc. A.I. 7 (1870-71), 511.
56. Lieut.-Col. R. Harrison, "The Duties of the Royal Engineers in
Time of War, and the Best 0ranisation for Enabling them to Carry out
those Duties", P.P.R.E. 6 (1881), 253.
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French military history". 57
 By the l880s, such sentiments were
commonplace. Colonel George Armand. Purse, the army's chief authority
on logistics during the late nineteenth century, summed up the nice
balance of attention to, and detachment from, continental examples
which the reformers of the British school sought to achieve:
Though we should look on our minor wars as the rule, and
on the others as the exception, we should. guard from con-
centrating our attention entirely on the first, for the
latter are those which indicate the great principles of
the art of war. We should study these principles, and,
notwithstanding the exceptional circumstances of our petty
contests, we should endeavour to let them (the principles)
form the basis for our arrangemenis in any- war.58
That such a warning was indeed. required in 1894 hows how far
attitudes had changed from those of twenty-five years previously.
Some general reflections upon the rhetorical style of the chief
military theorists of the period may be made before the precise
organisation for war is considered. In the works of writers such as
J.P. Maurice, G.P.R. Henderson, or Spenser Wilkinson, one finds
repeatedly an impatience with the time-honoured abstractions of
mi1itar r theory. The practical bent of their writing seems to have
57. "Influence of Modern Improvements upon Strategy", Saint Paul's
Magazine 3 (Oct. 1868-March 1669), 713. For Brackenbuxy's links with
this periodical, edited by Anthony Trollope, see Brackenbury's Some
Memories of My Spare Time (Lond. 1909), 48-49. With the reformer's
enthusiasm, he surely underestimated the bulk and quality of earlier
military writings.
58. The Organization dnd Aiministration of the Lines of Con]muni'ation
in War (Lond. 1894), 20.
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been akin to the imperial view of army organisation and. training.
All the major writers of this school were marked. by a certain tough-.
minded empiricism, confidence that Britain could find, her own answers
to her own military problems outside the mainstream of continental
theory. All were practical reformers, concerned. to anchor their
hypotheses in the real issues of the day. Similarly, they were
either sceptical of the existence of itmiutable "principles of War" or
doubtful of their value to the military student. While most minor
writers accepted that these laws existed and. provided. the key to
understand. all operations of war, more original thinkers adopted a
different view.
Maurice argued that history was worthless unless it placed the
reader in the position of those whom he was studying. Abstract
lessons and laws were useful only insofar as they were immanent in
past situations. 5	Henderson believed that the rt of wø.r could. be
reduced. to a few great principles, but stressed. that they were
beneficial only when embedded in an analytical narratve. At each
stage of this the reader was to work out for himself the problems
facing the protagonists and. appreciate the motives for their
d.ecisions.60 Henderson's own celebrated. life of Stonewall Jackson
exemplified. this style of naxrat5ve. Prom the present perspective,
his historiography seems dated.; he assumed complete objectivity and
59. Lieut.-Col. Sir Frederick Maurice, Sir Frederick Maurice: A
Record of his Life and Opinions (Lond. 1913), 121-22 (a collection
of essays edited by Maurice's equally distinguished. son Frederick).
Some fascinating remarks by J.P. Maurice on the purpose of official
histories will be found in his "Critics and. Campaigns", Portnightly
Review 44 na. (July-Dec. 1888), 112-14.
60. The Science of War, ed.. Col. Neill I1alcolm, (Lond.. 1910), 48-49.
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expected history to produce applicable lessons. In 1898 his approach
was indeed novel. One situation after another unfolded as Stonewall
Jackson was presumed to have sben it, and. every principle of his
operations was extrapolated from a precise circumstance.6l As the
author pithily summed up the whole matter:
The rules of strat&y are few and. simple. They may be rned.
in a week. They may be taught by familiar illustrations or a
dozen diagrams. But such knowledge will no more teach a man
to leth an army like Napoleon than a knowledge of grmm will
62teach him to write liks Gibbon.
Spenser Wilkinson made the identical point:
General principles because of their simplicity and. generality
axe aids to the understanding; but the difficulties of
practical life are specific; a general priiIciple seldom
helps us to solve them, for it has been reached. by the
elimination of all those particular features which make each
individual case what it is.
61. Stonewall Jackson and the .Amer5 can Civil War (2 vols. Lond..
1898), passim, espec. I, 500, 509, II, 242. The rules of war were,
according to Henderson:
Concentration of superior force, moral and. physical, at the
decisive point is the grand rule of war.
Simplicity is better than ingenuity.
Complicated. operations are very dangerous.
Try to realise the situation from the enemy's point of view.
Always endeavour to mystify and. mislead.
Surprise 4 the greatest of all foes.
Omit no precaution to conceal your own dispositions.
Attack when and. where you are least expected..
"Strategy and its Teaching", J.R.U.S.I. 42 (1898), 782. (Condensed).
62. Stonewall Jackson, op. cit., 1, 500.
63. The Great Alternative A Plea fora National Policy (Lond.. 1894),
6; and. likewise The Nation's Servants Three Essays on the Education
of Officers (Lond.. 1916), 273 ("There is no such thing as war in the
abstract; there are only wars, and no two of them are alike.").
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Such military commentators had a very modern view of theory as
something not divorced from reality but a means of grappling with it.
Theory was siguificant only within particular historical situations,
but, taught in this way, was indispensable. Maurice, arguing to this
effect before the Irish Military Society, found support from Wolseley,
who criticised the British tendency to consider an ounce of experience
to be worth a bushel of theory. That assumption, Wolseley remarked
crisply, was itself a "bushel of nonsense, because it is in itself a
theory, and not a very reliable one either in our science".6
Similarly, Maurice wrote in his brilliant essay War:
It must be emphatically asserted that there does not
exist, never has existed, and. never, except by pedanta, of whom
the mo3t careful students of war are more impatient than other
so]4ier.a, baa ther ever been. supposed. to ri
 at "an art of war"
which was something other than the resultant of accumulated
military experience.6
These distinguished writers spelt out the attitude implicit in
the British school of reformers. In terms of their devotion to
military stuxy, they were no less "scientific", to use the favourite
contemporary term, than those we have described as continentalist.
Both groups would have agreed with thb dictum of Lieutenant-General
Sir William Butler: "The nation that will insist upon drawing a
64. Col. J.F. Maurice, "Theory and Practice", Military Society of
Irciand (1891), passim, and Wolseley's comment, 22.
65. 'iar (Lond.. 1891), 8; a view echoed by his son: Maj.-Gen. Sir
F. Maurice, British Strategr (Lond. 1929), 38.
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broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking
man is liable to find its fghting done by fools and its thinking by
cowar*:Is". 66
 But if we judge the two schools by their relative
Influence upon practical reform, they were very different. Their
disparity clearly emerg's when the record of what was said. is com-
pared with the evidence of what was done.
66. Butler, Charles George Gordon (Lond.. 1907), 85.
CUAPTIR 2.
The Rise of Mobilisation Schemes.
36.
By the early seventies it was generally appreciated that the
secret of Prussia's success had been organisation rather than her
army's tactics or armaments. In the current British mood, organ.isa-
tion became the key word of army reform. Cardwell himself was pre-
eminent amongst those who stressed the need. for a general scheme of
reform which should embrace defence requirements at home and abroad.
Writing to Gladstone in 1869, Cardwell set out the principles of such
a scheme. The colonies were to assume responsibility for their own
defence, the militia were to be taken from the lords lieutenant of
the counties and placed under the War Office, and. a single plan for
home defsnce was to be formulated,' !diat al]. these eims were sub-
stantially achieved testifies to Cardwell's breadth of vision and
energy of purpose.
In domestic planning for war, the scheme that was framed in 1873
largely held the field until the South African war rendemd. its trans-
formation imperative. Developments after 1873 were grafted onto the
basic structure which emerged from the prolonged enquiry under Major-.
General P.L. MacDougall. 2
 A central conception of his localisation
committee was to unify the land. forces of the crown in a scheme which
should allow equal play to the needs of home defence and the demands
of a major war. To this end the committee charted the first standing
plan for mobilisation in British history. The final localisation
- scheme arranged the infantry into 66 sub-districts, the artillery
into 12 sub-districts, and the cavalry into two great districts; in
1. Edwarl Cardwell to W.E. Glad.stcne, 9 Jan. 1869, Cardwell Papers,
- P.R.O. 30/48/6, ff. 30-31. Cardwel. was S. of S. for Var Dec. 1868-
Feb. ls7tt.
2. Reports of the Committee on the Organization of the Various Military
Land Forces of the Country P.P, (c. 493, 1872), 37; P.P. (C. 588,1872), 14; P.P. (C. 712, 1873), 18.
of a Committee on
, 1872), 37.4-1,	 4w.,.,1
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effect there was no localisation for that arm. In accord with these
provisions, the committee's mobilisation plan was sketched out in the
following fashion. When both battalions of a sub-district were
abroad, the auxiliary forces were to be embodied in order to secure
home defence. In their model scheme, the committee envisaged 50
battalions being sent to the scene of action. Each of the districts
thus left destitute of regular battalions was to have both its
militia battalions called up, and every depot in the United Kingdom
was to be expanded to a full battalion to provide an increased flow
of recruits to the theatre of war. Infantry units were to be
arranged in readiness for war according to their establishments. ILl
peacetime 18 battalions were to be kept at 820 rank and. file, 18 at
700, and 35 at 520. 	 Some aflowacice in the plan for war was made
for the vital difference between British and. continental localisation.
In Germary and. Prance, recruiting and military districts were iden-
tical. The freedom of the body of the army from overseas service
permitted individual units to maintain permanent links with certain
zones in the national mobilisation scheme. 4 In Britain, where a man
served bore no relation to his place of origin. Purthermnore, the
actual identity of units failed to coincide in Britain with military
3. Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief on the propoal of the
4. Army Book, 515; Lieut. Gerald P. Talbot, AiiiysJj of the
Organization of the Prussian Army (1872); The Aimed Strength of
Prance, compiled y Maj. C.J. East, (Intelligence Branch 1878),
and. generally for short service in Prance: A.P. Kovaca, "Prench
Military Legislation in the Third Republic", Military Affairs
13 (Spring 1949), 1-9.
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districts. The place of any one unit in the defensive scheme
depended upon where it was located at any time, not upon what unit
it was. Accordingly, the localisation committee recommended that
any district could supply recruits to any unit abroad in time of
war.5
The shortcomings of the plan are immediately obvious. It made
no attempt to grapple with the style of warfare which was becoming
characteristic of the British army's operations. The measures to
be taken in the event of a major war were the barest outline of a
mobilisation scheme. There was no pretence at assessing the
requirements of supply and transport or even of troops needed for the
line of communications. Implicit in the linked battalion system was
the oft-criticised supposition that the army was to provide for only
two contingencies; the status quo and the grand emergency. It
seems to be equally t1ear that, with Crdwell struggling for accep-
tance of his basic principles, to have tried to do more in 1873
would have been courting failure. At least the outline showed some
concern for the army's expeditionary role, and MacDougall later
claimed that his establishments proposal had been made with small
wars in mind. 6
 Judged as a scheme for mobilisation, the plan was
merely a paper sketch, giving the illusion of an organisation with-
out actually creating one.
-	 It was rendered completely academic by the failure to maintain
an equality between the battalions abroad and at home. The rese-
voir of men was thus too small for the outflow, and. the drain upon
5. Memorandum ... op. cit., 8.	 (C. 493, 1872), 37.
6. "The Inefficiency of the Army: A reply", Blackwood.'s Edinburgh
azine 152 (July-Dec. 1892), 267-72.
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the home battalions sabotaged the establishment's device. When
Cardwell left office, only three of the home battalions were on the
high establishment, and all save seven of the remainder were on the
lowest of 520. In 1892, eight were on the high establishment and.
the remaining fifty-seven on 741 rank and file. 7 The only way to
have solved, the imbalance of battalions would have 'been to increase
the army, and. this was made impossible by the constraints of economy
and the exigencies of the recruiting market. It was plin1y un-
realistic to call upon the militia in peacetime, despite their
theoretical liability to compulsory service. 8
 All subsequent
planning for war, therefore, had to ta.ce account of this apparently
insoluble defect of the Cardwell system.
During (3athorTle Hardy's tenure of office a 'Purther hesitant
step was taken towards a real mobilisation scheme. In the Aimy List
of 1875, a blueprint was published in which the home forces were
divided into eight army corps, and a full list was provided. of the
locations to which each unit was to repair upon declaration of war.9
In this alone lay the value of the scheme. Otherwise, it was a
sie
confession of weaknss. The first corps alone was composed wholly
of regular troops. The next four were formed of regular and auxiliary,
7. Army Book, 103; Report of the Committee appointed to consider
the Terms and Conditions of Service in the Army Ninutes of evidence,
96, 481. P.P. (0.6582, 1892), 19.
8. Hamp'Ien Gordon, The War Office (Lond. 1935), 85-88.
9. Army List (Dec. 1875), lO9a-09z.
Gathorne Hardy, (Lord Cranbrook from 1878), S. of S. for War, Peb.
1874-April 1878.
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and the last three of auxiliary troops only, save for divisional units.
None except the first corps had a full complement of engineers, and.
only the first two had their requisite artillery. No ammunition
trains existed at all. As for the other services, asterisks indica-
ting their absence occurred more frequently than not. Nevertheless,
the very composition of such a scheme showed how deeply reformers in
the 1870s were influenced by continental models. Britain must have
her arnr corps like the other great powers, even if it was the name
without the substance. Similarly, the scheme indicated how unhelpful
it was to apply foreign models directly to British circumstances.
Nobilisation in Victorian Britain on tie scale of eight corps could.
never be more than the paper plan worthy of the criticiaL., indeed.
contempt, which it received.
John Hoims, an M.P. who took an amateur interest in military
affairs and admiredcontinental institutiois, described the new plan
as one that "fell little short of the grotesque
	 Captain Nolan
academically stressed that the scheme departed excessively from the
foreign models from which it derived.
	 W.V. Knollys regarded it as
a futile exercise for a power such as Britain to undertake. 12 Sir
George Chesney, although he saluted the scheme as a step in army
ref orm of first importance, acknowledged that, being a purely
13defensive arrangement, it left the arny as "immobilid" as ever.
10. Hansard , 3rd.. series , 230 (23 June 1876), col. 369, and see his
The British Army in 1875 (Lond. 1876).
11 • Hansard, op cit., col. 367.
12. "Localization and Mobilization", U.S.M. (1877), pt. 2, 47-58.
13. "The Pirst Step In Army Reform' S, Blackwood's Edinburgh
MagazIne 119 (Jan.-June 1876), 103-11.
41.
In answer to such attacks, Frederick Stanley, the Financial Secretary,
argued that the purpose of the scheme had been generally misapprehended.
His critics had mistakenly assumed that Britain T s mobilisation plans
should rival in comprehensiveness those of Gei'maziy and. France.
Complacently, he regarded. the war plan as it stood as a satisfactory
application of modern principles of organisation to domestic conditions,
insisting that:
Many of the so-called points of weakness in the scheme
were deliberate departures from the rules which had guided the
foiiation of large armies in foreign countries, and. were
intelligent applications of the same principles to the different
circumstances under which we lived ... It was wholly in its
nature a defensive scheme, and on its merits and demerits as a
defensive scheme he was prepared to meet any arguments that
might be deduced.14
The only occasion on which the scheme was slightly tested occurred
in 1876, when a partial mobilisation of two army corps took place;
that is to say, two corps (the second and. the fifth of the scheme) were
15
simply assembled at cne location.
	 But at least, as Captain John
14. Hansard,op. cit., cols. 373-74. One radical, Sir William Harcourt,
who was suspiãious of this new term in parliamentary legislation, moved
Stanley to ponderous irony:
although it ought to be pretty well known by this time what
an Army corps was, he was willing to gratify the thirst of the
hon. and learned Gentleman opposite for all kinds of military
knowledge. It consisted of the three arms of the Service -
namely, the Infantry, the Cavalry, and. the Artillery combined.
It was divided into divisions and brigades, the latter consisting
of two or more regiments. He trusted that this information,
and the assistance derivable from The Army List published since
last December, would enable his hon. and learned Friend to approach
the subject with more information than he had hitherto displayed
to the House.
(Hansard., 3rd. series, 229 (12 June 1876), col. 1752).
15. Army Corps Traininç Bill P.P. (39 Vict., 1876), 1; "Memorandum of
the Secretary of State (Edward Stanhope) relating to the .Arny Estimates",
9.	 (C. 4985, 1887), 50.
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Colomb pointed out, the concept of mobilisation was no longer alien to
British military thinking. "The word "IIobilization", he wrote, "has
worked its way into common use in this country by the sheer force - so
to speak - of its indisputable ability to express something which no
J	 16
wort of g].ish origin could describe ..."
	 With all its faults,
and for the lack of a better, the mobilisation plan. of 1876 was pub-
lished. year by year in the Arn List until 1881.
During this time and until the 1890s, the Cardwell system was
subjected to an increasing volume of criticism. Its supporters and
opponents alike agreed that, as conduced, it was sadly deficient.
The great divide of opinion was as to whether the remedy for its
defects lay within the system itself or in its abandonment. Closely
connected with this debate was the work of a few reformers in key
positiona to p.zovlde what the CardweU system so mnffest1y lacked;
arrangements for expeditions on a scale suited to current requirements.
Every colonial campaii of the period which required reinforce-
ments from home caused upheaval in the roster for overseas service and
the fra8mentation of certain units. Por the Ashanti war of 1873-74,
which required only three British battalions, transfers from the 79th.
battalion were needed to bring the 42nd. up to strength for the
expedition. 17 Each battalion ordered to South Africa in 1879 was
completed to war strength by calling upon volunteers from units
16. "What Mobilization Is", U.S.M. (1877), pt. 1, 135.
17. Hans, 3rd. series. 224 (51 May1875), col. 1113. The 79th.
and 42nd. did, however, belong to the same sub-district. Report of
Committee on the Formation of Territorial Regiments, appendix IV, 26.
P.P. (C. 2793, 1881), 20.
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further down the roster.'8
 The 21st, indeed, had to leave behind
nearly half of its 800 rank and. file as insufficiently matured for
war service and to fill their places with drafts from a number of
other regiments. A similar number of men were left at home by the
91st., which was replenished from eleven different regiments.'9
During the Erptian campaign of 1882 the same problem recurred.
Unable to declare a national emergency, the authorities were obliged
to make up the necessary establishments by calling upon volunteers
from the reserve. Those who answered. the call did so of their own
volition; they had. no obUgation to respond. 2° Colonial campaigns
abound with examples of the curious makeshifts whereby the special
provisions of small wars were met. A camel battery for the Nile
expedition of 1884-85 was formed of men drawn from the garrison
artillery at Cairo. 21 Sir Edward May later recounted his irritation
when, in 1882, he was forced to surrender the horses and harness of
his Royal Horse artillery battery in order to equip one en route to
Eg.y-pt. 22
 For every battery sent abroad, another was rendered
immobile at home. So long as the reserve was excluded from all but
major wars and. high establishments for battalions first for foreign
18. Minute by the A.G., Gen. Sir Charles Ellice (3 April 1880),
V.0. 33/35.
19. Hansard, 3rd. series, 260 (5 April 1881), col. 724.
20. Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Terms and. Conditions
of Service in the Ariitv Minutes of evidence, 280, 448. P.P (C. 6582,
1892), 19, and Brian Bond, "Mr. Gladstone's Invasion of Erpt (1882) -
a Revelation of Military Weakness", Army Quarterly 81 (Oct. 1960-Jan.
1961), 87-92.
21. Proceedings of the Confidential Mobilization Conmiittee, 20,
V.0. 33M.
22. Naj.-Gen. Sir Eci.ward. May, Changes and Chances of a Soldier's Life
(Lond. 1925), 94.
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service were not maintained, British expeditionary forces were obliged
to be "scratch packs swept together from all directions, with huntsmen
knowing nothing of their horses, their hounds, or their whips".23
The nature of traditionalist attacks upon the linked-battalion
system has been touched upon above. The critics also included a group
led. by Sir Charles Duke and Sir rederick Roberts, who, although the
reverse of conservative, advocated a drastic change in the Cardwefl
organisation. This body of opinion may be conveniently considered
first and., on account of the notice it has received from other
historians, with brevit.24
Roberts assumed the role of public critic of the hor se army in 1881,
when he was fresh from India with a successful campaign enhancing his
reputation. Speaking at the Mansion House in Whitehall, he launched
au attack upon the ahort service system and reii4orced his speech with
a persuasively argued article in the Nineteenth Century. 25 His basic
proposal was to form a dual army, its long service portion to be for
Indian and. colonial defence, its short service for home defence. All
recruits should be inittally contracted for three years. After this
period they could either pass out of the aimy or contract for twelve
years and, eventually, for a lifetime in the army if they so wished
it. Roberts had every reason to be concerned with the problems of
the Cardwell system, but his suggestions hardly contained their
23. Sir Garnet Wolseley, "Our Autumn NanoeuvTes", Biackwood's
Edinburgh Magazine 112 (July-Dec. 1872), 638.
24. Skelley, op. cit., 258; Hamer, op. cit., 78-80.
25. "Free Trade in the Ainiy", Nineteenth Century 15 (1884), 1055-74.
Tert of Mansion House speech substantially reprinted in David James'
ha.giographica]. Lord. Roberts (Load. 1953), 167-71.
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potential solution. He assumed that to offer a choice between long
and. short service would, dissipate the recruiting problem; there were
certainly no grounds for such an assumption and good. evidence from
long service days to show that 'under such an arrangement it would be
extremely difficult to get men for duty abroad. Reintroduction of
long service would have strick a disastrous blow at the reserve.
Roberts indeed anticipated this criticism and. composed actuarial cal-
culations to prove that his suggestions posed no threat to the reserve.
The fact that his arithmetics were based upon the premise that the
yearly intake of recrui ts under his terms would be thrice that of a
full short service system robbed his arguients of reaiity.26 ivIore
over, his proposal would. have caused a drastic increase to the rate
of invaliding and mortality. The risk of death or serious disease
rose dramatically in the leter years of a soldier's Thd±sii service.27
Nonetheless, the idea of two armies seemed to offer a feasible
alternative to the current organisation and was especially attractive
in that it reflected a deep concern with imperial defence. This was
spelt out by Roberts in 1891. It was clear, he wrote of the existing
arrangements:
that the system is one extremely ill-adapted to meet the
continually varying requirements of the British Eipire. That
npire is so extensive, and. is coterminous at so many points
with semi-civilised. countries, that hardly a year passes
without some po-i .tion of the Army being engaged in hostilities,
26. "Note on the Report of Lord Wantage's Committee and Sir A.
Haliburton's Dissent", (4 Nay 1892), 3, W.O. 33/52.
27. Report of the Committee apiinted to Consider the Terms and
Conditions of Service in the Army Appendices xxi, xxiv, 526, 529.
PP. (C. 6582, 1892), 19.
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or being called. upon t occupy fresh territory. In conduc-
ting these minor military operations reinforcements from
England are occasionally indispensable, and it follows
therefore that a b€ilance between battalions at home and.
28
abroad cannot be mintained
Thus, organisational criticisms could be reinforced by strategical
arguments. Roberts' dissatisfaction with the current system stemmed
in large part from its failure to provide for assistance to India in
the event of hostilities with Russia. Accordingly, well after
Edward Stanhope's authoritative pronouncement on the axny-'s role,
Roberts was complaining that it had been inadequately defined.29
In varying forms, the idea of a dual arnr gained wide currency.
Spenser Wilkinson, one of Roberts' most enthusiastic and vocal
disciples, embraced the concept in the famous study of imperial
defence he co-authored with Sir Charles Duke. 30 Dilke himself was
28. "Note ...", op. cit., 5, and Roberts to Spenser Wilkinson, 12 Oct.
1892, Spenser WilkinsonTPapers, 13/14, f.8.
29. "A review of the evidence given before Lord Wantage's Committee ..."
(i Sept. 1891), 43-44, W.O. 33/52, and "Notes on Army Organisation",
enclosed in Roberts to Spenser Wilkinson, 27 April 1891, Spenser
Wilkinson Papers, 13/14 f.3. To the question of reinforcements for
India Henry Brackenbury turned once he had completed his great wo& on
home niobilisation, and became converted to the view that the Indian
arny-, having acted so often as the imperial fire brigade, in turn
should be reinforced in an emergency. Adrian Preston, "Wolseley, the
Khartoum Relief Expedition, and the Defence of India, 1885-1900",
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 6 (Nay 1978), 273-74;
'!Memorandum by Lieutenaat-General Brackenbury Director of Military
Intelltgence ..." (1889), V.0. 33/49; Pleetwood Wilson (Stanhope' a
private secretary) to Col. J.C. Ardagh, 15 Aug. 1889, .Ardagh Fapers,
P.R.0. 30/40/13.
30. Imperial Defence (Lond. 1897), 142-158.
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preoccupied with Indian defence, and. dismissed all supposition that
Britain might have even a limited military role in rope as
chimerical. 3' The royal Duke of Conriaught sided tentatively with
Roberts. 32
 Sir William Gosset, Viscount Chelmsford.'s military
secretary during the Zulu war and Sir George Trevelyan, formerly in
Gladstone's cabinet, argied on identical lines to Dilke. 33
 Other
less well-known commentators echoed these views. 34
 By the 1890s,
therefore, the debate over army organisation had become complicated
by a most interesting development. The situation was becoming less
and less one of a simple contrast between traditiona].istb and. the
"young army school" to which Wolseley referred so often in his auto-
biography. 35
 Two equally progressive groups were proposing solutions
to current problems based. upon differing interpretations of the needs
of imperial defence. The voice of the traditional school, with its
assaults upon the Cardwell system, was becoming rarely heard. and. then
36
without its old. vehemence.	 Those who have been distingui.shed as
31. The British Amy (Lond. 1888), 4-5
32. Report of the Committee appointed to Consider the Terms and Conditions
of Service in the Arnw Minutes of evidence, 318-19. P.P. (C. 6582,
1892), 19.
33. Thid, 139; Hansard., 3rd. series, 333 (ii March 1889), cols.
1435-37. Gosset arranged Chelmsford's private papers, somewhat obtrusively.
34. A General Officer, "Army Reform", Army and Navy Magazine 2 (May-Oct.
1881), 798-808; C. Raleigh Chichester, "Short-Service and its Supporters",
Blackwood's Edinburgi Magazine 129 (Jan.-June 1881), 591-601; Maj. H.
Pearse, "Squeezed. Lemons: Or, Home Battalions and. the Army Reserve",
U.S.M. n.s. 9 (May-Sept. 1894), 474-80; Hansard, 4th. series. 2 (7
March 1892), col. 195 (R.W. Hanbury).
35. The Story of a Soldier's Life (Westminster 1903), II, 226-56.
36. E.g., comment by Lieut.-Col. P.T. Wintle upon P.N. Naude, "Economical
Ar&y- Reform", J.R.U.S.I. 42 (1898), 1266); comment by Naj..-Gen. R.L.
Dashwood. upon Col. J.D.Legard, "Army Re-organisation ...", ibid., 249-52.
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continentalists showed, at least in their professional capacity, a
curious oblivion to broad questions of national defence altogether.
There was no lack of response to these critics. The cornerstone
of the various apologies advanced was that, as Bernard Shaw was to
remark mockingly of Christianity, the Cardwell system did not work
because it had. never been properly tried. Political inertia and the
drag of the old school ensured that the size of the arnn,y was riot
adjusted to its growing imperial responsibilities. Accordingly, the
draft system was continually distorted and the efficiency of the home
battalions undermined. It is not easy t' assess the force of the
apologists' case. It has carried conviction with at least one
historian. 37 But the work of Dr. Skelley suggests that even had the
prescription of the Caidwellites been followed to the letter, the
recruiting problem would have proved the stumbling block to all their
good intentions. Nonetheless, their diligence In seeking to answer
the needs of imperial defence within the existing system was not
destitute of results.
Prom the first, Wolseley and. his closest associates were identi-
fled in the public mind with Cardwell's reforms, and Wolseley's friend
and disciple, J.P. Maurice, proved one of their most eloquent def en-
ders. Reviewing in the Quarterly of 1892 the reforms of the previous
twenty years, he lamented that their initial implementation had been
- entrusted to those who deeply opposed them. The reformers could.
introduce changes, but traditionalists could prevent them being
properly carried out:
It was an attempt to pour new wine into old bottles, and. it
met with the usual fate of that experiment. It was not
37. Barer, op.	 87-92.
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possible to select as the generals command.ing districts, or
as the lieutenant-colonels commanding battalions, men who
would infuse the new ideas among their subordinates, for the
head. of the Army avowed his disapproval of the ideas them-
selves, and., wherever possible, selected those who shared his
own opinions and eentiments.38
Likewise, Wolseley insisted that the Caxdwell system was faulty not
in conception but in aiiTnirlistration. 39 Every small war provided him
with the opportunity to eulogize the modern soldier. He wrote, for
instance, with typical assurance of the Eptian campaign: "I hope
we have now silenced for ever all the old fogies who have for some
years past talked. so much nonsense about young soldiers and. the
iniquity of those who favoured Army Reform". 4° General Sir John Adye
used his great authority as a military administrator to argne, mflar].y,
that the Cardwell system provided the framework for all other reforms
of the late nineteenth oeiitury.41
The Wantage enquiry gave the Cardwellites the opportunity for a
concerted expression of their views. In testimony before this
committee Wolseley indeed described the home battalions to be like
38. "The War Office and the Anity", Quarterly Review 183 (Jan.-April
1896), 196.
39. Maj.-Gen. Sir Garnet Wolseley, "Our Army Reserve", (Jan. 1875),
W.O. 33/26; Report of the Committee appointed to Consider the Terms
and Conditions of Service in the Army Minutes of evidence, 153-68,
273-87. pp. (0.6582, 1892), 19.
40. Wolseley to i)ampbell-Bannerman, 28 Sept. 1882 , Campbell-Bannexmafl
Papers, B.M. Add. I1ss. 41232 if. 23.
41. "Recruiting of the British Army: the. 01d Systems and the New",
(Aug. 1880), V.0. 33/35; Recollections of a Military Life (Lond..
1898), Ch. 23, passim.
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squeezed lemons, and his remarks have sometimes been taken to imply
that he was questioning the principle of balanced battalions. Like
most famous phrases which have passed into common parlance, this one
was misquoted from the original. What Wolseley actually said was
that, if the present imbalance of battalions persisted, "they (the
home units) will be like a lemon when all the juice is squeezed out
of it, they will be of little fighting use
	
,,42 Plainly, this
was a criticism of the conduct of the system. Other notables who
adopted this viewpoint included Redvers Buller, Henry- Hallam Parr,
and Evelyn Wood. 43 Sir Patrick MacDougall represented the extreme
of the defence, arguing that if his localisation reports had. been
followed in their entirety:
neither Lord Airey t s Committee nor that of Lord Wantage
would ever have bee.a assembled, since there would have been
no failure or breakdown to inquire into, and all the fume and.
froth of the angry discussions that have since raged around
the subject would have been avoided, as well as the labour's of
the many committees assembled in this much committee-ridden age
and country.
Many of the apologists, indeed, refused to accept that "breakdown"
was an accurate word to describe the afficulties through which the
system was passing. Sir Arthur Haliburton (Assistant Under-Secretary
1891-95), in his lengthy and celebrated dissent from acme of the
42. Report, op. cit., 154.
43. Ibid, 5-6 391, (Gen. Sir Red.vers Buller), 56-64 (Col. H.H. Parr),
42 (Lieut-Gen. Sir LE. Wood).
44. "The Inefficiency of the Army: A Reply", Blackwood's Edinburgh
Magazine 152 (July-Dec. 1892), 68.
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Vantage recommendations, argued that much of the obloquy heaped upon
the system was excessive. 45 Its severest critics could not deny its
contributions to the mobilisation of manpower. The reserve had been
called a paper army, a chimera which would not materialise when needed.
Prom 1878 it became less easy to make this charge. In that year,
during the Russian war scare, the entire reserve was inobilised. Only
470 failed to report themselves to the depots. There was a similar
response when the whole of the reserve was called up in anticipation
of the Erptian expedition, and required in 1890-91 and 1891-92 to
report for magazine rifle training. 6 The reservists drawn upon for
the test mobilisation of 1895 responded almost to a man, and the
commanding officer spoke in glowing terms of their standards.47
In parenthesis, it may be noticed that the Cardwellites often
used rhet',ric which contrasts strangely with the language employed by
some historians to describe the military institutions of Victorian
Britain. Henry Knollys, a minor military theorist and progressive
tactician, was distressed at the way in which the British army was
"constantly absurdly underrated in foreign countries and intermittently
belittled in its own	 ,,48 In an interesting essay on the
45. Report, op. cit., 33-62. P.P. (C.6582, 1892), 19.
46. mid, appendix XXVIII, 533.
47. "Report of the Mobilization of the 1st. Brigade, by Naj.-Gen.
(p.s.) Methuen, Comindg. Home District", (1895), V.0. 33/55; and.
"Memorandum by the Marquess of Lansdowne to the Cabinet of 15th
December 1897", Report of His Majesty's Commissioners appointed to
Ingui:e into the War in South Africa, Appendix B, 250. P.P (C.1789,
1904), 40. The evidence laid before t1ie Wazitage enquiry ac least
ended. sweeping generalisations about "boy regiments"; in 1891, only
20,190 of the home rank and. file were under 20 years of age. Report,
op. cit. Minutes of Evidence, 289 (Col. A.E. Goldsmid).
48. Col. Henry Knollys, "English Officers and Siiers - As They Will
Be", Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine 159 (Jan.-June 1896), 199.
52.
organisatiorial demands of imperial expansion, Colonel J. Duncan
lavished eflouns upon the current state of the army; it was, he
wrote, elevated to a standard beyond that imagined by the "most sanguine
army reformers • . .	 Others claimed that only the failure to expand
the army in consonance with the empire stopped it from rivalling any
50
army in the world in efficiency. Even Ian Tmilton, hero worshipper
of Lord Roberts, wrote in retrospect:
The British Empire has been raised to its present dizzy height
by the profound imaginings of a mere handful of great men
Cardwell was one of the great men; or, if not, at least he
was grAatly advised. Consider that exquisitely cunning
device, that system of his, which guarantees the sovereign
sheep against their sheepishness.5'
However chauvinistic the basis for suc.h remarks,' they reflect the
growing sense of an insular and imperial tradition of army reform.
The clarity with which differing interpretations of the Cardwell
system had emerged by the last decade of the century is shown in a
series of prize essays published by the R.U.S.I. in 1893 on "The
Military Organization Best Adapted to Imperial Needs". The winner
of the first prize followed Roberts to the letter. 52 Major J. Adye,
49. "The Military Organization Best Adapted to Imperial Needs",
J.R.U.S.I. 37 (1893), 713.
50. Cap. G.P. HLlison, "The English Military System", 1.S.M. n.s.
16 (Oct. 1897-March 1898), 449-62; Col. W.T. Dooner; "The Organisation
of our Infantry with Reference to Foreign RelitZs", U.S.M. n.s. 16
(Oct. 1897-March 1898), 337-48.
51. Col. Ian pm{lton The Soul and Body of an Army (Loud. 1921), 4-5.
52. Essay by Lieut.-Col. J. Farquharson, J.R.U.S.I. 37 (1893), 329-60.
S
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the second prize-winner, took the existing organisation as his text. Its
main principles were, to his mind, harmonious with the character of
British military liabilities. Like J.P. Maurice, Adye differed
slightly from the Stanhope memorandum in believing that the axnr
should be ready for continental action on a very limited scale.53
The third prizewinner concentrated upo'i the need. to develop a striking
force. 54
 Colonel Duncan, whose essay has been cited immediately
above, wrote on similar lines to Adye, advocating also a national arnr
for home defence in the style which was to be widely proposed after
the South African war. 55
 None reconunended a reversion to the old
ways.
By the 1880s, therefore, reformers who espoused Cardwellian
principles faced a problem which the years of debate had somewhat
clarified. The short service and localisation system provided the
framework for all other reforms. But it was aparent that, however
admirable the basic conceptions of Cardwell and. MacDougall, these
alone could not supply the expeditionary potential needed for
colonial campaigns, not to consider action on the continent. The
plan of 1875 could only be regarded as a spur to further reform.
For the administrators of the 1880s and. 1890s, the task was to
develop preparations for war comparable, on however limited a scale,
to the mobilisation schemes of the continent, and. yet to ensure the
flexibility demanded by imperial warfare.
53. Essay by Maj. J. Adye (author of Soldiers and Others I have Known
(Lond. 1925), and. to be distinguished from Gen. Sir John Adye), J.LU.S.I
37 (1893), 443-90; J.P. Maurice, The Balance of Military- Power in J'urop
(Lond.. 1888, first pub. Portnightiview). Maurice argued that if
Britain ere to form a limited, military alliance wi th Germany, European
peace would be ensured; the cheque signed by Britain would never be drawn.
54. Essay by Naj. H.W. Pearse, J.R.U.S.I. op. cit., 579-620.
55. Ibid., 713-33.
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The first initiative to modify the mobilisation scheme of 1875
seems to have been taken by Gnera1 Sir Charles Ellice, Adjutant
General to the Forces 1876-82. Between 1877 and 1880 he composed a
series of searching memoranda in which he analysed the recent perfor-
mance of the Cardwell system in providing for small wars. Ellice's
own opinion of the new reforms is not quite clear. That he opposed
them on principle Is not borne out by the sober and balanced arguments
of his memoranda. He was certainly detested by Wolseley, who called
him "a wretched devil of no origin & of no repute as a soldier, nor of
any ability except as a oourtier". 6 But Wolseley felt antipathy
towards so vast a number of people that this remark alone does not
indicate much. Ellice did., however, sympathize with the proposals
of the Airey committee to 'iodify drastically the terms of short
service. 57 He maybe regarded as a mcderate critic of the system,
but the chief concern of his memoranda was to draw attention to the
need for an expeditionary element in the general organisation of the
58
army.
The immediate outcome of the Adjutant General's initiative was
the formation of an intra-War Office committee to investigate the
speciflc'aubject of organisation for small wars. Their report abdes
by Card.wellian principles, and its strictures were directed. at the
authorities' failure te maintain the stipulated establishments. The
56. Wolseley to Ladr Wolseley, 20 March 1880, Volseley Papers, Hove,
W/P 9.
57. Minute of 3 April 1880, W.O. 33/35; Report of a Committee on
Army Reorganisation p. p. (C.2791, 1881), 21.
58. Minute of 3 April, op. cit.; Minute of 25 June 1880; "Memorandum
on the Working of the Double, or Linked Battalion System", (n.d. prob.
1880); Minute of 25 July 1877; Minute of 19 Jan. 1878. All W.O. 33/35.
Ellice advocated the politically unacceptable measure of embodying the
militia of a sub-district if both battalions should be abroad.
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committee did not seem to consider that their brief included any matter
beyond the rank and file available for expeditionary purposes. They
contented themselves with recommending that the home battalions should
be kept to a level such that in each battalion there would, be at least
500 rank and. file of 20 years old. and upwards. This involved request-
ing, fri.itlessly, that the infantry be increased by 10,000 men.59
Wolse1eys similar plea on the eve of the South African war was to be
more successui.60 At least the counnittee's report indicated, that
some Card,wellian reformers were willing to admit that the origin'i-
scheme had. been framed to meet a static situation and that some
modification was imperative. Who wrote the Committee's report is
not recorded in the dricial files, but an entry in Wolseley's private
journals indicates that he was a leading member.6l
Thus far, all discussions of mobilisation, save those concerned.
with particular campaigns, had been preoccupied 'with numerical
questioLs of personnel. When, in 1886, Henry Brackenbury addressed
his remarkable mind to planning for war, material as well as men
began to receive serious consideration. Hitherto, many reformers
had. seemed to think that readiness for war lay chiefly in having a
sufficiency of men eai1able for an emergency. It was Brackenbury's
great virtue to persuade such of his collea1gues as were amenable that,
59. "Draft report of a Committee assembled at the War Office ... to
report on the effects of Short Service on the preparedness for War of
the ArTxry", (n.d.), W.0. 33/35 (1880).
60. Report of His Majesty's Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into
the War in South Africa, appendix D, docs. 1-5. P.P. (C.1789, 1904),
40; Minutes of evidence, 523 (Lord Lansdowne). 	 .(C.l791, 1904)
41.	 -
6. "South African Journal 1879-80", entry for 8 June 1879 W.O. 147/7.
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on the relevant scale, Britain could essay preparations for war
qualitatively as comprehensive as those of Germany or any other great
power.
Brackenbury was ideally suited to this task. Like Wolseley, he
was a man of flair and. imagination, responsive to every new wave of
thougiat that stirred the military world. Unlike Wolseley,
Brackenbury possessed the capacity for prolonged and exhaustive
eyin4 nation of abstruse and tedious subjec as the records of his
labours testify. Professionally, he bore marked similarities to Sir
George Clarke, the future secretary of the Committee of Imperial
Defence. Both devoted their early careers to a detailed study of
their respective arms; Clarke's analysis of the battles of Plevna
was a masterpiece of military erudition. Both then turned their
attentior to the broad issues of national defence and. cid their
greatest work therein. They exemplified the new brand of bureau-
cratic soldiers, but were marked by a breadth of knowledge and
(.	
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analytical ability rate in any profession.
In 1886 Brackenbury, then Deputy Quartermaster—General, was
ordered by Edward Stanhope to work
out in detail the troops we should. require for the rein-
forcements of our Colonial Garrisons & imperial fortresses
abroad, (exclusive of India) in case of war with a great
62. Impressions of Brackenbury derived from his articles in the
civilian and military press, his correspondence with Lord. Roberts
(National Army M.u.oum), his memoirs, Some Memories of My Spare Time
(Lond. 1909), as well as his icial memoranda and evidence before
parliamentary committees. Impressions of Clarke derived. from his
My Working Life (Lond. 1927), his Plevna (vol. 5 of the P.P.LE.),
and numerous references to him in John Gooch, The Plans of War
(Lond. 1974), anil. Nicholas D'Ombrain, War Machinery and. High Policy
(o.u.P. 1973).
57.
maritime power and. for the defence of the fortresses & mercantile
seaports, at home • 63
Thus commissioned., Brackenbury drew up a series of memoranda which
comprehensively surveyed Britain's military position. This was not
the first general survey in our period of the empire's military
liabilities and resources; the early seventies bad. oroduced scores
of such wide-ranging exminAtions. 6 	Brackenbury's work seems to have
been unprecedented in dealing not only in general blueprints for ref orm,
but in a mass of precise information to support these. The data was
presented in such a fashion that it illuminated rath.r than obscured
the object nf his exercise and. the force of his conclusions.
His inquiries revealed that, after provision for defensive measures
necessary in case of a major emergency, there was virtually no field
ar left. An inter±nr rpuLt outlined the standing absolute deficien-
cies (that is, before mobilisation of a field arnty-) and the still more
alarming gaps which would occur in the event of a major war. The con-
clusion which emerged was as follows. Once all regular, volunteer,
and militia artillery and engineers had been called upon, there were
deficiencies of fifteen garrison batteries and. of forty-six R.E.
companies. Britain's home and. overseas ports thus lacked. proper
protection against full-scale attack. Insufficient numbers of
commissariat and ordnance store officers existed to supply the two
army corps of the proposed field. force. This was so after every
station in the U.K. had been hypothetically depleted of the first
63. Brackenbury to Sir frederick Roberts, 10 Aug. 1886 , Roberts Papers,
National Arnr Nuseum, 7101-23, file 11; "Nemorandum of the Secretary of
State relating to the Army Estimates", (27 Feb. 1887), 9. LL (c.4985,1887), 50.
64. Dozens may be found. in the unclassifiec. series preserved in the
British Library as Tracts Relating to Nilitary Affairs, 1870-75,
1870-72 , 1864-1901, 1867-73, and. 1879-81.
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service and every out—station of the second. The medical staff corps
and. the veterinary department were in a similar position, and. there
was a deficiency of nearly 20,000 horses after every axur horse at home
had been allotted to the two corps. "I fear that when these troops
are all told off, there will be no field amy left! U, Brackenbury wrote
in alarm to Roberts. 6
	This numerical analysis was accompanied by a
strategical survey of the current military situation in Europe.
Clearly, Brackenbury was rea3y to anticipate continental action on a
limited scale, although the immediate threat to British security was
taken, of course, to emanate from Russia. Brackenbury's chief con-
cern was to show that any involvement in the affairs of the great
powers would threaten imperial security. To produce an amny corps,
Bjtain resources would be strained to the utmost, and her home
stations would, be stripped of their services and thrown into ad.mini-
strative confusion. The gravamen of his argumehts was that Britain
should seek to rival the foreii powers not in the scale of her
mobilisation but in its readiness:
In every other civilized nation, the axixr is based upon the
requirements of the nation in case of war, and. the necessary
war establishment being fixed, the peace establishment is
deduced from it ... In this country there never has been,
so far as can be traced, any attenpt to settle what number
of troops we require to place in the field in case of war
with a great Power, exclusive of our necessary home and




It is not under existing conditions that those who are
behind the scenes can view with calm the possible alliance of
Prance and. Russia against England. How different our position
would be, how easy our minds, were we conscious that we could
place even two completely organized Army Corps, a force of
60,000 trained fighting troops, in line to oppose our enemies
abroad or at home, in pursuance of a well-matured plan of
offence or defence! 6
Unlike the compilers of the 1875 scheme, Braokenbury did. not rest
content with presenting a picture of the army's deficiencies. Having
made clear his concern with grand strategy, he then left matters of
policy altogether and sought to ascertain what could be achieved with
the force ac.tually available. In doiLg so he was fulfilling Stanhope' a
intentions. As the secretary of state made clear to the House, his
first preoccupation was with what the army could do in the immediate
future, rather than with what it might do in the remote contingency
of war with a great power. 6
 According to this brief and assisted by
Ralph Knox, the Accountant-General, Brackenbury had completed by the
end. of 1886 a tri-partite report on army mobilisation. Two major
features mark this document. First, while conceived on the basis of
continental examples, the plans showed their authors' readiness at
every hand to make concessions to the needs of an imperial power.
On balance, Brackenbury and. Knox evidently thought it desirable to
bring Britain into line with Europe so far as imperial circumstances
66. Maj.-Gen. H. Brackenbuiy, "General Sketch of the Situation at Home
and. Abroad from a Military Standpoint", (3 Aug. 1886), 19, 20, 22, and.
pssim 1-22; Minute of 23 Sept. 1886. Both V.0. 33flS.
67. "Memorandum of the Secretary of State relating to the Army Estimates",
op. cit., 9-10.
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would allow. Secondly, and what is most noticeable to a modern reader,
these plans were drawn up in a strategic vacuum. Whatever Brackenbuxy a
views on the policy which should be adopted towards Russian expansion,
he allowed them no scope in the official report. The basic assumption
was simply that Britain should. be ready to mobilise a small expeditionary
force in an emergency. Within these severe limitations, the mobilisation
report was a milestone in British preparation for war.
The plans dealt purely with existing cadres and supposed no material
increase in the establishments. Numerically, the three m4n services
were in a relatively strong position, and Brackenbury therefore merely
suggested minor alterations in the structure of units in order to bring
them into conformity with their European counterparts. Thus, it was
proposed that the battalions in a brigade would be increased. from three
to four, and that a rifle battalion be attached to the corps troops.
Otherwise, only a little time was needed to bring the infantry into
consonance with the two corps standard. In 1886, the reserve was
sufficient to fill up to war strength the two corps and furnish the home
and colonial fortress garrisons. Some 9,000 men were needed to corn-
plete the forces in India and. Erpt to wax strength, and this deficiency
was being yearly rethiced. A major change in the war organisation of
the cavalry was recommended. Its existing paper organisation, whereby
the six divisions of the two arnr corps received a cavalry regiment
each, and the remaining three available cavalry regiments were to form
an independent brigade, was to be replaced by an arrangement whereby
each army corps was to have only one regiment and the remainder of the
cavalry were to form an independent cavalry division, such as every
other great power possessed. This recommendation, as a subsequent
chapter will show, derived from the prevalent assumptions about the
strategic role of cavalry in modern war. The reserve for this arm
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was only 500 short of the number required to bring establishments
everywhere in the empire up to war strength.
In the artillery, the proportion of guns to troops rivalled that
of other powers; the report therefore recommended that, in conformity
with the supposed requirements of modern artillery tactics, a separate
artillery division be formed from the batteries presently attached to
the army corps. As an economy device, four horse artillery batteries
at home were to be converted into field. For the commiesariat and.
transport, it was proposed to maintain small cadres susceptible of
expansion in time of war. Knox and. Brackenbury accepted, however,
that the majority of supply personnel for an emergency would have to
be enlisted as needed. Similarly, it was inevitable that civil
practitioners would be called upon to aunent the medical staff upon
mobilisation. Ordnance stores were sufficient for the two army corps.
To rectify the deficiency of more than 15,600 hoises, commercial owners
of suitable animals were to be asked to make them available whenever
the other reserves were called. up. For this concession the owners
were to receive a small remuneration,68
Part II of the report considered home defence, a matter later
envfned exhaustively br J.C. .Ardagh. Herein Brackenbury and. Knox
recommended some minor redistribution and. an increase in the R.E. of
eleven companies and. in the garrison artillery of four batteries.6
The final part urged the authorities to begin immediate work on the
mobilisation scheme for one arny corps, and set out the principles
to guide such preparation. Units of the first army corps were to be
kept on the highest establishments and. quartered at specified stations,
68. Reports of a Committee on Army Mobilisation: Part I: Field Army,
passixa (1-15). -
69. Thid, part II: Garrisom.
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reserves of equipment were to be built up at the depots of these
stations, points of disembarkation were to be selected, and the
Admiralty supplied with all relevant information.70
These documents show that British p1nning for war was taking on
its characteristically dual form. On the one hand, the authors of
the report were dealing with the full-scale mobilisation of all
auxiliary and. regular forces for home defence. On the other hmti,
they were thinking in terms of a small field army to serve anywhere
in the world, as the empire's trouble-shooter or in aid. to a continem-
tal ally. This two-fold mobilisation was essential to britain, lack-
ing as she did the degree to which localisation was carried in Germany
and Prance. Nevertheless, and according to the reports of 1886, both
aspects of British preparation for war were to be encompessed. within a
single framework. Brackenbury and Knox stressed that if due provision
'1ere made for Brjtajn's special circumstances, such a scheme could.
embrace both home defence and all the expeditionary forces she was ever
likely to need. In this vein they concluded their investigation:
We can never hope to reach the sane perfect!.on of
mobilisation as those fordgn nations whose very existence
depends on their being first in the field, but if our
recmmendations be carried into effect the Secretary of State
-	 may hope, within a reasonable time, to see our small army in
as complete a stat of preparation for war as the peculiar
conditions of our service admit.71
70. Ibid., part III: Mobilization for Foreign Service.
71. Ibid., 2.
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Over the next thirteen years, the work of mobilisation proceeded apace
upon these lines, though sorely limited, by the lack of consultation
with India and the absence of inter.-bervice planning.
The years following Brackenbury' s enquiry witnessed two allied
developments. First, preparation for wax was at last placed firmly
within the context of a policy statement on the army's role. Second,
a number of minor but significant steps were taken to render the
mobilisation scheme a reality rather than a paper outline. In 1897,
Major-General Sir Charles Grove (Military Secretary 1895-1901), wrote
that Brackenbury's scheme never "received authoritative approval or the
reverse". 72
 This statement would not seem to have been correct.
Both in principle and in detail the mobilisation reports of 1886
received considerable endorsement over thi ensuing years, although
their confidential recommendations did not undergo the' formal examina-
tion of a report laid. before the House. Some minor points were not
cairied. out. The conversion of horse into field batteries was set
aside, and the British axiay fought both world wars with three battalions
in a brigade. 73
 But the deficiencies in the Royal Engineers were
rectified in the 1887-88 estimates, and the garrison artillery
establishment raised. 74
 More importantly, Edward Stazthope (Secretary
of State for Wax January 1887 to September 1892) publicly stated in
1888 that mobilisation work was under war in accordance with the
reports of 1886. Its main principles, he remarked, "were accepted
72. "Short Sketch of the Rise and Progress of the Mobilisation Scheme",
(ii ITov. 1897), 247. Report of His Maj-sty's Commissioners Appointed to
Inquire into the War in South Africa P.P. (C.1789, 1904), 40.
73. Ransard. ,3rd. series, 337 (18 June 1889), aol. 179.
Core].li Baxnett , Britain and Her Army (Penguin 1970), 468.
74. "Memorandum of the Secretary of State relating to the Arxr, Estimates",
13. P.P. (C.4985, 1887), 50.
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by all my inilitaxy advisers and it has ever since that tine formed the
standard up to which we have desired to work
Moreover, the two corps principle was embodied in the most sigmi-
ficant statement on army policy of the period, the oft-quoted and.
somewhat infamous Stanhope memorandum. Therein those who had been
appealing for a definition of the army's role found. their response,
though not one in accord in every reformer's convictions. 1888 was a
year of great and perhaps unprecedented concern with defence, domestic
and. imperiai. 6 Stanhope could not have been otherwise than deeply
influenced by the atmosphere of public opinion in that year. But it
is apparent that the immediate impulse for the Stanhope memorandum came
from the 1886 reports and. a subsequent initiative on the part of
Wolseley. Prom his point of vievi, Stanhope merely spelt out what
had been the convictions of many reformers for a number of years.
As early as 1875 Wolseley had. urged that an autharitative context be
established for the detailed work of anxr reform:
Before we proceed to discuss what our military force should
consist of, it is, I think, essential that we should have clear
views as to what objects we wish to secure by its means; its
raison dtre to be well understood before we proceed to discuss
its strength or organisation.
There is a seming absence of plan and. of fixed military
principles for all our military establishments, nor would it
75. "Reply by th Right Hon. E. Stanhope to a Deputation of Members of
Parliament on the Subjeoc of National Defence", (9 May 1888), V.0.
33/48.
76. Howard Noon, "The invasion of the U.K.: public controversy and
official planning, 1888-1918", (Lond. Ph.D. thesis 1968), 379-428,
shows how much of this was attributable to the invasion scare.
eviaence, iui. k'..t.
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appear that any positive decision has been arrived at, having
in view the altered conditions of military affairs and. of
military sciences throughout the world, as to what the
requirements are, that the ar ia meant to secure, much less
the number of men and. the organisation to be given them in order
to secure these objects.77
Despite these appeals to authority, Wolseley was far from hesitant
to give his own views on the matter. He was one of the most prominent
reformers t', express the conviction that "we ought to make our organza-.
tion and our system of drill to suit the warfare that is in fact our
norma]. condition of existence, and. not the abnormal wars that perhaps
,78once or twice in a century may be forced upon us'. 	 Testifying
before the Stephen commission of 1887, Wolseley echoed his earlier
complaint that military planners were operating dthin a vacuum.79
Pina.11y, writing to the secretary of state in June 1888, Wolseley not
only appealed again for a definition of the army's functions but set
out his own ideas on the subject. In preface to a s nTn.ry of the
desirable peace establishments of the army, Wolseley wrote:
It is necessary to bear in mind that those who have -to
organize the military forces of the Crown, are left in
77. Maj.-Gen. G.J. Wolseley "Our Any Reserve", (Jan. 1875), 3,
W.O. 33/26.
78. Comment upon Col. Edward Clive, "The Influence of Breech-Loading
Arms on Tactics ...", J.R.U.S.I. 22 (1879), 862 and 859-62, and
si.i1ar1y comments upon Col. C.B. Brackenbury , "The Latest Development
of the Tactics of the Three Arms", J.R.U.S.I. 27 (1883), #8l.
79. Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Ingvire into the
sv-stem under which PattemB of Warlike Stores are Ad.onted and. the
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ignorance of the specific objects which that organization should
aim at. For what purposes does the Army exist? What are its
duties and the national objects it is meant to fulfill? Is the
Army only intended for the passive defence of the United Kingdom,
or is the passive defence of all our foreign possessions also
to be provided for? Is it necessary to provide for the organi-
zation and. equipment of axiy field army to operate on foreign
soil, or even on British soil beyond the seas? And. if so, what
is to be the size of the field army? ... until clear decisions
have been given upon them (these questions) by Parliament, or by
the Government on the part of the nation, the military advisers
of the Crown will be forced to work on comparatively in the dark,
and in a haphazard fashion with no clearly—defined or weU-
understood aim, or military policy before them.
Nonetheless, Wolseley went on to argue that the basic duties of
the army were indisputable. These were: the support of the civil
authorities in the U.K.; provision of garrisons for India, fortified
places at home and coaling stations abroad; the mobilisation upon
emergency of three army corps at home (including auxiliaries) and of
two army corps (reg,ilar and. reserve) for expeditionary purposes, with
their attendant cavalry and services. The remtiier of the paper
considered the slight changes in establishments which, in Wolseley's
opinion, were necessary to fulfill these functions. 8° By the end of
the year, Wolseley had the response he desired. In a memorandum
sanctioning negligible increases in the establishments, Stanhoe laid
down, c.lmost word, for word, the functions of the army as set out by
80. ?Iinute of 8 June by Gem. Viscount Wolseley, A.G. to the Forces
(June 1888), passiin, quo.l., V.0. 33/48, and. repr. Report rf His
M,4ga+rIa	 A r,sjy.±R +r Tnrnv p. in+, +I	 vi rs11+l'l
Africa Appendix D, 217-23. P.P. (C.l789, 1904), 40.
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Wo].seley. The only material difference was that the mobilisation of
the two army corps was to be the same for home and. expeditionary
purposes; that is, the arny was to be able to mobilic3e, on short
notice, two army corps for an emergency at home or abroad. Stanhope
did not, therefore, insist upon a purely defensive approach to war
planning. But, as a cautionary rider, he added. the notorious
"improbable probability":
But it will be distinctly understood that the probability of
the emplonnent of an Arnr Corps in the field. in any European
war is sufficiently improbable to make it the primary duty of
the military authorities to organise our forces efficiently for
81the defence of this country.
In an abbreviated form, these points were embodied. three years later
82in the document usually cited as the Stanhope memorandum.
During the same period, Major-General E.P. Chapman, Director-
General of Military Intelligence in 1892, described the role of the
arny in memoranda similar to Wolseley's paper of 1888. Chapman added
a further duty, namely, that the home arnr should be capable of rein-
forcing India in the event of war with Russia. Moreover, the D.M.I.
favoured an Anglo-German alliance against prance and a continental
role for he British arnr. Stanhope's anger was aroused by these
- suggestions. Upon the proposal to reinforce India he minuted: "Is
this (to pronounce on such matters) in any way part of his duty", and
when Chapman circulated. the documents within the War Office without
prior permission, Starihope rebuked him in the severest terms.83
81. "Minute of the Secretary of State laying down the requirements from
(sic) our Army, dated 8th December 1888", W.O 33/56, repr. Report,
op . cit., appendix IV, 225. P.P. C.l789, 1904), 40.
82. "rther paper i?y the Secretary of Sta-1e laying down the requirementsfrom our army ...", (1 June 1891), W.0. 33/56, repr. Report, op. cit., 225
83. Memoranda by Naj.-Gen. E.P. Chapman, 22 Dec. 1891 and 12 Jan. 1892,
With. marginilia by Stanhope, and note upon minute by Capt. J.M. Grierson,
16 Nov. 1891., Stanhope Papers, U 1590/0267.
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The reason for Stanhope's reaction may simply have been that he
was justifiably annoyed. by Chapman's departure from the normal, procedures.
But(is equally likely that Stanhope considered that his response to
Wolseley's initiative had closed the debate on the role of the army.
Although addressed to the Secretary of State, Wolseley's memorandum had.
not been without presumption. Both soldiers had emphatically laid down
what the government should define as tlie army's functions. Wolseley's
statement, however, of what the army should do was nearly identical with
what it could do at its current stren-th. Chapman's ideas involved a
new departure, in which the army' a current capability would be much
exceeded by the demands of the duties he wanted it to discharge. This
fact may explain Stanhope' a annoyance with. Chapman's initiative and his
quiet acceptance of Wolseley's blueprint. There seems to be no
evidence, however, to suggest that Wolseley was unhappy with the secretary
of state's praatidraponse. It was interpreted very differently by
Sir Coleridge Grove, who voiced in 1897 what was to become the standard
criticism of the Stanhope policy after the South African war. To his
mind, Stanhope had received a clear statement of the axixy's weaknesses
from Brackenbury and Wolseley, and. had defined its functions according
to these deficiencies rather than according to the military needs of
the empire:
By laying down as the ultimate oranisation to be aimed at,
the imperfect and provisional arrangements which were the best
that the Mobilisation Section could temporarily hinmer out,
Mr. Stanhope's minute barre the way to the attainment of a
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satisfactory or efficient military system.84
Nonetheless, Stanhope did. set the military planners a realistic
standard, and to dismiss his policy as purely motivated by economy seems
to be an oversimplification. It is not easy to read. his private corres-
pondence and the memoranda which accompanied his presentation of the
annual estimates without feeling that national defence mattered as much
to him as fimmcial stringency. 85 A politician could not by-pass
finmcial questions in the way the military members of the Wa Office
tended to do. In setting or rather accepting the two corps standard
Stanhope gave the planners of mobilisation a goal to aim at only
marginally greater than the existing capability of the army. By com-
parison, the eight corps scheme of 1875 gave a sense of farce when set
against the available military resources. The two corps st-i,àn-vd was
financially appealing and, aince it inv.1ved. the imtrod.ui±i of no
new terms, found easy acceptance. Nobilisation had become, therefore,
a "cry to conjure withtt66 and had been placed within the context of an
authoritative statement on policy. The subsequent stage was the
a'lministratjve refinement of the scheme and the institution of such
practical measures as peacetime permitted. During the last decade of
the centuxy reserve stores were accumulated and the procedures to be
followed on the declaration of war constantly revised and elaborated.
84. "Short Sketch of the Rise and. Progress of the ?Iobilisation. Scheme",
(11 Nov. 1897), 248, and. remarks in minutes of evidence, Report, op. cit.
p.p. (c.1789, 1904), 40 and P.P. (c.179o, 1904), 41. Also see, typically,
P.M. Sir William Robertson, Prom Private to Field-Marshal (Lond. 1921), 92.
85. Stanhope Papers, Naidstone, Kent; Memoranda of the Secretary of State
relating to the Army Estimates. Hanard. , 3rd. series, appendices to 333,
342, 350, 4th. series, appendices to 2, 9.
86. Hansard , 3rd. series, 337 (18 June 1889), col. 203.
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In 1887 Brackenbury found that the pressures upon his time were so
great that they precluded, his further work on mobilisation. At his
instance a new subdivision of the Intelligence department was created
to carry on the preparation for war. J.N. Grierson, then a rising
star of the Royal Artillery, was recalled from Erpt to supervise the
new sectton. Its duties embraced keeping a roster of units for
service at home and. abroad, mdntenance of statistical information on
numbers of men and. horses available for mobilisation, and the compila-
tion of plans for home defence. 87 Given a congenial environment for
such work b the invasion scares, Ardagh turned his attention to dove-
tailing the mobilisation plans with schemes for home defence. His
labours bore fruit in several minutes and. two major reports. 88 To a
large degree, these documents were paper schemes for the precise
measures to be taken upon declaration of war, and, in retrospect,
appear to be academic exercises. Nonetheless, ihe blueprints were
given practical value in that, because the regular corps for home
defence were identical with the expeditionary force, readiness for
the defence of Britain contributed directly to readiness for overseas
service.
Unlike the work of Brackenbury, the home defence schemes were
laid. before the Cabinet. Wolseley and other distinguished officers
urged that the government authorize planning for first (regular) and
second (auxiliary) lines of mobilisation and. the construction of
eazrthworks at strategic points around the capital. These measures,
87. La. memorandum by Col. J.C. Ardagh (n.d., Ca. 1890), Ardagh
PaperE., P.R.0. 30/40/13. The mobilisation and. intelligence sections were
remarried in 1901: Report, pp. cit. Minutes of evidence, 209 (Maj.—Gen.
J.C. Ardagh). P.P. (C.1790, 1904), 41
88. Preserved in Ardagh Papers, P.R.0. 30/40/13, and in W.0. 33;
reference is made to the latter collection. Col. J.C. Ardagh , "Defence
of England", (17 April 1888), and "The Defence of London", (16 July
1888), W.0. 33/48.
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Wolseley and his colleagues estimated, would cost £500,000. To rein-
force these proposals, Stanhope drew the first of Ardagh's reports to
cabinet attention. 69 Unsurprisingly, the £500,000 was not forthcoming,
but these plans were not simply lost in the War Office files. £20,000
was included in the 1889-90 estimates for the purchase of storage sites,
and. Ardai's home defence schemes were accepted in principle. Head-
quarter staff ey m-i-ned their feasibility on the ground itself, and
thirteen defensive sites were purchased, three of which had been given
provisional fortifications and. storage facilities by 1897. Some
£50, 000 had. been expended u pon this work by that date. 9° In view of
the success of the mobilisation of the first field force in 1899, there
is no reason to suppose that the home defence scheme would have proved
illusory if put to the test.
Preparation of the expeditionary force was similar; certainly
deficient but not merely limited to outlines on paper. Those who were
contemptuous of mobilisation work after 1886 seem to have had little
direct knowledge of progress within the War Office. Duke, in the
wings of public life after his divorce scandal of 1886, wrote mockingly
of "visionary" mobilisation schemes and. as late as 1898 declared that
it was impossible for the arny to transform its plans into reality.
Critics such as him simply failed to 4preciate what was taking place.91
89. Memorandum of 9 Nov. 1888 by Gen. Viscount Wolseley (A.G.), Maj.-.Gen.
Sir Redvers Thiller (Q.M.G.), Sir Lothian Nicholson (Inspector-Gen. of
Fortifications), and Maj.-Gen. H.J. Alderson (Director of Artillery),
Cab. 37/20, no. 49; Memorandum of 22 Nov. 1888 by Wolaeley, Col. T. aser,
and Naj.-Cen. Sir Coleridge Grove, Cab. 37/20, no. 49; "Defence of
England.", o p. cit., Cab. 37/21, no. 6.
90. Hansard, 3rd. seies 337 (18 June 1889), col. 202; Maj.-Gen. J.C.
Ardagh (Director of Military Intelligence) '!Memorandum on the (so-cafled
"Authorized. Scheme of Defence", and on the Defence of London", (1897),
V.0. 33/63.
9L The British .Arny (Lond.. 1888), 72, 204-15, 76, and. his Ar y Reform
(Lond.. 1898), 45-44. Similarly T. S. Sturmey ansi Louis Tebutt, The British
Ar&y and the Business of War (Lonsi. 1896), 10, 11, 29; Hansard. , 4th.
series., 22 (16 March 1894), cole. 519-20.
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In add.ition to the afore-mentioned preparations for home defence,
tables of reserve equipment were drawn up and regularly revised, and
depots of stores gradually brought up to their stipulated levels.
When depleted to supply an expedition, they were replenished as rapidly
as possible. 92 The standard. to be aimed at was laid down by the
reserve stores committee of 1888; to complete (rather than, as in
continental mobilisation, to equip from scratch) for war the two arny
corps and. the attendant cavalry and. line of coinxnunication troops.93
In 1893 standing tables for the men, supplies and equipment available
for part of the expeditionary force were compiled. By 1898 mobilisa-
tion tables for every t,rpe of unit had proliferated and were regularly
issued to comn ing officers. 94 As recommended by Brackenbury, a
system of registration of horses was begun and. some 14,000 were already
on the lists by l889. 	 This is not to deny that when war was declared
in 1899 there were cave deficiencies .n reserve stores, as simm'-rized
by Brackenbury himself in a well-known memorandum. 96 On the positive
side, however, there were 200 to 300 rounds per gun of ammunition in
reserve, 10,000 sets of infantry accoutrements, 5,000 tents, 100
hospital tents, and a few hundred sets of mounted infantry equipment.
92. Report of His Majesty's Commissioners Apointed to Inquire into the
War in South Afriça Minutes of evidence, 61 (Sir Ralph Knox, Peim. U.S.S.
1896-1900). P.P. (C.1790, 1904), 41; Hansard ,4th series 23 (23 April
1894), col. 13.
93. Report of Committee on Reserve Stores (13 Aug. 1888), W.O. 33/48.
94. 1.0. 127, Army Orders, 1893; 1.0. 107, Armj Orders, 1898.
95. Hanisard, 3rd. series, 337 (18 June 1889), aol. 179
96. "Minute by General Sir Henry Brackenbury, G.C.3., K.C.S.I., the
Director-General of Ordnance, of the 15th December, 1899", Report,
op. cit., appendix E, 278-80. P.1'. ( C.1789, 1904), 40.
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This seems to be meagre enough in comparison with the unanticipated.
demands of war. In comparison with the anticipated needs of the
initial field force, the deficiencies appear less glaring. It may be
borne in mind that the administration had been developing the reserves
of stores for scarcely more than a decade.
As elaborated on the eve of the South African war, the mobilisation
scheme appears to have been a rather masterly application of continental
models to British conditions. The reserve, short service, the very
concept of inobilisation, were all foreign ideas. As developed with-tn
Britain, they had taken on an insular aspect. The chief difference
between Britain arid the continental powers arose from the unique system
of British localisation. Rigid localisation in the armies of the great
European powers permitted the military authorities to lay it down that
a numbered army corps was to be quartered at specific places and to con-
sist of specified units. In the British arnr the place of forces in
the mobilisation scheme was defined by which units happened to be at
specified locations at any one tine. Thus, the composition of the
arxxsr corps was continually changing, a provision mrnifestly suited to
an imperial army whose constituents we.ce frequently on the move.97
Other minor differences abounded, some of which will be noticed
in later chapters. British army corps possessed a far smaller
proportion of regular cavalry to infantry and artillery than the ames
of Prance and Germany. 98 To what extent this reflects the greater
97. Above, 4, and. Irirty Book, 515, and enunciated in the Army List
(Dec. 1875), 109a.
98. Maj .-Gen. Henry Brackenbury, D. .M.G. • "Return Showing the
Proportion of Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery in Two Army-Corps and.
one Cavalry Division", (27 March 1887), W.O. 33/47.
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purity of cavalry traditions on the continent is speculative; it
could have been a matter of expense. Permanent machine gun units,
mounted infantry, mounted Royal Eugineer units, and signaller
companies were not represented in any European axr of the 1890s
except the British.99
 It will be shown below that the first two
services seem to have been established in direct response to exper-
iences in colonial warfare. The most glaring defect in the mobilisa,-
tion scheme remained the absence of permanent staff for the higher
units. Temporary staff cadres formed during small wars provided
valuable training for coirmianding officers, and. the administrative
demands of standing staff appointments in the War Office and the
educational, establishments should not be under-estimated. None-
theless, the fundamental deficiency remained; in the home army the
staffs which would. be
 needed in war existed only on paper in peace
and found merely anccasional embodiment during' manceiivres.
A final and untried improvement in Victorian preparation for
war was introduced at the close of the period. Even according to
the two corps standard, mobilisation provided. only for the grand
occasions; full-scale war or important colonial campaigns.
Routine imperial policing was still. liable to disrupt the whole
system. This problem was not ignored, least of all by the
Cardwellites themselves. In fact, they devoted more attention
to it than did proponents of a dual army, preoccupied as these were
with the threat of a war with Russia. The home reformers suggested
that a portion of the reserve be placed at the discretion of the
secretary of state, who could use it without having recourse to
99. Army Book, 501-07.
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parliament. Such forces as were inobilised. could draw upon the standing
reserve stores of supplies and. equipment. This idea was broached to
the Commons as early as 1879, discussed in the press, and enthusiastic-
ally purveyed by Wolseley and Sir Arthur Haliburton. 10° By the end. of
the century, sufficient support had been mustered to pass a bill dividing
the reserve into two classes. The first class remained subject to the
original provisions of the arnr enlistment act. The second, numbering
5,000, voluntarily rendered themselves liable to service abroad at any
time in return for a small renmneration.101
In assessing the readiness for war of the Victorian army in 1899,
it is not easy to strike a balance between what bad been done and. the
enormous amount that remained to be done. Certain fundamental weaknesses
persisted. Preparation for war was engaged in what may be called a
game of double bluff. The expeditionary force was at once the prfmvy
line of defence at home and the means for offence abroad. Aix expedition
like the Erptian campaign of 1882 would have, even under post-1886
arrangements, stripped the United Kingdom of most of her mobile field.
force and left the few remaining regular troops tied up in garrisons.
As it was, of course, the South African war left Britain frighteningly
ad	 Iimprotected/as-weU---s--stra±n±ng her auxiliary forces to the utmost.
The reliance upon India for small expeditions was another instance of
the same Janus-face of Britain's milit&ry organisation. As well as
100. Hansard, 3rd.. series, 246 (19 May 1879), cola. 666-69; Maj.-GenChenevix Trench, "The Future Role of the Arnr Reserve", Blackwood' a Edjn-
Magazine 150 (1.891 ), 641; Report of the Committee appointed toConsider the Terms and Conditions of Service in the Ai	 Minutes of evidence,
449 aj.-Gen. J.K. fraser, Inspector-Gen. of Cavalry in the U.K.), 280(Wolseley), 482 (Sir rLalph Knox, Accountant Gen.); Sir Arthur Haliburton,(Perm. U.S.S. 1895-97) "krnty Orga.nisation", (July 1397), passim and. espec.
13-14, V.0. 33/82; comment by Capt. LB. MacDonnell upon CöI. J.D. Legard.
"Arnr Re-Organisation ..." J.LU.S.I. 42 (1898), 257.
101. Reserve Forces and. Militia Act 	 (61 Vict. 1898), 6.
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discharging its custodial duties and. preparing for a war on the North-
West frontier, the Indian army was obliged to fulfil its somewhat
illegitimate expeditionary role. The device was a gamble forced upon
the authorits by economy, and related to the imbalance of battalions.
Britain's home army was weakened for the sake of the troops abroad,
and all hoped that it would not be put to the test. Without any
"slack" in hum-'i resources, it was difficult to make statutory
provision for the normal mode of warfare of the Victorian armxr.
Nonetheless, within individual services continual adjustments were
being made to the needs of small wars. The reform of 1898 suggests
that, had circumstances not changed, this process would have been
taken much further.
On the credit side, the rise of mobilisation schemes and the
accompanying accumulation of reserve stores translated the concept
of an expeditionary army into reality. When mobilisation was
ordered on 7 October 1899, the reserve responded almost to a man, and
proceeded to the theatre of war well fed and properly armed. As
Sir Ralph Knox wrote excitedly to Sir Henry Canipbefl-Bannerman:
"Our doings here are perfectly wonderful, everything going so
smoothly. Division after division is mobilized by the turn of a
handle".'°2 If the scale of events in South Africa had. coincided
with the scale of mobi].isation plans, Victorian preparation for war
- may have evoked little besides admiration. It is the characteristic
irony of this period that, just as army reform was adjusted to embrace
the warfare of the Victorian age, this was coming to an end.
102. Letter of 2 Dec. 1899, Campbell-Bannerman Papers,
Add. Nas. 41221 ff. 265-66.
CU.A.PTER 3.
Nanoeuvres aM the Concentration of m4ier Units.
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The average Victorian officer, it may be surmised, habitually
thought in terms of his regiment rather than the axiry. Some reformers,
however, normally thought in a broader context, and were inclined to
make the average commander do likewise. They therefore sought to
persuade the authorities to concentrate troops as far as possible in
peacetime, both in standing camps and. by the institution of large-
scale xnanoeuvres. The importance of rairiing officers arid men by
brigade and division became a staple of military discussion within
reforming circles. Many contemporaries were aware of the inexperience
of most Victorian officers in the problems of comrnnd and ailmfriistra-.
tion assc.ciated. with large bodies of troops. That the fraentation
of units characteristic of Victorian warfare reinforced this inexper-
ience was widely appreciated.
Manoeuvres proved an eventual success story for the reformers,
but their efforts torectify the home army's dispersion, a heritage
from the days of Lords Sidinouth and Liverpool, were largely frustrated.
Sir Patrick MacDougall's localisation committee of 1872-73 had. urged
the concentration of troops in key training centres, and had enumerated
their most desirable locations. 1
 In iesponse to this reconnnendation
certain existing stations (Coichester and Shorncliffe) and. the barracks
at Glasgow and Belfast were enlarged. Only one new camp was created,
and no action was taken with respect to the great centres of A1dersht
and the Crragh 2
 Thereafter, official interest in the concentration
of troops. seems to have flagged until revived by .H. Smith (secretary
of state for war 1885-86 and 1886-87). In 1885 he appointed a
1. Final .Report of the Committee on the Organization of the various
Military Land. Forces of the Country, 13. P.P. (C.712, 1873).
2. Army Book, 101.
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committee to investigate the possibility of concentrating the ax in
centres suitable for strategical instruction. After a brief delibera-
tion, the committee drew up a list of twenty-four stations which they
believed it would be advantageous to vacate. The Home Office -
immediately objected to the vacation of nearly all these sites,
presumably on the grounds that it would leave the civil power without
proper support in the event of social crisis. Foiled, therefore, by
thinking more suited to 1815 than 1885, the committee relinquished
their scheme.3
Only in manoeuvres could troops be organised in the higher units
in which they would. fight, march, aM be comm'mded in the event of a
major war. Throughout most of this period, Britain was unique amongst
the great powers in failing to conduct regular and. large-scale manoeuvres.
Legislatively, they did. not become a standing part of British preparation
for war tntil 1896. Previous to this date, manoeuvre acts wars occa-
sional; fresh bills were introduced in 1871, 1872, 1873, 1875 and 1882.
Finally, in 1896 the constitution of the act was altered to permit its
application at any time by order in council, (subject to limitations
embodied in the act). A revised version of this was passed in the
following year, and under the new law the great Salisbury exercises of
1898 were carried out. 4 Minor manoeuvres conducted during the 1890s
were made pousible only by agreement between district coinmmders and
- landowners and occupiers.
3. Report of the Committee appointed, to exiiire into the Distribution
of the Army in Gre.t Britain, with a view to its greater Concentration
in Strategical Centres or Camps of Instruction, passim Smith papers,
W.O. 110/8. Also preserved in W.O. 3/45.
4. Military Manoeuvres Act 1871, P.P. (1871), 4; ibid, 1872, P.P.
(1872), 3;
	
1873, p.p. (1873), 3; ibid, 1875, P•p (1875), 4;
ibid, 1882, P.P. (1882), 4; ibid, 1896, P.P. (1896), 5; ibid, 1897,
r'.. (1897), 5.
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The slow development of planning for war at the highest levels of
Britain's military organisation has been delineated in the preceding
chapter. Nanoeuvres, because they normally brought together units
composed of all the services, were the practical corollary to such
plmng. They provided a useful, if limited, test of some of the
procedures and organisations devised by the War Office authorities.
Inevitably, as peace-time exercises, the manoeuvres gave only the
vaguest indication of the fighting abilities of troops. With respect
to the i'nn theme of this study, the introduction of manoeuvres was
a striking example of the Prussian influence in the early seventies.
Prussia eras the first great power to institute exercises which were a
simulacrum of real war, and her example was an abiding inspiration to
those who urged that Britain should do likewise. A later chapter
will portray the enthusiasm with which British observers watched and
criticised, the great mm -euvrea of the £o-rei gu. powers.5
Caxdwell, attuneo new ideas in training as in organisation,
ordered full-scale xnanoeuvres, with the consent of parliament, in his
third year of office. These were unprecedented; the concentration
at Chobbam in 1853 had. been a standing camp rather than manoeuvTes in
the modern sense of the word. 6
 It was almost universally acknowledged
that the exercises of 1871 were a splendid occasion. The odd kill-
joy, such as Colonel C.C. Chesney, argued that the gulf between real
and mimi
 c warfare was so great that nothing could be learnt from the
5. Ch. 4, p.].Of-O6; and Col. Valentinc Baker, Army Reform (1869),
35-37, Tracts 1839-74.
6. j.-Gen. T.A. Murray, "The Rise of Aldershot", U.S.N. u.s. 8
(Oct. .893-April 1894), 322-24.
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latter. 7
 But most commentators agreed with Charles Brackenbury that
the 1871 manoeuvres marked Britain's coming of age as a military nation.
We shall now, le exclaimed exultantly to the R.U.S.I., "make all nations
come here to learn from us". 8
 The military press followed the field
days closely, and. the Times published elaborate and. solemn n1yses
of the generalship of the opposing sides. Cardwell was particularly
gratified by the admiration for the xnanoeuvres expressed by foreig!i
dignitaries and. generals, taking all their compliments in good faith.9
Despite the distractions of spectacle and. the sense of occasion,
there was an earnest endeavour to derive professionally useful lessons
from the manoeuvres. Searching criticisms on their conduct were made
by a number of officers, though not by Cambridge in the public report
laid. before parliament. Save for some remarks which reflected. upon
staff work and. the exposure of infantry to fire, his assessment of
the manoeuvres awarded bland praise all round and. made no pretence at
analysis. 10 But others saw the manoeuvres less as an occasion for
self-congratulation than for examination and. criticism. It was
readily perceived that their chief value lay in the opportunities
7. Li.eut.-Col. C.C. Chesney, "The Theory and. Practice of Peace
Manoeuvres, and their Relation to Real Warfare", J.R.U.S.I. 16 (1872),
550-74.
8. Col. C.B. Brackenbury ,"The Autumn Nanoeuvres of England", ibid
222-37 (quo. 236), and. similarly: Gen. Sir William Codrington,
"Autumn Manoeuvres Abroad and. at Home, 1869-71", ibid, 497-526;
Timee 1 Sept. 1871.
9. Edward Cardwell to Queen Victoria, 20 Sept. 1871, Cardwell Papers,
P.R.0. 30/48/3, ff. 172-73. The Queen cast rather a damper upon his
enthusiasm by remarking, in reply, that she hoped. manoeuvres would. ri't
become a regular part of the military scene. (Henry Ponsonby to Cardwell,
29 Sept. 1871, ibid., f. 174).
10. Reports on the Military Manoeuvres Held in September 18711,
Report of His Royal Highness the Field-Marshal Commanding in Chief,
3-12. P.P. (c.494, 1872), 37.
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they provided for practice in administration. Mock-battles in the
pleasant autumnal downiaths of Salisbury Plain were of much less
importance, as Sir Archibald Alison pointed out, than "those operations
which are carried on out of range of fire".
	 It seems to be clear
that, as a test of the troops' fighting skills, the manoeuvres were of
negligible value. Their intrinsic unreality was exaggerated by the
12insistence of the C.-in-C. upon the rigid British line.
	 Suicidal
tactics went unrebuked., and. Captain W.S. Wolfe noted an entire dis-.
regard of cover amongst the infantry.'3
 Prearranged schemes of attack
and. defence gave little scope to the initiative of junior commanders,
so that their operations resembled what one writer later called
"campaigning in nightgowns and. slippers".' 4 Nonetheless, however
unreal, such operations were an improvement on the tedious round of
regimental field-days. To exercise with some purpose in view, a
cavalry officer wrote, infused new life into squadrons wearied of
being "boxed about to all parts of the compass with tLe most perfect
mechanism, but without the smallest gleam of object".15
General ai9miistration and command were defective, but their
short-comings did. not escape censure. Staffs of the opposing sides
11. "Our Autumna]. Manoeuvres", Blackwood' a Edinburgh Magazine 111
(Jaxi.-June 1872), 322.
12. "Report of His Royal Highness ...",
	
cit., 9.
13. Capt. VS. Wolfe , "A Sketch of the Autumn Nanoeuvres of 1871",
Proc. R.A.I. 7 (1870-71), 510.
14. Anon ,"Camps of ercise in India", U.S.M. (1873), pt. 1, 176.
15. A Cavalry Officer, "Our Cavalry System", U.S.N. (1871-72),
575.	 -
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were, of course, especially formed for the occasion and. evidently in a
somewhat haphazard manner. Many staff officers seemed to be uncertain
of their precise duties, and most £ai]ed to appreciate the distinction
between the executive role of the Quartermaster General's department
and the administrative function of the newly formed Control department.6
No head of administration in the field or chief of the military staff
existed to resolve these confusions, nor were procedures authoritatively
laid. down. Thus, on occasion, whole divisions were separated from their
transport and baggage at vital moments in their strategic movements.
These mishaps did, however, lead to the appointment of a staff officer
in each division who was to oversee the baggage, ensure that it advanced.
in the same line of march as the troops, and. submit a daily written
report of his charge.'7
 By the gradual fomu3ion of such elementary
procedures the Victorian army moved towards an efficient administration
in the field. In 1871, as in later years, the opportunity was aeized
to experiment with new ideas. A systen of regimental transport, which
had no permanent existence in the British army, was tried out in two
18
cavalry regiments and. answered. admirably".
	 The artillery was freed
from its traditional adherence to infantry movements and. was employed
as an independent arm.' 9
 How significant this reform was in the
16. Autumnal Manoeuvres, final report by Deputy Controller Henxy
Robinson. (27 Sept. a187), 22-25, W.O. 33/24. Repr. Re?orts on the
- Military Manoeuvres Held in September 1871, 40-42. P.P. (C.494, 1872), 37.
17. Report no. 5, Control Office, (18 Sept. 1871), 38. Ibid.
18. Sir Archibald Alison, "Our Autumnal Manoeuvres", Blackwood's
Edinburi Magazine 111 (Jan.-June 1872). 325.
19. Capt. W.S. Wolfe, "A Sketch of the Autumn Manoeivres of 1871",
Proc. R.A.I. 7 (1870-71), 497.
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development of tactical thinking will be shown in the subsequent
chapter.
All this is not to deny the element of play in the manoeuvres.
What seems to have been the most exciting episode of the 1871
manoeuvres occurred when a troop of Life 	 horses bolted,
frightened by a flock or geese. Officers and men downed battle-
plaits ansi rifles and. joined in a mock-heroic pursuit which lasted
several days and. afforded much innocent amusement to observers and.
the Times ' correspondent. 2° All exercises provided the pretext for
lavish picnics, garden parties, and gatherings of the landed elite.
For officers, the frugality of camp-life was tempered, as Colonel
Henry Knollys later fondly recalled, by privately contracted trains
carrying alcoholic beverages and. other luxuries. 21 The festivities
concluding the cavalry exercises of 1890 typify the conviviality of
Victorian manoeuvres:
After the march past Sir Evelyn Wood entertained the farmers
and. landowners of the district to luncheon in a tent on the
ground and. the proceedings wound up the same evening by a
great ball given at Lockinge House to the sta.f a and. regimen-
22
tal officers of both camps and to neighbours far ant]. wide.
As portrayed in the civilian if not the military press, Victorian
mazioeuvrea sometimes remind, one irresistably of the astonishing and.
delightful day Mr. Pickwick had. spent at a certain review many years
20. Times, 2 and. 4 Sept. 1871.
21. "English Officers and. Soldiers - as they will be", Blackwood'r
Edinburgh Magazine 159 (Jan.-June 1896), 203.
22. Lord Vantage, V.C., K.C.B. A Memoir by hiR Wife (Lond. 1907), 332.
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previously. Nonetheless, to scientific soldiers such as Wolseley,
manoeuv-res were completely serious. He seized the opportunity they
offered in 1871 to pass a savage judgement upon most of his colleagues:
"the majority were incapable", he wrote (anonymously), "of affording
instruction to others from their igaorance of the science of their
profession ••23
During the following autumn, a Rm1l axusr of some 30,000 troops
was gathered in Dorset and Wiltshire and exercised over a fair tract of
territory. Staff work seems to have been carried out more adeptly
than in the trevious year, and some attempt was made to establish a
system of regimental and centralised transport suitable for real
canipaigcing. 24
 Just how efficient was the management of troops can
hardly be ascertained from the anodyne phrases of Cambridge's official
report. 25
 In 1873 about thirty thousand troops were again exercised,
but at three different locations: Dartinoor, Cannock Chase, and the
Curra,gh.26 Then, scarcely before there had been time to digest such
lessons as the manoeuvres afforded, they ceased. Small-scale exei'-
cises were held frequently over the next quarter_century, but there
were no more large concentrations until 1898. The official reason
given for this change in policy was lack of funds. 27
 Disraeli's
23. "Our Autumn Manoeuvres", Blackwoo.l's Edinburgh Magazine 112 (July-
Dec. 1872), 628, and 627-44 passim.
24. Controller W.H. Maturin, "Report on the Control Arrangements During
the Autumn Manoeuvres of 1872", (23 Nov. 1872), 15-16. Reports on the
Military Manoeuvres held in September 1072 P.P. (C.720, 1873), 40.
25. Report of H.R.H. the Field Marshal Commanding in Chiefs (16 Dec.
1872). Thid.
26. Reports on the Military- Nanoeuvres held in the Arttmin of 1873
P.P. (c.94o, 1874), 36.
27. Hansard, 3rd. series, 225 (13 July 1875), col. 1371.
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government was also perhaps influenced by those who regarded manoeuvres
as un-English and a threat to property. Certainly, the rights of land-
owners and. shooting tenants were an acute problem in the conduct of
manoeuvres during the l890s.
So-called manoeuvres were held at Aldershot in 1875, but the
troops simply lived in quarters and. worked over the surrounding few
miles of well-known countryside. 28 In 1890, genuine manoeuvres were
conducted at Dover, in the form of combined naval and military
exercises. 29 These coincided with the emergence of Major-General
Sir HE. Wood. as the xLding spirit in the reform of British tactics
and. training. Mach of his time as commander of the eastern district
and then of Ald.ershot was spent in applying his considerable charm to
persuade landowners to allow invasions by troops of the farms and
parkiand.s of the great estates. Gaining access to sufficient land.
was a persistent problem, but was minimized by the troops' impeccable
behaviour and. the social standing of commanding officers. 3° When so
much depended upon personal contacts, this was of first importance.
Wood, for instance, was a City Liveryman, sportsman general
excellence, and bon viveur; during one period in London he dined
out for sixty-nine successive nights. 31 His successor in the
.Aldershot command was the Royal Duke of Connaught.
While at Coichester, Wood instituted, the practice of night
marches for infantry and long distance rides for cavalry. Upon
assuming coimnand. at Ald.ershot, he immediately resumed the practice
28. Thid. col. 1368.
29. Hansard, 3rd. series, 345 (13 June 1890), col. 837.
O. b1ci. 224 (31 Mar 1875), col. 1113; Report on Autumn Manoeuvres
(1895), l2,j Repc1't on Irish Manoeuvres (1897), 39. Ministry of Defence
Library, Wkittebai..L.
31. F.M. Sir H.E. Wood, Winnowed Memories (Lon4. 1917), 78, and.
generally his From Midshipman to Pield.-Ma.rsha]. (2 vols. Lond.. 1906)
Wood coTTlmmlded Coichester District 1885-89 and. .Aldershot 1889-93.
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of regular manoeuvres, though necessarily only within his district.
Within this lay the estates of Viscount Vantage, a leader of the
Volunteer movemen+ and. a peer with a long-standing interest in military
affairs. His good. offices permitted Wood to conduct prolonged cavalry
manoeuvres in 1890. A force of 3,000 engaged in mock conflict over
some twenty miles of Berkshire downs by day and encamped. on Wantage' a
ground by night. 	 These exercises were of particular interest, as
being the first occasion when British cavalry were trained division-
ally.	 Nanoeuvring horse in division became a regular occurrence
thereafter. Land. proved less accessible for Wood in the succeeding
year. Approaching a ntinber of landowners in Hampshire, he gained alL
immediately iavourable response. Several tenants and. owners agreed
to allow troops onto their land, and. the magnate of the district, the
Earl of Carnarvon, gave permission for 6,000 men to encamp upon his
parklands. But Wooa was blocked by tl'e holders of shooting rights,
who refused to allow disruption to the pheasant season. Wood then
tackled the landowners of a different part of the county, and was
frustrated in the same manner. Finally, some inferior tracts of
common and. farmland were secured around Pet ersfield..35
Such problems were recurrent. On the eve of the purchase of
Salisbury Plain by the government, General George Arthur gained the
permissio"i of landowners to carry out the 1895 manoeuvres on that
32. Ibid., II, 183-84.
33. Lord Vantage, VC., K.C.B. A Mem by his Wife (Lond. 1907),
327, 330-31. For Wantage's interest in army refnrm, Stanhope Papers,
131590/0313 (file of correspondence between Wantage and Stanhope);
Hugh Cunningham, The Volunteer Force (Lond. 1975), 111, 114.
34. Hansard, 4th. series , 2 (7 March 1892), col. 232; Army Book, 204.
35. Report of 20 Nov. by Lieut.-Gen. Sir Evelyn Wood, Autumn
Nanoeuvres in Hampshire (1891) M.0.D. Library.
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part of the Wiltshire countryside. Despite this, the objections of
the shooting tenants proved insurmountable. Arthur then resorted to
a more inconvenient location in the New Forest. Some landowners,
perhaps, appeared obliging only because they could rely on their
shooting tenants to stop the fulfilment of any rash promises. 6 In
the subsequent year, during the delayed passing of the 1896 manoeuvre
bill, the problem became quite intractable. Arthur found it impossi-
ble to gain access to any extensive tract of unfamiliar ground and was
forced to be content with the tediously familiar Pox Hills of Alder-
shot. 37 As five divisions were involved, they simply had no room to
move. Therefore, although the exercises were unprecedented in size,
they were in the nature of field days rather than. genuine manoeuvres.
Even when land. was secured, its use was hedged about with cripp-
ling restrictions. Not only were troops forbidden to trample upon
growing crops, but the çreatest solicitude was also displayed for
farm livestock:
Care is to be taken by mounted troops not to gallop past
cattle or horses grazing or working on the farms or out for
training, but to move steadily past them. Troops should not
inov past sheep-pens at a less distance than 50 yards or fire
within 100 yards of them. In the case of flocks being
driven across the line of operations troops are to give them
a wide berth, and if the sheep scatter, the men should halt
until the shepherd gets his flcck clear.
When halted near hay or straw ricks, the horses are not
36. Report on Autumn Manoeuvres (1895), 1. M.0.D. Library.
37. Report on Autumn ?4axioeixvres ( 1896), 1. N.0.D. Library.





to be allowed to nibble them. ... If any game is started
it is on no account to be pursued.38
How often did the cavalry, one wonders, raise a trot? One result of
this commendable responsibility on the part of the military authorities
was the modest cost of compensation. Claims for damages were few arid
quick].y settled.39
Reports of manoeuvres in the last decade of the century tell us
rather more about their conduct than do the cominnd papers of the early
seventies. Being printed for circulation only within the War Office
and to certain commanders, the later reports were frank and exhaustive
in their criticisms. Moreover, the manoeuvres of the nineties seem
to have been approached in a more rigorous and professional manner than
had their predecessors.	 afore the 1891 manoeuvres, Wood had the
nr'e Survey department draw up seven hundred maps of the area, and
these were issued to all officers concerned. In addition, they
received. a pris compiled by Wood. of the tactical mistakes made dur-
ing the previous two years training at Aldershot. A detailed narra-
tive and analysis was compiled of each day's operations and was, one
presumes, discussed. 4° Elementary but vita], procedures were laid
38. Autumn Manoeuvres In Hampshire (1891), appendix .
40. Report of 20 Nov. 1891 by Lieut.-Gen. Sir Evelyn Wood.
Autumn Manoeuvres in Hampshire (1891), 3, 7, 8, 17. The unpaginated
quotid.ien reports are collected in the appendix, their exhaustive
detail now only of antiquarian interest.
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down; that officers bad to be told to write orders on "white paper,
consecutively numbered, correctly timed, dated, and addressed"
indicates something of the haphazard methods wiich seem to have
prevailed in the first manoeuvres.41
Cumulatively, the reports of the l890s suggest that regimental
officers were becoming more responsive than previously to local
topography and its effects upon tactical movements. Less tolerance
was afforded to actions which would have been impossible in war. In
1893, for example, general officers were urged to stay in the rear,
and all off cera, of whatever rank, who were found mounted in the
firing line were automatically put out of action. 42 Certdnly,
headlong assaults regardless of topographical features remained a
co=on occurrence, though it is significant that such tactics were
severely criticised.. 43 The right ideas were there, but only slowly
being put into practice. As Wood wrote revealingly to Stanhope:
I could not allow the combatants as free a hand as I should
have preferred, and the attacks were not only pre-arranged,
but were actually timed very much like events in the large
London Music Halls
Few cavalry commanders employed their troopers, as ordered, for
flexible reconr'M ssa.nce rather than attack. Their units moved in
41. Report on Autumn Nanoeuvres (1895), appendix I.
42. 2nd. Division Manoeuvring Force (1893), Diary by Assistant A.-G.
Col. J. Alleyne, 24.
43. £bid., 21; Report on Autumn Manoeuvres (1895), 4; Report on
Summer Exercises. ... (1897), 3; and. also see Report of His Majesty's
Commissioners Appointed to Enquire into the War in South Africa Minutes
of evidence, 444 (Maj.-Gen. J. Talbot Coke). P.P. (0.1790, 1904), 41.
44. Wood to Edward Stanhope, 24 Oct. n.d. (internal evidence points
to 1891), Stanhope Papers, U 1590/0315.
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rigid formation without regard to country, and. they "seemed intent on
disposing the men under their command as if to complete some diagram".45
Orchestration of artillery, machine-gun, and. infantry movements was at
a very elementary stage. On one occasion, a machine-gun detachment
claimed to be doing massive execution upon the enemy side. The
umpire, intervening, found the gun to be showering troops of its own
brigade with imaginary ammunition. During the 1896 Ald.ershot exerh
cises, one battery was caught blazing away at a hillside crowded with
spectators. 6 Even within the limited areas of the 1895, 1896 , and
1897 manoeuvres, coordination of higher units was extremely defective.
In 1895, commanding officers lost tracir of their own brigades, and a
battalion of the Northern frce charged its own artillery.47
Manoeuvres seem to have been more sophisticated. on the technical
side. Commanding officers showed every willingness to combine tele-
phony, telegiaphy, aM machine-guns with troop movements, even if their
enthusiasm outran their expertise. Telephone exchanges were constructed
in 1891, and became an accepted part of manoeuvres thereafter.48
Experime.ctal balloons, and. steam traction engines (to be a familiar
sight in the South African war), were tried upon occasion. 49 Oppoi'-
tunity was taken to embody some of the war organisation for supply and.
45. Report on Cavalry anoeuirres by Lieut.-Cen. Sir Keith Fraser,
Inspector-Gen. of Cavalry, (1894), 2.
46. 2nd. Division Manoeuvring Force (1893), Diary, 21; Anon, "The
Aldershot Manoeuvres", u.S.M. n.s. it' (Oct. 1896-March 1897), 268.
47. Report on Autumn Manoeuvres (1895), operations of 24 Aug. (n.p.).
48. Report of 20 Iov. 1891 by Lieut.-C-en. Sir Evelyn Wood, op. cit., 12.
49. Thid, 8; Report on Autumn Manoeuvres (1895), 9.
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transport, of which the newly formed Army Service Corps was a part.
Accordingly, from 1891, the executive control of supply, previously
entrusted to civilian contractors, was entirely committed to the new
service. 50 such experience was invaluable. Like the staff organi-
sation of higher units, the wartime structures of supply and. transport
existed only on paper during peace. Manoeuvres therefore provided
the chance to test organisations which normally consi&.ted only of
written regulations. These minor exercises of the nineties typified
Victorian army reform. Their achievements did much to enhance the
axnr t s efficiency but also threw into relief its remaining defects.
Britain was finally brought into line with the continental powers
when the act of 1896 made manoeuvres part of her regular preparation
for war. Here was the answer to the pleas of army reformers, from
Valentine Baker in 1869 to H.W. Hanbury nearly a quarter of a century
later. 51 In 1898 tio army corps, with their attendant cavalry bri-
gades and. a full array of services, InanoeuvTed against each other in
Wiltshire and on Salisbury Plain. Blue army, presumed to have been
an invading force and commanded by General Sir Redvers Buller, was
eventually adjudged to have suffered defeat. (There was no lack of
commentators upon this fact after Colenso and Spion Kop). The work
of the supply and transport units evoked admiration, as they were to
do in th South African war, and railway administration seems to have
52
meshed in efficiently with the needs of supply and strategy.
50. Au.timrn Manoeuvres in Hampshire (1891), 17 and. appendix H; Report
on Autumn Manoeuvres (1895), 8; Report on Summer Exercises (1897), 5.
51. Col. V. Baker, Army Reform (Loud. 1869), 35-36, Tracts 1839-74;
Hansard, 4th. series, 2 (7 March 1892), col. 192.
52. Anon, "Railways and the Manoeuvres", U.S.M. n.s. 18 (Oct. 1898-
March 1899), 71-81, and for an excellent anaIIof supply and transport
in he South African war: Andrew Page, "The supply services of the
British Arnty in the South African war 1899-1902". (Oxford D.P.h11. thesis
1977), chs. 5 aid 8.
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Tactics and. command. appear to have been less satiafacto:ry. The
cavalry concentrated to an exaggerated. extent and favoured the tedious
wc:& of intelligence much less than shock tactics. Seizing tfrery
opportunity for a charge" they provided a brilliant display for the
numerous spectators. 53 The deliberation with which troops moved
under supposed fire showed how much remined to be taught by the
shock of real war. But even Wolseley, never a man who shrank from
criticism, acknowledged that:
While these manoeuvres have brought out mistakes they have
shown indubitably the immense strides which the Arnr has made
of recent years; the increased efficiency of the Staff, the
keenness, the interest in, and the increased knowledge of,
their profession displayed by our re,4mental officers
The introduction of manoeuvres into Great Britain owed little
to her own experiences of war during the period under review. None-
theless, it was a reform supported by almost everyone who considered
himself on the side of change and efficiency in the army. The very
success of the agitation for manoeuvres, however, bred a slight sense
of complacency amongst those who admired the great exercises of 1898.
It was Buller who wrote with urtfortunate assurance:
In conclusion I must testify to t.ie immense advantage the
Army has derived from these manoeuvres ... In staff training
alone their value has been estimable, while Officers of all
53. Anon, "Autumn Nanoeuvres at Aldershot", U.S.M. n.s. 16 (Oct.
l897-Mar'h 1898), 130; General Report by F.M. Lord Wolseley (27 Oct.
1898) , Reports on the Manoeuvres held in the Neighbourhood ol Salisbury
in August and September 1898, vii. P.P. (C.9139, 1899), 53.
54. Thid, xvii.
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razks, and no one more than wyself, have profited
individually.55
55. Report by Cen. Sir Redvera Bul1r, (10 Sept. 1898), ibid, 13-14.
Thomas Pakenbam has sought, however, to vindicate Buller's reputation
in his recent splendid book, The Boer War (Lond. 1979), 123-307.
This work supersedes all previous narratives of the war.
CHAPTER 4.
Infantrr and .krtillery in Battle: Tactical
Debate and Training.
94.
A nyriad of small improvements in the routine trining of troops
accompanied the introduction of manoeuvre a into the Victorian army.
Behind both developments lay a world of tactical debate, most of which
focused upon the nature of modern battle and the role of the various
arms therein. Some of this debate was brntT and repetitive, but much
was alive with enthusiasm and imagination. As might be assumed,
practical r'?form tended to lag behind changes in theory. Nonetheless,
the degree to which modern ideas were accepted in theory and modified
training seems to have been generally underestimated.1
On the eve of the Prussian campaigns of 1866 and 1870-71, British
tactical ideas and training had altered little from those of the
Peninsular war. Host infantry troops were taught little besides
endless drill around the barrack square. Official regulations on
the sui4ect were domir.ted, in the apt phrase of one writer, by the
"study of mechanism without object". 2 The spirit of Sir John Moore
did, however, linger on in the stress upon preliminary skirmishing
and double lines as the way to meet the massed columns of the continent.
Thus Kinglake could. write with confident grandiloquence of the battle
of the A1m:
But along the whole line, from east to west, these files
of two men each wej.e strong in the exercise of their country t a
1. Thus, a distinguished historian haL recently written: "(Genera]. Sir
Redvers Buller)was the f 4 rst British general to grasp that the old
parade-ground advance in close formation was suicidal on the veldt."
A.J.P. Taylor, review of T. Pakenhrni , The Boer War (Lond. 1979) in The
Observer 9 Sept. ±979. The ensuing chapter indicates that Bullar's
views were not without precedent in the Victorian army.
2. A Cavalry Officer, "Our Cavalry System", 1LSH. (1871-72), 574.
Prescribed ideas at the opening of the period, under review are well
indicated in Field Exercise and Evolutions of Infantry (H.M.S.0. 1867)
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great prerogative. They were in English array. They were
fighting in line against column.3
The technical excellence of the artillery in the 1860s outstripped
the proficiency of its men and. officer in field movements. Notions
of infantry and artillery cooperation were in their infancy. ThM ring
in the higher units of artillery did not exist, and the army "thought
in batteries". 4 In their movements artistic impression was all:
The six guns were accompanied by their six waggons close behind
them. When the guns made the slightest change of position, the
waggon had to follcw it and. cover it off with the sane precision,
however small the space traversed, as before. In action at
drill the officers sat on their horses between the guns
British tactical ideas were thrown into confusion by the Prussian
victories. The American Civil war was certainly not ignored, but its
effects were slight and gradual compared with the impact of the cain-
6paigne of Moltke upon the European military world. 	 Reforming
thin1ers in every European army were constrained to reassess radically
the probable nature of future battles. With respect to the infantry
3. Alexander Kinglake, The Invasion of the Crimea 3rd. ed., (Edin. and.
Lond. l83), II, 434.
- 4. Naj.-Gen. Sir Edward May, Changes and. Chances of a Soldier's Life
(Lond.. 1925), 93.
5. mid, 31.
6. The impression derived from wide reading in the relevant literature,
but also see: Jay Luvaaa, The Military Legacy of the C'ivil War
(Chicago 1959), 100-18; Adrian Preston , "British Military Thought,
1856-1900", Anny Quarterly and. Defence Journal 89 (Oct. 1964-Jan.
1965), 57-74.
96.
aM artillery arms, the origins, nature, and. practical results of this
reassessment in Britain are the concern of the ensuing chapter.
The relevance of continental exa.aples to British tacticians was
er'hnced by the introduction of breech-loading rifles in 1866 aM of
short service in l87O. 	 The first reform put British troops roughly
on a technological par with those of France and. Germany. The second
meant that British regimental officers would henceforth. like their
European cou'iterparts, be training chiefly young soldiers over a
relatively brief period. It is therefore unsurprising that the
assertion of English traditions should bave been initially only a
modest accompaniment to the somewhat awed attention paid. to German
methods. There is now, wrote one dissenter in 1871, "a Prussian
mia far stronger and more general than the French Tnnja ever was" • 8
Of this early phase of thought, J.P. Maurice's Wellington Prize Essay
was the most famous, distinctive, and. influential example. 9 This
tract embodied the latest continental ideas, but expressed them with
a wit and elegance which makes one of the most readable military
studies in English.
The siguificance of its argument was threefold. Maurice was in
the vanguard of those who argued that it was imposaible to maintain
closed formations under breecbload.er fire. Nased assaults had
7. Proceedings of the Committee appointed, by the Secretary of State
for War ... to report upon ... breech-loading arms (1865), W.O. 33/17B;
V.D. Najend.ie, "Breech-loading Rifles", Corzthill Magazine 16 (July-Dec.
1867), 177-90 aM "The New Breech-Loader", ibid, 19 (Jan.-June 1869),
583-99; Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War (Lond. 1961), 5-8.
8. A Cavalry Officer, "Our Cavalry System", U.S.L (1871-7 2), 573.
9. Lieut. John P. Maurice, The System of Field Naaoeuvres Best Adapted
for enabling our Troops to Meet a Continental Army (Lond. 187 2) Hence-
forth cited as Maurice, Prize Essay. On its background, see Jay Luvaa,
The Education of An Army (Lond.. 1965), 175-76; F.M. Viscount Wolseley,
Story of a Soldier's Life (Westminster 1903), II, 281.
97.
become suicidal, as evidenced by the four thousand. casualties of
St. Privat.'° Secondly, he was one of the first to appreciate that
German tactics had been developed under stress of circumstances and
therefore, as models, should be regarded with caution. Maurice was
especially wary of the later great victories of Gravelotte, Beaumont,
and. Sedan, pointing out that, as Prench morale and. organisation crui-
bled, the German tactical innovations of the late sixties
... were never perfected even under the more rapid tutorship
of battle itself. The time came when the only thing that was
dangerous was not o dare enough.11
Thirdly, and despite this proviso, he supported the notion of the
"swarm formation".
In practical terms, this seems simply to have been a disinte-
fl
gration of European columns under battlefield conditions, and is to
be distinguished from the skirmishing order of the British line. By
the early seventies, continental writers, the most famous of whose
works were soon circulating in English trans'ations, had elevated the
swarm formation into a principle of modern tactics. Basically, it
was argued that the attack should b carried out by wiits grouped
within a shallow, vastly extended front forming the firing line.
This, as it converged towards the enemyTs weaker areas, should be
fed continually by supports merging into the firing line, and. finally
strengthened by the reserve, thrown en masse towards the decisive
point at the decisive time. Then the whole body would charge home
10. Howard, on. cit., 174-76.
11. Maurice, Prize Essay, 17. The identical point was made 'by Col.
Macdonald, "Considerations on the Tactical Unit of Infantry", U.S.
(1871-73), 164; Anon, "The Warfare of the Latter Half of the Nineteenth
Century", U.S.N. (1877), 207-08.
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with shouts, fixed bayonets, arid the ron of 	 The fundamental
principles of this doctrine were: the flexibility permitted to forma-
tions under fire, the need for troops to coalesce arowid. their nearest
officer when normal. divisions between wilts gave way in the advance,
and. the latitude given to the ainixture of units, even to the point
of allowing brigades to mingle in the firing line. With minor
variations, this form of attack soon became standard in all major
European armies. In essence, Maurice was at one with continental
tacticians in maintiining that exiend.ed formations should not merely
prepare, but become, the assault)3
Hedid not, however, look for salvation merely in forms. The
chief significance of the breechloader, to his mind., was that it
demanded an end to jjiechmical training. Only thereby, wider the
fissiparous conditions of the modern battlefield, would, an intelligent
response to contingencies be found at all ranks. Clear instr'u.ctlon3
should. replace rigid prescriptions, and. responsibility should be
delegated to every level, with due regard to the amount of freedom
with which each rank could cope.
summary of the essay:
As he later remarked in virtual
The essence and substance of the change which is taking place
is not that we have taken up a skirmishing form of fighting in
12. Notably: A.K. Boguslawskl, Tactical Deductions from the War of
1870-71, transl. Col. Lumley Gr plxn, (Loud. 1872); The Campai of
1866 A Tactical Retrospect, tranal. Ccl. H.A. Ou.vry, (1873); W.C.P.
von Scherff, The New Tactics of Infantry, transl. Col. Lumley Gram,(L.ad. 1873); On the Prussian Infantry 1869, trarisl. Col. H.A. Ou.vry,(1870), Tracts 1870-72.
13. Maurice, Prize Essay, 30-31, and An Outline of the "Attack
Formations" for Infantry in the Austrian, French, German, and Italia
Armies (H.M.s.o. 1881), Tracts 1879-1881; Lieut.-Col. Enory Upton,
The Armies of Asia and. Europe Embracing Official Reports ... (N.Y.
1878), 270-316.
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place of masses and. line, but in those points ... which I
should express by saying that whereas under the old condition
of fighting the General in coTnmmd had to handle a machine,
now he has to lead and guide a body which has become infused
14
with a spirit and a mind of its own
Within a few years of the Pranco-Prussian war a progressive school o.
tacticians, deeply influenced by their observation of continental
experiences, bad emerged in Britain. The points upon which Maurice's
essay turned soon became the commonplaces of advanced. tactical
thought. Above all, it was stressed .hat the road to victory was tne
accumulation of firepower a the eneny's weakest points. Indeed, as
one disgruntled traditionalist remarked., the contemporary military
"shibboleth is most decidedly an unquestioning, almost a child-like
belief in the breechloader 	 Colonel Lonsdale Hale was distinc-
±iy exceptional amongst reformers in maintaining that the soldier was
to become an absolute machine, an opinion which drew a shocked response
from Maurice.16 In brief, this school took as its text for the
future: "Let us not merely drill, let us educate".'7
14. Comment upon Charles Brackenbury, "The Latest Development of the
Tactics of the Three Arms", J.LU.S.I. 27 (1883), 461. That Maurice
could. make such a remaz off-hand indicates his natural gift for
felicitous expression.
15. Army and Navy Magazine 4 (May-Oct. 1882), 19.
16. Comment upon J.H.A. MacDonald, "Infantry Training", J.R.U.S.I.
34 (1890), 636-37.
17. "Drill or Education?" (Lecture to Military Scientific Society of
Vienna, Nov. 1883, by the Archduke John, transl. Capt. V.A. Hare) r
J.R.U.S.I. 29 (1885), 816. Distinctive examples of the new school are:
Capt. Ilius Clay-ton, "Field. Entrenching ..." (LU.S.I. prize essay of
1879) J.LILS.I. 23 (1879), 291-308, 322-28; Col. Edward Clive, "The
Influence of Breech-Loading Arms on Tactics ,." ibid., 22 (1878), 814-30;
Lieut. E.H. Cohen, "The Battle of Worth", 	 17 (1873), 464-71
(Staff College Prize essay); Naj. E.M. Jones, "On the Latest Changes
Made by the Prussians in their Infantry Drill-Book", J.R.U.S.I. 16
(1872), 527-49; Lieut. R. da Costa Porter, "The System of Field. Training
Best Suited to our Army", P.P.R.E. 9 (1883), 31-77, espec. 44.
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Although tactical debate during the ár1y seventies concentrated
upon the role of infantry in battle, other questions were far from
ignored. The writings of the artillerist Prince Krcft were first
translated into English in 1872, and their emphasis upon the semi-
ind.ependent action of artillery en masse found a favourable reception
in Britain. l4aurice, citing Kraft as an authority, f.nveighed. against
the tendency of artillery officers to tM,1 in. batteries) 8
 As
noticed above, the manoeuvres of 1871 were a lpm9ma-rk, if a rather
academic one, in the development of artillery training. During these
field days, and evidently under persuasion from tactical reformers,
Cambridge ordered the artillery to act as an independent arm (subject
to the direction of their (L0.C. ․) and to avoid its traditional
adherence to infantry movements) 9 Conformation of guns to infantry
was thereby pilloried, in Henry Hime's extravagant phrase, as "utterly
and diametrically contrary to the whole spirit of modern tactics
But as long as the three arms were rarely exercised tcgether this
change in the regulations had little practical import. Not until the
Russo-Turkish war did the question of guns and entrenchments receive
serious attention.
It as natural that, in an age of technological innovation, the
Prench mitrailleuses should have aroused curiosity amongst British
reformers. What is more surprising is that, after the poor perfori.
marice of the new arm during the battles of 1870-71, the machine-gun
18. Maurice, Prize Essay, 64; Kraft, Prince of Hohenlohe-Ingelfixigen,On the Employment of Field Artillery in Combination with the Other Arms,
transi. Capt. F.C. Clarke. (Woolwich 1872), Tracts 1870-72 , and
Letters on Artillery, tranel. Maj. N.L. Walford, (Lond. 1888).
19. Capt. W.S. Wolfe, "A Sketch of the Autumn Manoeuvres of 1871",
Proc. R.A.I. 7 (1870-71), 496-97 (reprints "Memorandum relative to
Ithe employment of Horse and Field Artillery", 17 Sept. 1871).
20. Lieut. W.H.L. Rime, "The Minor Tactics of Pield. Artillery", Prc.
R.A.I. 7 (1870-71), 339. (R.A.i. prize essay for 1870).
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should have been regarded as a weapon of great potential by commentators
in Britain. A War Office committee of 1871 exhaustively exmtned
evidence relevant to the new arm, and ',oncludecl that it should be used.
in a defensive role and. as supplementary to artiller.y. 21
 Some prac-
tical experience with this new and. horrifying weapon was needed before
British reformers recognized its potential as an offensive arm to be
used. in combination with infantry. Even in the early seventies,
however, it found no lack of advocates.22
Nevertheless, foreign examples could exert a distinctly ambivalent
influence upon British tactical thought. In some quarters, the radical
ideas of the early seventies hardened into a new dona as the Prussian
campaigns receded. When suffused with extremes of offensive doctrine,
the advanced tacticians' view of the modern battlefield often could be
as unrealistic as the traditional notions they derided. This inflex-
ible and increasingly academic approach, which placed all factors at
a discount compared. with the need for a massive build.- .up of rifles in
the assaulting swarms, was closely associated with the rise of off en-
sive doctrine in Europe, and. therefore strongest in Britain amongst
those who advocated close adherence to continental models. Charles
Brackenbury provides an interesting example of the conflicting
21. Second Report of the Special Committee on Mitrailleurs (Nov. i7l),
V.0. 33/24.
22. See: Anon , "The Gatling Gun", Army and Navy Magazine 5 (Nov.
1882-April 1883), 193; Capt. C.B. Brackenbury, "The Autumn Nanoeuvres
of England", J.R.U.S.I. 16 (1872), 235; "Lord Derby on our National
Defences", Times 9 Jan. 1871; Maj. Robert Home, A Pris of Modern
Tactics (H.M.S.O. 1873), 135; Lieut.-Col. H.C. Pletcher, "The Thiploy-
ment of Nitrailleurs During the Recent War, and their Use in Puture
War", J.R.U.S.I. 16 (1872), 28-53 (inc1uding discussion in which the
speakers, and. especially Henry Brackenbuxy, supported. the lecturer);
"Report by Major G.V. Fosberry ... on the Mitrailleur Christophe at
Nontigny ...", (1868), W.0. 33/21A, and further below, p. 138-40.
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elements in this movement. In one sense, he was very much the pro-
gressive; a pioneering advocate of large-scale manoeuvres and. tactical
reform, a champion of higher education in the Royal Artillery, and an
early proponent of a General Staff for contingency planning. 23
 His
total lack of active service set him somewhat apart from the "young
axxxy school" associated with Sir Garnet Wolseley.
The contents of Brckenbury's lectures and articles reveal his
lack of interest in any developments save the recent changes across
the Channel. He was not unaware of the implications for arnr organi-
sation of Britain's imperial geography. But, with respect to tactics
and trrting, he argued that only the Prussian campaigns offered use!ul
guidance. He ignored the American Civil war and imperi. warfare.
Shortly after the ranco-Prussian war, Brackenbury urged the abandon-
ment of the British line in favour of the swarm. As the line had
superseded the column, he insisted, so mus the flexible group forma-
tion replace the line. Company commanders should receive the respon-
sibility for training currently shouldered by the battalion staff.
The influence of "Pru.sso-phobists", he alleged, was preventing much of
the significance of l86( and 1870 from reaching the British officer
corps. Over the next twenty years he urged these views upon R.U.S.I.
audiences, with bat must have been wearisoiie iteration to himself and
perhaps to his hearers. 24 Increasingly, his opinioni reflected. the
growing popularity of offensive doctrine on the continent. Chairing
an R.U.S.I. lecture in 1888, he crtticized the speaker for his
23. Below, p 183, and NE.j. C.B. Brackenbixry, "The Autumn Nanoeuvres
of 1872", J.R.U.S.I. 17 (1873),90-91.
24. "The Autumn Nanoeuvres of England", I.LU.S.I. 16 (1872), 222-57;
"The Autumn Manoeuvres of 187 2", ibid., 17 (1873), 84-89; "The Latest
Development of the Tactics of the Three Arms", Thid, 27 (1883), 442-44.
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preoccupation with minimizing losses:
We insist upon this wretched defensive idea, though there is
not another army in the world that believes in it in the least,
except perhaps the Turks, and they have suffered enough by it
the real fact is that the side which has the greatest moral
force .25
C.B. Mayne, whom Ian Umi1ton later regarded as the chief spokes-
mazi of the continentalist tacticians, supported Brackenbury's main
ideas. T4ayne stressed the need for individual intelligence as much
as Maurice, but was a persistent critic of English training. Mayne
inveighed against the "morally disastrous" effects of c over, 26 nn
advocated ax' unremitting offensive once all prelimfnaries had led to
the decisive moment:
Masses are required nowadays, as formerly, to force a position
and drive the enemy out of it; the extended order of modern
warfare is used. ac a means to collect the mass within assaulting
distance ... At the instant of contact, therefore, a closed
formation of some kind is required, whether in loose or rigid
close order, both in the attack and. defence.27
25. Comment upon Maj. Walter Smith, "The Mechanism of the Counter-Attack",
J.R.U.S.I. 32 (1888), 455-56 , and. similarly "The Latest Development of
the Tactics of the Three Arms", op. cit., 447.
26. Naj. C.B. Mayne, "The Difficulties of the Tactical Defensive, and
How to Meet Them", J.R.U.S.I. 40 (1896), 1095.
27. Capt. C.B. ' Nayne, The Late Battles in the Soudan and. Modem Tactics
(Loud. 1884), 16-17. This replied to an article of the same title by Sir
Patrick MacDougall in Blackwood' s Edinburgh Magazine 135 (Jan.-June 1884),
605-10, which defended the traditional British line. See also Mayne's
Infantry Pire Tactics (Chathain 1885), 193-94. This was, at one stage,
prescribed for the officers' ernination in the Hythe Extra Certificate
(A.o. 1892, no. 26), but this was probably on account of its information
on trajectories and. velocities rather than. its tactical doctrine.
Mayne' a final work, The Infantry Weapon and. Its Use in War (Loud. 1903),
indicates that the South African war had. slightly modified his opinions.
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This combination of new ideas aM offensive dogma characterised.
the foreign training observed by British officers. On the one haM,
almost all commentators on foreign xnanoeuvres remarked upon the intelli-
gence displayed by subordinate commanders, and, in German.y, the consider-
able extent to which entrenchments were practised in the attack. As
Major P. Trench wrote in 1894:
To anyone fresh from our own camps of exercise there is
perhaps nothing more striking at German manoeuvres than the
amount of independence and initiative allowed to the
28
oomma.nd.ers of the smaller units
Others marvelled at the dexterity with which the German infantry threw
up field defences. 29 But even in the German arirç, after painstaking
preparations had. been made for the attack, something of a bludgeon
technique was used. at its climax. Although prescribed tactical forn-
ations were forbidden by 1893 in the German drillbooksnock battles
followed a fairly predictable pattern. After a prolonged artillery
preparation, the units worked. their way towards the point of irraption,
building up the firing line in depth ani density, until at the last,
with regiments mingling indiscriminately in the battle-front:
28. "Autumn Manoeuvres in the Ithineland", U.S.N. n.s. 8(Oct. 1893-
April 1894), 45; similarly Foreign Na'ioeuvres 1894, 24 (report by
Capt. G.F.R. Hendersox ,
 V.0. 33/55.
29. Capt. Turner, "The German Nanoeuvres, 1880", Army arid Navy Magazine
1 (Nov. 1880-April 1881), 604; Pore5gn Manoeuvres 1894, 86 (report by
Capt. G.C. Sartorius), w.o. 33/55; Foreign Manoeuvres 1895, 56 (report
by Capt. H.D. Napier), W.0. 33/56; Foreign Manoeuvres 1897, 25 (report
by Lieut.-Col. J.M. Grierson), V.0. 33/bOB.
30. Capt. JJI. Grierson, "The German .kruty", P.P.R.E. 19 (1893), 59;
Foreign Nanoeuvres 1893, 26 (report by Maj. Barter), V.0. 33/54;
Foreign Nanoeuvres 1894, 74 (report by Capt. E. Agar), V.0. 33/55.
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The advance to the attack was executed with the utmost rajidity,
and all minor forms of cover were absolutely neglected
Everything appeared to depend on the carrying out of the off en-
sive. Where the attack succeeded. all went well, ... when the
attack was repulsed and a retrograde movement became necessary
it did. not appear to me to be carried out, as a rule, with so
much skill and the losses in real warfare must have been
terrible.
Henderson pointed to a similar pattern in the 1894 Austro-Rungaxia.n
mnanoeuvres. The prepar.tion for the attack was meticulous, its
execution foc.ihardy, with the charging linesmen, conspicuous in two-tone
blue, looking "like great patches of corriflowers on the bare hil' sides
,, 32
Manoeuvre reports also revealed how much further the cult of the
offensive was taken in France than in Germany. A famous German pain-
phlet, translated into English under the beguiling title of "A Summer
Night's Dream" did indeed advocate reckless offensiveness and a return
to rigid formations. Received with scepticism in Britain, it was
officially condemned in Germany. 33
 Less restraint was evident in the
31. Pore4gn Manoeuvres 1893, 30 (report by Capt. D. Agar), V.0. 33/54;
similarly ibid, 25 (report by Maj. Barter); Capt. J.M Grierson., "The
- German Army", P.P.R.E. 19 (1893), 59-60; Foreign Manoeuvres 1894
(report by Col. G.F.R. Henderson); ibid, 74-76 (report by Agar).
32. Porein Nanoeuvres 1894, 22, W.0. 33155.
33. "A Summer Night's Dream", transi. Capt. Gawne, U.S.M. n.e. 1 (April-
Sept. 1890), 205-29, 356-76; Spencer Wilkinson, "Ni1itiry Literature and
the British Army", U.S.M. n.s. 3 (April-Sept. 1891), 512, and "Recent
German Military Literature", U.S.M. n.s. 5 (Apri].-Sept. 1892), 98; G.P.R.
Henderson, The Science of War (Lond. 1910), 137-38; Col. J.F. Maurice,
"Slavish Discipline", Military Society- of Ireland (Dec. 1891), 11;
Lieut. Stewart lthirray, Fire Discipline (Lond. 1893), 15.
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tactical trn4nirig of Prance. By the eighteen nineties its manoeuvres
could present sights fantastic in both senses of the word. In 1691
Captain JJ. Nanifold witnessed an imaginary invasion across the Meuse
by some 60,000 men, spread over a seven-mile front, pressing forward
with great rapidity and. in seemingly endless lines, breaking down the
eneiiy's defence by sheer weight of numbers; "granted that one 1,if of
the first line is killed, let their places be filled up from the rear,
but let the attack proceed at all costs". 34
 Even where troops were
stipposedly in loose formation, piling up of the firing line often
caused the men to close up shoulder to shonider. Charles a Court
(later famous as C. a C. Repington) noticed. -that umpires rarely put
troops out of action during an advance. Once the forward sweep had
begun, commuiding officers found it almost impossible to alter its
course, 35
 At the peak of an action, troops seemed to abandon all
caution. It was curiou3, Henderson wrote, to witness the opposing
lines
standing in the open, blazing away at each other at 200 or
300 yards range, with the lines beautifully dressed, and the
36
second line lying down a short distance in the rear.
34. "The French Nanoeuvres of 1891", Proc. LAl. 19 (1892), 73.
35. Foreign Manoeuvres 1894, 45-46 (report by Charles a Court),
V.0. 33/55; similarly ibid, 42 (report by Col. K. Kingcote); ibid, 58
(report by Maj. D.P. Chapman); Foreign Manoeuvres 1895, 31-47, passim
V.0. 33/56.
36. Maj. G.P.R. Henderson, "The French Manoeuvres of 1891", .T.R.tT.SI
36 (1892), 873. Generally on coninenta1 doctrine see Michael Howard,
"The Armed Forces", in The New Cambridge Modern History XI, ed. P.H.
Hinsley (c.u.P. 1962), 208-09.
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A critical attitude towards continental models of training tended
to develop along two quite different lines. On the one hand, it
fostered the school of thought which considered itself both progressive
and. peculiarly British. On the other hand, resistance to foreign
examples could reinforce contempt for all things new.
Many soldiers still brought a barrack-square mentality to the
problems of modem warfare. Traditionalists such as Lord Chelmaford
believed that J.F. Maurice had been led astray by continental theorists
and. pleaded for a return to rigid linear tactics. 37
 The fad of
extended formations, lamented Colonel C.P. Evelyn, had rendered the
British infantry less da1igerous to an advancing enenr than they had
38been in the days of muzzle-loaders.
	 Press of numbers none, Lieut.-
Gen. W.J. Williams repeatedly insiRted, could carry infantry through
modern rifle-fire. 39
 Captain William McTaggart deprecated proposals
to introduce a small-bore rifle as the infantry arm:
the capacity am]. effect of infantry fire is enormously
overrated ... the weapon of the future, as of the past, is
the bayonet. A strong, excited, beef-fed Englishman,
Scotchman, or Irishman, can handle a bayonet in a way that
37. Comment upon Naj. C.A. Arundel, "Some Suggestions as to the Better
Training of our Infantry", J.R.U.S.I. 30 (1885), l8R and. Lieut.-Col.
Rrederic Thesiger (Lord. Chelmsford from Nov. 1878), "Is a Radical Change
in the Tactical Formation of our Infantry Really Necessary?" J.R.U.S.I.
17 (1873), 411-23; Col. J.C. Gawler, The British Line in the Attack
(Lond. 1872), passim, espec. vii-ix. Tracts 1870-75.
38. Comment upon Arundel, op. cit., 188.
39. "On Infantry Tactics", J.R.U.S.I. 16 (181872), 768-73); "Notes
on Infantry Tactics", ibid, 37 (1893), 23-27; "Note on Infantry Tactics",
Proc. R.A.I. 20 (1893), 552.
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no nation in the world can aspire to, and. that no nation in the
world can withstand.. 40
It might be efficacious, mused Colonel Evelyn in the R.U.S.I., to arm
the rear ranks with pikes instead of rffles; what better way to
hasten the attack?4'
Nevertheless, it may be stressed that such views were hardly
typical, either of the general tenor of tactical debate or of the
style of training towards the end of the century. The weight of
opinion either accepted the standard doctrine of the continent or
tended ti favour Ideas associated with the British or imperial school
of thought. By the final decade of the period under review, their
position on modern tactics and trdMng had. emerged with some
clarity. This development was closely linked with the tendency of
these ref oT!ners to examine foreign example& in a critical light.
Maurice was the herald in Britain of the new European tactics,
but even in 1872, writing as a subaltern of the greatest military
event of his generation, he maintained a measure of detachment.
The German arxxr had indeed grasped the role of disciplined intel].!-
gence in modern warfare, he wrote, Irbut an Eng1ishmrn thought of it
42	 ____first.	 The Englishmm in question was Colonel George Cawler,
whose book The Essentials of Good Skirmishing was written in the spirit
of the Storncliffe system of training established by Sir John Moore.43
40. 'The Capacity and. Effect of Infantry Fire", krmy and Navy
Magazine 7 (Nov. 1883-April 1884), 260, 264.
41. Comment upon Lieut.-Gen. Sir Gerald Grhm, "Infantry Fire Tactics",
J.R.U.S.I. 30 (1886), 264.
42. Maurice, Prize Essay, 11.
43. The Essentials of Good Skirmihing (2nd. ed. Load. 1852, 1st. Pub.
1837); J.P.C. Puller, British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century
(Lond. 1925), and Sir John Moore' a System of Trainin (Load. 1925).
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To Maurice, who published an edition of Moore's diaries in 1904, the
quaiities required in modern warfare were latent in British traditions.
Certainly, light infantry training had something in common with the
advanced tactics of the late nineteenth century. "The Life and
especial mark of the good skirmisher", wrote Colonel Gawler in 1837,
"is ACTIVE INTELLIGENCE ... The true summit of perfection in skir-
misbing is, the preservation of order in disorder and of system in
confusion".	 Some years later, Captain Douglas Jones wrote to
similar effect on the training of skirmishers. 45
 It would seem,
however, that pariotio loyalties led Maurice to exaggerate the
element of continuity. Until the Prusian campaigns, skirmishing
was seen as a mere prelimindry to the main encounter, and. even Gawler
wrots that the genera]. body of the army should attain "to a state of
____	 46unreflecting mechtrnsm, with noth.ing of mind but attention ...".
Nonetheless, th sense of historical continuity encouraged the
growth of independent ideas. That reformers such as Wolseley and
Maurice constantly studied and. wrote about Britain's own military
history was of more than academic significance. 47
 Other factors
reinforced the growing tendency to view European developments with
more detachment and in a broader perspective than. had been customary
at the outset of the period. These factors seem to have been three-.
fold; the legacy of thc American Civil war, the Russo-Turkish war,
44. The Essentials of Good Skirmishing, op. cit., 15.
45. A System of Company Drill, Company and Battalion Drill, covering
the Pront of a Battalion in all its Changes ... (Lond.. 1855), 747&
46. The Essentials of Good Skirmishing, op. cit., 14.
47. See, for example, works by Wolseley, Maurice, and Evelyn Wood iii
the bibliography.
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and the so-called second tactical revolution, arising from the intro-
duction of magazine rifles and smokeless powder.
The work of Professor Luvaas makes it unnecessary to do more than
to touch upon the first fa.ctor. 48 Most British military writers who
discussed the American campaigns adopted a slightly contemptuous
attitude towards their supposedly irregular operations. 49
 The
majority of writers on war ignored them altogether, as the titles
alone of their books listed in the bibliography to this study indicate.
In some quarters, however, a distinct sense of iriity with America's
military experience was evident. J.F. Maurice, at firsi.. sceptical
of the value of lessons from pre-.breecbloader days, later set his
high estimation of the Civil war's significance over against the
weight of continental authority. 50 Wolseley, also init5ally a
doubting Thomas, eventually accepted that the American campaigns were
the first of the great modern wars. 5' Henderson, the arch-exponent
of a British school of training, was also Britain's leading student
of the Civil war. In retrospect, Henderson regretted that the
Victorian axnr had been so feebly influenced by American examples in
comparison with continental:
48. The Military- Legacy of the Civil War, op. cit.
49. E.G.: Review by Naj. E. S. May of J. C. Ropes, The Story of the
Civil War (Vol. 1 N.Y. and Loud. 1894) Proc. R.A.I. 22 (1895),
109-10; Alexander limes Shand, The Life of General SIr Edward Bruce
Fr.zn1ey (Edin. and. Loud., 1895), I, 136; review by Capt. J.W.H. Eozier
(a minor cavalry reformer, whose bound volumes of zr'ilitaxy pamphlets
are deposited in the Institute of Historical Research, Loud.) of G.P.
Denison History of Cavalry (Loud. 1877) J.RIr.S.L 21 (1877), 1229;
Capt. Bwd1er Bell, "The Strategic Service of Cavalry", J.R.U.S.I.
25 (1881), 414.
50. Capt. J.P. Maurice, Austria Advantages an.d. Defects of an 0anjtbo
es, as Illustrof the Battalion into 4,
Army (1878), 39, W.0. 33/32 and.	 (Lond.. 1891), 107.
51. Comment upon Lie. F.J. Graves, "On Military Equipment", J.R.U.S.I.
22 (1898), 154; P.M. Viscount Wolseley, The Story of a Soldier's Life
(Westminster 1903), II, 122, and. 117-44, and "General Forrest", U.S.N.
n.e. 5(April-Sept. 189 2), 1-14, 113-24.
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The result was that when rnanu.ls of tactics and instru.ctions
for field-exercise were required, the deductions of foreign
theorists were accepted without question ... A kindred army,
organised on the same voluntary system, making the same use of
irregular levies, possessing the same characteristics, conduc-
ting operations under the same conditions of rough arA wooded
country, and. continually fighting against space, was a far
better model for the forces of Great Britain and. her Colonies
than the hosts of the Continent.52
The Russo-Turkish war not only modified attitudes towards
Prench and German offensive doctrine but drew widespread attention
to the vital question of guns and entrenchments. The spectacle of
less than 50,000 troops resisting the bulk of the Russian empire's
znobilie& forces for Ltvs moniha arouaed. universal. in.tc  rest and. much
perplexity in the military world. It became less easy to aisume
thereafter that modern wars were "sudden in their commencement and
short in their duration". 53 To chart fully the reactions in Britain
to the Russo-Turkish war would. be a major project in itself. The
ensuing discussion seeks only to bring out the salient features of
the major writings in English on the campaigns in Bulgaria.
52. The Science of War (Lond. 1910), 1.19-20, and similarly 56-57,
148-52, chs. 8, 9, 10. (it is hoped that this chapter demonstrates that
Henderson's opening statement was not entirely accurate.) On Henderson
as a studant of war, Jay Luvaa.s, The Education of an Army (Loud. 1965),
216-46, is excellent; Henderson's Stonewall Jackson and. the Americai
Civil War (Lond.. 1898), is, of course, a classic military biography.
For views similar to Henderson, se: Capt. H. Schai, "The Amount of
Advantage which the New Arms of Precision Give to the Defence over the
Attack", J.R.U.S.I. 14 (1870), 379-383; Lieut.-Col. E.T.H. Hutton,
(a leading proponent of mounted infantry) "Nounted Infantry and its
Action in Modern Warfare", P.P.R.E. 16 (1890), 29.
53. Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Recruiting
for the Army, xv. P.P. (C.3752, 1867), 15.
112.
The most widely read serious history of the war seems to have
been that by the American Francis Vinton Greene. 54 Compiled from
Greene's official reports as American Military Attache"at St. Peter-
burgh, it is a classic of military narrative and exposition and is
cited in almost every relevant book and. article consulted by the
present writer. Under the auspices of the Royal Engineer Institute,
Capt. G.S. Clarke, the future secretary of the Committee of Imperial
Defence, produced a British analysis of the war, comparable in sub-
stance to Greene's work. 55 General Franz Todleben's official
account of the Plevna. defences was translated both for the Royal
Engineers and the R.A.I. Institution. 6 Both this institution and
the R.U.S.I. were prompted by the 1877-78 campaigns to hold prize
essay competitions on the subject of entrenchments and. the defensive
powers of breechloaders. 57 The standard German account of the war
58
was also, in due course, translated into English. 	 A colourful
54. Lieut. P.V. Greene, The Russian Army and. its Campaigns in Turkey
1877-78 (N.Y. 1879) (Br. ed. pub. 1880 by W.H. Allen).
55. Capt. George Clarke, Plevna (pub. as vol. 5 of the P.P.R.E.,
1880). Also see his "Provisional Fortification", P.P.LE. 3 (1879),
254-46.
56. "The Blockade of the Fortified Position of Plevna, ... Report of
General Aide-de-Camp Todleben to his Imperial Highness the Cominicler-in-
Chief of the Allied Arir.!es", transi. Lieut. J.N. Grierson , Proc. R.A.I.
10 (1877-79), 369-78; "The Investment of the Fortified Position of P].evna
and Surrender of the Turkish Army, Nov. 28th., 1877 ...", transi. Capt.
G.T. Plurikett, P.P.R.E. 2 (1877), 81-90.
57. Lieut. J.M. Goold-Adams, "On the Question whether any Develorment of
the Material of Field Artillery is Necessitated br the General Adoption of
Entrenchments ..." (Gold Medal Prize Essay, 1879), Proc. R.A. 	 10 (1877-
79), 505-34, and Silver Medal Prize Essay upon the same topic by Capt. E.R.
Elles, ibid., 558-76; Maj. T. Fraser, "Field Entrenching: Its Application
on the xiattLefield ...", (Gold Medal Prize Essay, 1879), J.R.U.S.I. 23
(1879), 339-401, and Military Prize Essay upon the same by uapc. iimiius
Clayton, ibid., 281-338.
58. Capt. Thilo on Trotha, Tactical Studies on the Battles around
Plevna, transi. Lieut. Carl Reichmann. (Kansas 1896).
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narrative by the cavalry reformer and. soldier of fortune, Valentine
Baker, supplemented these sober professional studies. 59
 Innumerable
passing reference to Plevna in the service and. civilian press over
the next twenty years show that it had become part of military legend.
As the first test since 1871 of a mass, conscript ari equipped
with breechloading rifles, the Russo-Turkish war was of particular
significance. In scale and intensity of losses, its operations were
of a kind. with the Prussian campaigns. During the second battle of
Plevna (30th July, 1878), for instance, nearly a quarter of the
Russian forces engaged was killed or wounded. The third and. great-
est attempt to take Plevna, in which some 80,000 infantry were
involved, caused losses of similarly awesine proportionsg some
18,000 men over two days of fighting.60 But in its duration, the
five-month seige of Plevna bore little resemblance to the major
battles of the Franco-Prussian war. The fundametital point at issue
was whether prolonged engagements fought around provi!ional forti-
fications would become a feature of future warfare in Europe.
Amongst those who gave serious attention to the subject, it soon
became habitual to stress that henceforth troops would be obliged
to entrench in the attack as well as the defence.61 On the other
59. Lieu!.-Gen. V. Baker, The War in Bulgaria (Lond. 1879) Greene
had his lighter moments in Sketches of Army Life in Rassia (Lond.. 1881).
60. Greene, op. cit., 200, 256, 224-61.
61. As wl1 as the views outlined in the succeeding paragraphs, see:
Lieut.-Col. C.P. Clery, Minor Tactics (6th. ed. Lond. 1883), 337-38;
Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Harrison "The Use of Field W,rks in War", U.S.M.
n.s. 9 (May-Sept. 1894), 111-27, espec. 125; Capt. Henry Rime, "The
Russo-Turkish Campaign of 1877-78", U.S.M. (1880), pt. 3, 20-32 , c30_40;
T.M. Magu.ire, "The Campaign of Plevna", u.S.M. u.s. 11 (April-Sept.
1895), 364-79, and. 464-75 (discussion).
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band, it seemed. inconceivable to most scientific soldiers that mere
earthworks could long withstand the power of modern artillery, if
properly handled. This conviction seemed to be given substance by
the three major studies of the war, all of which stressed the Russian
misconduct of the campaign.
Von Trotha pointed to the characteristic piling-up of Russian
infantry in a disordered swarm against the earthworks, futile
attempts to exploit successes with the bayonet rather than by fire,
the virtual absence of artillery manoeuvres, and over-reliance upon
long-range shelling. These factors, to his mind, satisfactorily
explained the prolonged success of Osxnan Pasha's defence.62 Clarke
wrote along identical lines. The failure of the grand assault of
11 September, for instance, could. be
 explained, in his judgment,
on purely tactical grounds. Russian attacks were universally
frontal, and artillery fire ceased as soon as the infantry began
their advance. Supplies of entrenching tools were meagre; ten
spades, three piokaxes, and. one crowbar to each company. On the
night of 11 September, exposed troops frantically scraped out shallow
depressions with bayonets and. canteen lids. It was only such
military ignorance, Clarke argued, that allowed the operations of
1877 to develop into a regular investment. Plevnas of the future
would have to be carried it once:
for the strain of modern war will not stand a five months'
siege of every stratcgically well-placed village which can be
garrisoned and. provisioned, and a study of the lessons affoded
62. Von Trotha, op. cit., 210-11, 222.
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by the Russian mistakes shows clearly how disasters similar
63to that above are to be avoided.
In Greene's work, the defects of Russian etrater and tactics,
frictions within the high comTnnd, and the poverty of intelligence
and. reconriaissane were presented as object lessons in military
incompetence. The reckless exposure of senior officers in battle
typified the way in which modern technolor and. eighteenth-century
methods were combined to disastrous effect; one genera]. was shot a
hundred yards from the indn redoubt 64 The abundance of such
evidence permitted Greene to reach the conclusion that:
the Russians were defeated at Plevna, not because the
position was impregnable, nor because they did not have
sufficient forces, but because they were ignorant of the
enemy's positith, and failed to concentrate their efforts
upon the decisive points.
None of these vriters considered the possibility that it was not
military ineptitude alone which had. prolonged the three battles of
Plevria.
Once the redoubt had fallen, the mobile character of the subbe-
quent operations, with the Russians' remarkable passage of the Balkans
in the winter of 1877-78, was less at odds with conteir'porary precon-
ceptions. Similar reassurance was offered by the well-executed
campaign in Armenia (April-December 1877). It was not difficult,
63. Clarke, op. cit., 141-42, and 86-142 (for third. battle of Plevna).
Similarly 26 assault on Nicopolis, 15 July 1877), 54, 33-58 (first and.
second. battles of Plevria).
64. Greene, op. cit., 196.
65. Ibid., 259, and. 185-202, 202-23.
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therefore, to regard Plevna as an aberration; significant, but as an
indication of what to avoid rather than of what was likely to occur in
a major war. This view was strengthened by the contemptuous opinion
most British had of the Turks and Ru.ssians as martial races. "These
wretched Turks were governed by a lot of intriguing women", Thomas
Maguire remarked waspishly to the Irish Military Society. 66
 An
anonymous contributor to the United Sez vice Magazine wrote of the
Russians, Bulgarians, and ThimRrd ans:
All three races are not only avaricious and untruthful, but
to these undesirable qualities are joined the most abject
meanness and the most detestable profligacy. In sensuality
their feelings are not controlled by either law, conscience,
or honour, while princes and peasants are alike barbarous in
their manners, resembling children in their aruseents and
women in their resentments.
Nonetheless, the battles around Plevna did provide another great model
of European warfare, and one rather different from the imaginary cam-
paigns fougit out in continental manoeuires. Swayed by the prevalent
interpretation of the Russo-Turkish war, British commentators accepted
that artillery could be effective against the deepest of entrenchinents.
Equally, many stressed that artillery must cooperate with infantry,
- and that junior officers must learn to devise, and their men to
66. "The Campaign of Plevna", U.S.M. n.s. 11 (April-Sept. 1895),
377.




A practical response was soon found to these appeals. The pre-
dominance of the technical aspects of gunnery in the education of
artillery officers was gradually modified. Practice camps were
established at Ijdd (1882), the Isle of Wight (1888) and, most
important, at Okehampton (1875). The last became a testing ground.
for new ideas, particularly for ways of circumventing or destroying
entrencbments. 6
	As already noticed, an earnest endeavour was made
in the mazioeuvres of the 1890s to coordinate guns and. infantry, and.
the elementary mistakes that occurred at least received severe
correction. 7° In 189]. the Commandant of the School of Gunnery,
Shoeburyness, was appointed Inspector of Artillery Instruction and,
in that capacity, was to examine the practice camps annually and
enaure uniformity of tactical and other practices. 71
 How far a
common doctrine deveroped. as a result of these innovations is another
question. The views of Colonel C.J. Long, commanding the artillery
at Colenso in December 1899, who allegedly reduced artillery tactics
68. See espec.: Capt. 1. Clayton, "Field. Entrenching ..." (R.U.S.I.
Military Prize Essay). J.R.U.S.I. 23 (1879), 308-20; Capt. E.R. Hues,
"On the Question of whether anyivelopment of the Material of Field.
Artillery is Necessitated. by the General Adoption of Entrenchments ..."
(R.A.I. Silver Nedc.]. Prize Essay), Proc. R.A.I. 10 (1877-79), 558-76;
R.A.I. Gold Medal Prize Essay on same topic by Lieut. P.M. Goold-Adams,
Proc. R.A.I. 10 (1877-79), 505-34; Naj. T. Fraser ,"F.eld Intrenching
..." (R.U.S.I. Gold NedEl Essay), J.R.U.S.I. 23 (1879), 339-401,
- eapec. 350, 397; Col. Robert Home, Precis of Modern Tactics (Lond.
1896), 30-31; Naj. E.S. May, "Why did. the Russian Artillery Pail at
Plevna?" U.S.N. n.s. 11 (April-Sept. 1895), 589-605; Lieut. A.N.
Nurraç "Russian Artillery Tactics during the late Campaign", Proc.
LA.I. 10 (1877-79), 379-87; Capt. J. Needhuii, "Lessons from the Late
War T1, J.R.U.S.I. 22 (1878), 941-53.
69. Capt. W.L. White, "Experiences at Okehampton in 1890", Proc. R.A.I.
18 (1890), 141-60; Capt. J. Headlam, "Okehampton, 1895, and the Progress
There in Recent Years", Proc. R.A.I. 23 (1896), 69-83.
70. Above, p. 90, notes 46, 47; and for an illustration of how pains-
taking artillery preparation had become a normal part of the attack by
the end of the century: Lieut. G.P. NacNunn "The Artillery at Dargai",
Proc. LA.I. 25 (1898), 173-78.
71. A.O. (1891), no. 47.
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to the axiom that "the only way to smash those beggars is to rush in
at them", suggest that in some quarters new ideas had. not penetrated
very far. 72 Moreover, as late as 1897 the Field Artillery Service
Handbook possessed no section on tactics. Similar reforms refined
infantry training. As a result of the Russo-urkish war, experiments
with entrenching tools were carried out and a light portable spade
adopted as part of infantry equipment. 73 Officer and. N.C.O. classes
for instruction in field entrenching were authorized in 1887.
	
The
modernity of these developments should not be overestimated; in 1888,
for example, the standard trench was only five feet long, two and. a
half wide, and one and a half deep.75
A critical attitude towards the continent had. become pervasive
in British tactical writing by the 1880s, but it was finally reinforced
by the "second tactical revolution", a term used by G.F.R. Henderson
to describe the changes in warfare wrought by the introduction of
smokeless powder, small-bore repeaters and, by the turn of the century,
quick-firing artillery. Smokeless powder first seems to have been used
by the German army in maxioeuvres of 1889. Early in the following year
its infantry were issued with a magazine rifle. 6 Full-scale experi-
ments with repeaters were conducted in Britain from 1887, and. in 1890
72. J.B. Atkins, The Relief of Ladysinith (Lond. 1900), 139.
73. Hansard, 3rd. series, 244 (27 March 1879), col. 1863; 1bi. 261
(10 May 1881), col. 173.
74. G.O. (June 1887), no. 80.
75. A.O. (Jan. 188), no. 9.
76. George Saunders, "The Employment of Large Cavalry Masses, of
Smokeless Powder ...", J.R.U.S.I. 34 (1890), 867; Report of the
Committee appointed ... to consider the Terms and Conditions of Service
in the Army Minutes of evidence, 454 (Maj. C. Barter, D.A.A.G.,
Intelligence Division). P.P. (C.6582, 1892), 19.
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the .303 Lee-Metford was introduced. 77 By the late 1890s every
European power had quick-firing guns under trial.	 In one important
respect, these inventions put a!]. European armies on a par. None bad
other than theoretical guidelines whereby to assess the implications of
the new technology for modern warfare. Henderson was quick to point
out that new, more than ever, a critical assessment should be made of
the prescriptive doctrines of continental tacticians. 79 As Maurice
later pointed out in the official history of the South African war:
The British Arny in 1899-1900 was dealing, as no European arnr
has yet done, with the new conditions of war. The weapons in
the hands of the opposr. forces were in point of efficiency
about in the same proportion to those with which thirty years
earlier the contest between Prance and Germany had been fought
out then stood to the Browa Bess of Waterloo.80
The tactical views of the British school, therefore, emerged
from the diverse in.fluences of insular traditions, foreign examples,
and new technology. On the issues connected with tactical forms and.
the relevance of colonial warfare the distinctive standpoint of these
reformcrs is apparent. But on the question of discipline, they were
at one with all other reformers. The ensuing discussion considers
all three aspects of tacics and training, taking the last first.
77. Hansa.rd. 3rd.. series , 319 (19 Au. 1887), col. 1100; ibi, 338
(22 July 188), col. 989 ibid, 349, (3 Feb. 1891), cola. 1631-84
(debate on new rifle).
78. Von Lobell's Annual Reports on Changes and. Progress in Military Matters,
pt. 3, .ransl. Lieut.-Co].. E. Gunter, J.R.U.S.I. 44 (1900), 154-55.
79. The Science of War (Lond.. 1910), 73.
80. History of th War in South Africa, eds. Maj.-Gen. Sir JP.
Maurice and Capt. J1.H. Grant., (Lond. 1906-10), II, 204.
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By the 1880s, the concept of a new discipline, based on trained
intelligence rather than mechanical obedience, had become a staple of
military discussion. In Captain Ian 1mii1ton's polemical pamphlet
of 1885, The Fighting of the Future, the concept found. brilliant
expression. The purpose of this tract was twofold; first, to draw
public attention to current deficiencs in training, and, second, to
counter the influence of military writers who were, in Wmilton's
opinion, slaves to continental teaching. His particular btes-noirs
were the textbook tacticians Francis Cler3r and C.B. Mayne. Reformers
such as these, Hnilton argued, merely wanted Britain to ape the armies
of the great powers. If she ever was to perfect a military system
based upon her imperial needs, she would have to strike out on an
independent path:
Through all the changes which have lately passed with bewilder-
ing rapidity over the British Army, no attempt at originality
is anywhere visible. The line formation, which, with its
comparatively greater fire front, used to roll up heavy
columns whenever it met them, had long stood far in advance
of any continental system; but when that line was outdone
on its own principle by the Germans, who used. a still more
extended formation ... we seemed to lose heart, and instead
of trying to regain our former pre-exninence, we save con-
tented ourselves with slavish imitations from the Prussian.
As it is evident that we can only carry out our mimicry on a
very miniature scale, such a course must, If persevered in,
81keep us immeasurably the military inferiors of our model.
81. The Fighting of the Future (Lond. 1885), 18, and., for references
to Clery azid Mayne, 16. Also see his Listening for the Drums (Lond.
1944).,l50.
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Like most inanifestoes, the Fighting of the Future dealt in broad
asseverations, and. made few concrete proposals. 1mlton's basic
contention was simply that, to produce the small, highly professional
army which Britain needed, mechanical discipline must be eradicated
and. troops trained primarily for colonial and. imperial warfare. As
an extreme imperialist, Thm{1ton believed that the a.rnty's future lay
solely within the empire, and. that to prepare to meet European armies
was profoundly misguided. But his tract was of real siguificance as
an indication, albeit an exaggerated one, of the current mood. of cer-
tain British reformers.
Whatever Thunilton liked to argue, the new discipline was not a
preserve of the imperial school. In 1889, the subject set by the
R.U.S.I. Council for its annual prize essay was: "Discipline: Its
Importance to an Armed Force and the Best Means of Promoting and.
Maintaining It". The published submissions, reflecting otherwise a
wide spectrum of military opinion, all expressed the conviction that
modern weaponry entailed intelligent rather than mechanical trdnirig
and the exercise of appropriate responsibility at every level.
These axioms began to appear in elementary textbooks and were embodied
in official doctrine.82
Regimental training was a less fruitful ground for new ideas than
the debating halls of the military societies, but theoretical discus-
sions were not devoid. of practical results. A succession of minor
reforms were introduced during the 1880s, and. doubtless owed. much to
82. Essays by Capt. J.P. Daniell, Capt. C.E.D. Telfer, Capt. P.C. Stone,
arid. Capt. A.M. Murray, all J.R.U.S.I. 33 (1889); Lieut, A.M. Murray,
"The Duties of Subaltern Officers", Proc. R.A.I. 11 (1880), 373-83;
Col. Robert Home, Preis of Modern Tactics (H.M.S.O. 1896), 51;
Lieut. Stewart Murray, Discipline: its Reason and Battle Value (Loud.
1894), and. his Fire Discipline (Lond. 1893). On official doctrine,
aee below, p. 126-28.
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Wolseley, who, as Adjutant-General to the Forces 1885-90, directed the
tratnlng of the home army. Radical improvements in musketry instruc-
tion were recommended by a committee which emined the subject in
1881. Its report urged that firing be practised at extreme ranges,
over broken country, and at moving targets, and that troops should be
put through an annual cotrse of training by their company officers and.
receive additional ammunition. 83
 The amnunition supply was increased
as recommended and. at least one commander enthusiastically adopted the
proposed methods of training before their general and belated acceptance
in the last decade of this priod. 84 During his commnd of the Eastern
District (1885-89), Sir Evelyn Wood instituted, an elaborate system of
flexible drill, giving especial freedom to company commanders and.
becoming much incensed with those who were too indolent to take
advantage of it. 85 Scarlet as a battledress was discredited by the
Colour Committee of 1883. Brick-red was seen foi the last time on a
British field of war during the Erptian campaign of the previous
year.86 During the 1890s, the question of a single dress for service
in peace and. war was discussed, but it was not until 1902 that troops
trained in the sane 'uniforms in which they were to fight.87
83. Report of the Committee on Nusketry- Instruction in the Army (1881),
xi, xv, xvi, W.0. 33/37. Similarly Report of the Committee on
Nusketry Instruction of the Army (1884), W.O. 33/42.
84. Hansard , 3rd. series, 269 (4 Nay 1882), cole. 66-67.
85. Wood to Edward Stanliope, 24 Oct.n.d.. (Prob. 1891), Staithope Papers,
'U1590/0315 (a description of his trairirig prograxmne as commander at
Coichester).
86. Report of Colour Committee (1883), V.0. 33/39; excerpts pub. as
comman i paper: p. p. (C.3536, 1883), 15; Gen. Sir C.N. Nacrea&y Annals
of an Active Life (Lond. 1924), 47, 52.
87. Viscount Wolseley to Lord. Lansdowne, 5 Oct. 1896, and. Lansdowne to
Wolseley, 13 Oct. 1896, W.0. 32/6332; Col. J.K. Dunlop, The Development
of the British Army 1899-1914 (Lond. 1938), 153.
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Junior officers were eventually authorized to exercise more
responsibility. In 1883 regimental instructors were abolished in
line battalions and their duties assumed by captains and subalterns.88
Pour years later the role of the adjutants of the home battalions was
restricted by the appointment, as their assistants, of subalterns
holding the ctra Certificate from the School of Musketry at Hythe.89
This instItution, established in 1853, had become a centre for
imaginative innovations in training, much to the amusement of army
traditionalists:
I was gay and blytbe
When I went to Ky-the
A soldier frank and. free
I was full of fun
Till I shoulderd. a n
At the School of Musketry.
I was spread out flat
On a cocoa-nut mat
On a gravelly rifle-range;
I lay on my chest,
And couldn t t digest
In that attitude cramped and. stran.e.
Though "Q" and. "R"
Were not so far,
I couldn't come off that day;
88. Hansard, 3rd.. series, 279 (10 Nay 1883), col. 382.
89. G.O. (April 1887), no. 41.
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The moment I got
Upon that spot
90The target vanished away.
In the debate over tactical forms an attempt was made to estab-'
lish a distinctly British tradition, whereby training should relin-
quish the rigid &rill of the past but avoid the massed disorder of
continental armies. At the outset of the period, there was a fairly
straightforward antithesis between the time-honoured British line and
the new swarm formation of the Prussians, and, as shown above, most
reformers favoured the latter. By the 1880s it was being widely
argued that the new discipline alone was insufficient to prevent
extension from degenerating into chaos, and that some sort of basic
line formation ought to be retained. Perhaps coincidentally, the
view that admixture of units had been carried too far in continental
armies tended to go hand-in-hand with resistance to the extremes of
offensive doctrine. P.N. Maude neatly summed up the opposing
tendencies of the British and German schools of thought by the 1890s:
Both start from the events of 1870 primarily, and yet, after
20 years, whereas in Germany we see steadiness on parade and
faith in the offensive raised to the first place in the
soldier's training, in England the advantages of the defensive
and. the uselessness of smartness under arms are accepted
almost unanimously as the cardinal points in our military
faith. ihile in Germany everything centres on the
90. AM many more stanzas of such doggerel in "A Ballad of Hythe",
Army and. Navy Magazine 15 (Nov. 1887-April 1888), 617-21. For Hythe:
The Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire in-to the Present State of
Military Education Second Report, appendix II, 193-225, and analysis
of evidence, xi.-xlv. p. p. (C.214, 1870), 24.
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destru.ction of the enemy first and the rest afterwards, in
England the avoidance of loss by the employment of suitable
formations is elevated to the dignity of a dogma.9'
The xiost elaborate statement of a British or at least Anglo-Saxon
school of tactics was made by G.F.R. Henderson in the series of leo-
tures and articles later published posthumously as The Science of War.
Henderson argued that the major continental armies had all permitted
the independence of units to go too far. The principle of company
initiative should be combined, he insisted, with the British tradition
of company subordination to the tactical leading of the battalion.
Henderson was confident that existing British forms, if imbued with
the new discipline and trained on flexible lines, would provide the
answer to current tactical problems. "We have no need. tc ask
another nation to teach us to fight", ha wrote.92
 Such views found
many proponents. The leading Scots volunteer J.H.A. MacDonald
repeatedly contended that the British compromise between rigid forma-
tions and. the "disorder swarm" should be maintained. In so doing he
was attacked both by traditionalists, and. continentalists such as
Lonsdale Hale and Lieutenant-General Sir Beauchamp Walker, but found
support from Maurice and Wolseley. 93
 During the l890s the United
Service Magazine, edited by Maurice from the begirming of the decade,
became a virtual forum for argnments on behalf of insif..ar traditions
91. "Twenty Years of Tactical Evolution in Germany", P.P.R.E. 20
(1894), 103, and 103-30.
92. The Science of War (Lond.. 1910), 130, and 117-64, espec. 139-40;
and similarly Henderson's "The Offensive Tactics of Infantry", U.S.M.
n.s. 7 (April-Sept. 1893), 959-60, and. "The Training of Infantry for
Attack", ibid., n.s. 19 (April-Sept. 1899), 491-512.
93. J.H.A. MacDonald., "The Changes Required in the Field Rcercise for
Infantry", J.R.U.S.I. 29 (1885), 143-79; "Ymfantry Training", ibid,
34 (l890 615-49.
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of tactics and training. One officer, indeed, went to far as to
write: "I must plead guilty to hating the very name of Cerinan when
it is used for purposes of drawing comparisons between them and. us.
It is only with reluctance that I make axy reference to them and to
their method of conducting an advance."94
Ideas associated with the new discipline and. the British view of
tactical forms proved to be equally influential in transforming the
infantry drill regulations. On the eve of the anco-Prussian war,
the field exercises were drawn up on strictly Wellirigtonian lines.
Open order was to be used. 'spaxingly and. kept under tight control.
Skirmishi.ig was emphatically only a supplement to the real attack,
for which undeviating linear tactics were prescribed. Nonetheless,
the light infantry tradition persisted. Local topography and. the
individual judgement of officers, it was emphasized, should. guide
extended formations n the rare occasions when their use was
advisable.95
 The 1874 edition of the Field Exercise contained
nothing that was new. In 1877, for the first time, the influence
of contemporary ideas was apparent.
94. A Company Officer, "Musketry Thxiring in the Arny", U.S.M. n.e.
5 (April-Sept. 1892), 261.
95. Field Exercise and Evolutions of Infantry (H.N.S.O. 1867), 213,
218-19, 361-67.
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A section on "extended order" replaced the regulations on skirmishing,
and. some attempt was made to explain basic tactical principles. Some
advice on nianoeuvres wa tendered, with the warning that a pettifogging
exactitude was not to be insisted upon during field aays. 6
 It could
no longer be assumed that good drilling was the answer to the demds
of modern tactics.
The subsequent edition explicitly adopted the general form of
the continental attack. Offensives were to be made in two major
lines, the first to be divided into fighting line, supports, and
reserves. Nevertheless, tie British line remained the standard
minor tactical formation. 97 It was not until the first edition of
Infantry Drill (1889) that some independence of thought was imnifest.
The flexible British line was to be retained, and. the battalion to
rem-in the chief tactical unit. Both in this and succeeding editions
admixture of units above the battalion was deprec.ted. 98 Although
normal formations were laid down, it was pointed out that these should
be tailored to contingent situations. A detailed shelter-trench
exercise was included in the infantry drill, and. direct control of
fire committed to company officers. The time-honoured mytholor of
the attack was perpetuated in some rospects. Concealment during the
culmination of an engagement was virtually forbidden, and the drill-
book drew a typical picture of the final rush; British lines storming
- entrenchments with cheers, beating drums, and bayonets fixed. None-
theless, these regulations constituted a remarkable acceptance in
official doctrine of the altered conditions of war, and the theme of
96. Field Exercise arid Evolutions of Infantry (H.N.S.O. 1877), 9l-.Ol, 209-il.
97. Field Exercise and Evolutions of Infantry (H.LS.O. 1884), 212, 213, 289,
and 287-312.





the new Infantry Drill was that:
Tactics should be studied rather than drill, accidents of
the ground rather than precision ... The success of every
attack depends very much upon the individual action of the
soldier fighting in extended order. This method of fighting
demands not only greater individual exertion and. intelligence,
but far higher and more complete instruction and. training both
of officers and men than mere parade movements.99
In the drillbook of 1892 the principle of subordinate respon-
sibility was carried to its logical conclusion and a standard form of
attack explicitly forbidden. The mrrner in which this innovation
was announced had a ring of modernity; it was embodied in a provision-
al edition so that officers should have some opportunity for discussion
before a more definitive d.rillbook should be comii1ed.1
	
Plalrly,
the adoption of such new ideas owed much to the European-wide climate
of tactical opinion since the Austro-Prussian war. But British
reformers had made them very much their own. The British line
remained, as did the supremacy of the battalion. The most novel
passages in the 1889 tmfantry Drill were written by Wolseley himself,
only a year after fixed formations in the attack had been proscribed.
in the German drillbook. 10' It would be interesting to know who
wrote these words in the Infantry Drill of 1893 (111):





(Provisional H.M.S.0. 1892), 94, 110, 111;
3 (31 March 1892), cole. 352-53; A.O. (June
101. Wolseley to the Duke of Goinaught, 30 Sept. 1889 Wolseley Papers,
Private Letter Book, 103-19, W/PLB 1; Spenser Wilkinson, '!Military
Literature and the British ArnSr", U.S.M. n.e. 3 (April-Sept. 1891), 512;
Von Lobell's Annual Reports on the Changes and. Progress in Militar y Matters
f.R.U.S.I. 43 (July-Dec. 1899), 1331.
129.
The conditions of modern warfare render it imperative that
all ranks shall be taught to think, and, subject to general
instructions and accepted principles, to act for themselves.
Every skirmish, every fight, influenced by many different
considerations, offers a problem which can only be grappled
with at the time, and cannot be treated under set conditions.
Controversy over tactical forms extended to one of the most
vigourously debated subjectsin this period: battalion organisation.
By 1880 every major army in Europe had. adopted the Prussian organisa-
tion of a battalion into four companies. The British battalion alone
had. eight. A large company gave scope for subdivisions - such as
the German zuge - which could act with a measure of independence. In
the German army, the company was the basic tactical unit and., in the
attack, pr3vid.ed. its own. supports and. reserves until the hi€h units
began to mingle in the firing line) 02
 Company subdivisions, or the
group system, were advocated on occasion in Britain but never intro-
duced into the Victorian aruy- 1o3
 In accordance with the organisation
of their battalions, junior officers in the major continental armies
received a degree of responsibility and education substantially greater
than tnat of their British counterparts. In Italy, Russia, Austria,
and. Germany, infantry officers underwent postgraduate trafnirtg at
102. An Outline of the Attack Formations for Infantry in the Austrian,
Prench, German, and Italian Armies (E.I!E.s.0. 1881), 3-6, 6-9, 9-12.
Tracts 1879-81; Fnory Upton, The Armies of Asia and. Europe ... (N.Y.
1878), 270-75; Capt. J.W. Buxton, Reports on the Changes which have
been Introduced in the Organization of the Italian Arny (Nov. l77),
W.0. 33/32.
103. Capt. A.M. Murray, "Discipline: Its Importance to an Armed Force
...", J.R.U.S.I. 33 (1889), 438-41; J.H.A. MacDonald, "Infantry
Trainfig", ibid., 34 (1890), 62227.
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institutions of higher military education once they had qualified at
equivalents to the R.LC.104 Save for Hytbe, the Victorian army
possessed nothing resembling these infantry schools of the continent,
although eyemiriMions for promotion were authorized for infantry
105officers in 1872 and made more rigorous in 1880.
	 Moreover,
schools for non-commissioned officers were widespread Dfl the continent.
Again, save for occasional specialized courses in range-finding and
signalling, there was no parallel to these in Britain.106
All British reformers accepted, after the Prussian campaigns,
that subalterns and. captains should learn to exercise a greater degree
of responsibility than that to which they had been accustomed. The
question naturally arose as to whether this could be facilitated by
introducing the double company and. reducing the control of battalion
commander and staff over junior officers. A remarkable amount of
heated debate was soon generated over the question of company size,
quite disproportionate to its significance. The inte:est aroused by
the subject, Charles Brackenbury remarked contemptuously, typified
the narrowness of military thought in Britain. 107 Nonetheless, most
104. Upton, op. cit., 129-33, 152-58, 172-81; Capt. W.S. Cook, Memorandum
on the System of Military Education in Austria (Topographical and.
Statistical Dept. 1872), 1, 4-6.
105. "Regulations Respecting First Appointments and. Thrimtnationa for
- Promotion", G.0. (1873), no. 35; Third Report on the Education of
Officers by the Director-General of Militaxy Education (Lieut.-Gen. Sir
C.P. Beauchamp Walker), 17-23. P.P. (C.3818, 1883), 15.
106. Upton, op. cit., 119-21, 191-92; Cooke, op. cit., 2-3; Gen. Sir
Edward Thm1ey, "The Armies of Russia and Austria", Nineteenth Certury
3 (Jan-June 1878), 853, 857; Anon, "Army Reorganization in Prance",
U.S.M. (Misc. 1871-72), 254.
107. Comment upon Col. idwaxd Clive, "The Influence of Breech-loading
Aims on Tactics ...", J.R.U.S.I. 22 (1877), 848.
13]..
commentators appreciated that battalion organisation was relevant to
current and major issues of tactics and training.
The opposing groups clashed in dehate at the R.U.S.I. in 1877.
Colonel Edward Clive, the lecturer on the occasion, urged that Britain
follow prance and. Germany in adopting double companies. He was
supported by Colonel Lonsdale Hale, General Sir Beauchamp Walker,
Military Attachi to Prussia during the 1870-71 war, and Colonel Sir
Luxnley Grahni, prominent as a translator of German works. A number
of speakers then rose to defend, at inorcHrute length, the English
system. 108
 In Lord Wolseley, who chaired he meeting, they found an
energetic defender. Large companies, he insisted, were no more
pertinent to military efficiency than was the Prussian spiked helmet.
Small companies, to his mind, were admirably suited both to the frag-
mented conditions of the modern battlefield and to the detached duties
-'-
so often demanded of troops in irregular warfare. He was emphatic
that it was this, rather than the hrpothatical requirements of a great
continental war, which should guide the development of British drill.'09
G.P.R. Henderson and the artillerist Henry Hime were amongst the
more notable reformers to concur with Wolseley, and Hixne criticized




109. mid, 859-62, and similarly Wolseley's comments upon Col. C.B.
Brackenburr, "The Latest Development of the Tactics of the Three Arms",
J.LU.S.I. 27 (1883), 11.81.
110. Henderson, The Science of War (Lond. 1910), 150; Capt. U.W.L. Hime,
"On the Development of Infantry Fo.mations ...", U.S.M. (1878), pt. 3,
24, 25, and. his Stray Military Papers (Lond. 1897), 58; Capt. J.P. Maurice,
Advantages and Defects of an Organiza,ion of the Batt ].ion into 4 or 6Uompanies, as Illustrated, by the Austrian Army (J3ft3), 7-59 W.O 3/32.Also see: Maj. Arthur Griffiths, The English Army ... (Lond 1878), 227-29
pro imal]. companies); Col. W.V Knollys, "Suggestions"
	
S.M. (18861, pt.1
-12 (çonl. Anon "Siggeste. A1eration in the Cadres ol oi4içers of Inlan!ry",ibid, (18 (s), pt. , 167 (con); Naj. A. S. Hardinge, "The Training and Organisa-
'ion of a Company of Infantry", ibid, n.s. 8 (Oct. 1893-April 1394), 176(con); Arion,ibid,, 247-50 (con); Lieut.-Gen. W.J'. Williams, "Note on Infantry
Tactics", Proc. R.A.I. 20 (1893), 552 (con).
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of sufficient importance to be discussed within the War Office during
the late 1870s. General Sir Charles Ellice, the Adjutant General,
agreed with Wo].seley and developed an intricate arguznmt on behalf of
small companies which, at every stage, compared British with continen-..
tal circumstances. "In this matter", he concluded, "as in many others,
to build a Prussian house on English foundations, wou3J be a costly
if not a dangerous exercise."	 Yolseley reiterated his opinions in
private correspondence, and commented in his usual biting way upon
the tendency of some of his colleagues to adopt, "inorikeylike", the
112trappings of the German success.
	 In the event, small companies
were preserved until a new era of military reform was beginning in
1902. The debate over company size may not have been of much prac-
tical sigeificance, but it sheds an interesting sidelight upon the
temper of a.rny- reform in the late nineteenth century.
Few reformers of the British school would have agreed with
Wolseley and Ian 1TnrUton that the axnr should direct its organisa-
tion and training solely according to the needs of imperial rather
than European warfare, but all were convinced that small wars provided
useful, if limited, lessons. With respect to tactical thought and
perhaps tc training, colonial warfare was of modest importance. On
U].. "Memorandum by the Adjutant Genera]. on proposal to reduce the
number of Companies in a Battalion from 8 to 4", (8 March 1877); Memo.
by Maj.-Gen. Sir G. Wolseley on ibid, (6 March 1877); Naj.-Gen. Sir
Patrick MacDougall, "On the PropiI to change the Organisation of our
Field Battalions ... t', (8 March 1877), supporting Ellice. All W.0.
33/34.
112. "Notes upon Sir Daniel Irsons' Attack Formation. Memorandum of
the 9th March 1882 by Naj .-Gen. Sir Archibald Alison", in • s., with
marginilia by Wolseley, Wolseley Papers, W/MEM 1; Wolseley to Duke of
Connaught, 30 Sept. 1889, Private Letter Book, 103-119, Wolseley Papers,
W/PLB 1. Cambridge and Wolseley had. one of their rare moments of agree-
ment over this question; see Hansard ,3rd. series , 260 (5 April 1881),
col. 714.
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occasion, it could provide a negative influence. Obviously, in an
encounter with an eneixr armed with grossly inferior weaponry, it was
legitimate to adopt tactics which would have been suicidal in European
warfare. While the more perceptive officers took this fact for
granted, 113 the less acute assumed that the efficacy of dated tactics
in irregu.ar campaigns vindicated traditional forms of training.
Victorian military history is dotted with celebrated examples of
commanders employing to resounding success methods obselete by current
European standards. For the engagement at Gi glov during the Zulu
war, Lord Chelmsford. arranged his men kneeling, in a massed, four-.d.eep
formation. At tJlundi they formed compact lines three-deep. Pi f'
the troops were striitiing upright and all fired by volleys.114 At
El Teb, during the Sudan campaign, the Dervishes were actually charged
by Highlanders in square, and the fighting became almost mediaeval in
character:
The battle was too fierce to permit of time to emity cartridges,
let alone load rifles. These men and their comrades opposed
stee'. with steel ... Two Highianders made over a dozen of
their foemen bite the dust before they fell from loss of blood
sustained by cuts from thrown spears. While they fought they
used not only their rifles, the bfr.ts as well as the bayonets,
113. Capt. Charles Caliwell Small Wars Their Princiles and Practice
(H.M.S.O. 1896), 205-06; Col. J.F. Naurice, "The Advantages of a simple
Drill Nomenclature consistent for all arms ...",J.R.U.S.I. 32 (1888), 96.
114. Report of the Committee on Misketry Instruction &n the Army (1881)
Ninutes of evidence, 36-40 W.0. 33/37.
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but when the Arabs closed in they hit out with their fists in
115the scramble.
Despite his experiences, Lieutenant-General Sir Gerald Graliani, coTmn-
der at El Teb, was of adranced views.h16 But to those who believed in
fixed forms arid the innate courage of the British soldier, such episodes
confirmed, as one officer remarked, the value of rigid drill and the
"shoulder to shoulder 1ine".7
In contrast, reformers of the British school stressed the positive
aspects of small wars. Initially, some reformers attempted to draw
lessons from colonial campaigns of immediate relevance to conventional.
warfare. In his history of the Ashanti war of 1873, Henry Brackenbury
argned valiantly (and. perhaps partly from loyalty to his chief) that
Wolseley's directions for bush-fighting in West Africa embodied the
ee8enc of modern tactics.
	
hort1y before the advance t Kumas!,
Wolseley issued a memorandum to the troops which gave them advice on
jungle fighting; to be vigilant in outposts and. scouting, to practise
concealment, and so on. 8 To Brackenbuxy, recently returned from
Prance, these sensible but self-evident maxims, when issued by a
115. Bennett Burleig±i (War Correspondent for the Daily Telegraph),
Desert Warfare Being the Chronicle of the Eastern Sudan Campaign
(Loud. 1884), 174-75, 49.
116. "Infantry Fire Tactics: Attack Formations and Squares", J.LU.S.I.
30 (1886), 233-74, espec. 233-43.
117. Comment by Col. Davies upon IEaj. (J.A. Barker , "Some Suggestions as
to the Better Training of Our Infantry", J.R.U.S.I. 30 (1886), 167.
Similarly see: Chelmsford's evidence before the Report of the Committee
on Muaketry Instruction in the Artpy, op._cit., 36-40, and his comment
upon Barker, op. cit., 185-86; Anon, 	 Dissertation on Square versus
Line", U.SJ. (1879), pt. 3, 201.
118. Repr. Capt. H. Brackenbury, The Ashanti War A Narrative Prepared.
from the Official Documents (Loud. 1874), I, 361-66.
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general whom he admired, became of especial significance:
Let those who think that warfare of this kind, is not calculated
to teach lessons useful for warfare on a grander scale read this
order, and. see whether it does not breathe in every line the
spirit of the teaching of the war of 1870. It recogmtses,
amongst other points, the vital importance of giving indepen-
dence of action to small units, and proposes to carry out on
this system exactly what had been done by our fathers, in the
days when the Light Division in the Peninsula - could beat all
119
other troops in the world in skirmishing
By the next decade, however, a clear recognition of the differen-.
ces between conventional and irregular warfare had. emerged. Well
before the publication of Caliwell's famous Small Wars in 1896,
several writers sought to prove that imperial warfare conatitu.ted a
•	 •	 .	 .	 . •
	 120distinct genre, and required. special skills and training. 	 Even
as a subaltern, Charles Callwell became known as an expert upon small
wars, and in 1887 won an R.U.S.I. Military Prize for an essay discus-
sing their professional ignificance) 21
 His work received semi-
official approval when his Small Wars was published by Her Majesty' a
119. IbId, I, 367.
- 120. Lieut. R. da Costa Porter, 'Warfare Against Uncivilized Races ...",
P.P.R.E. 6 (1881), 305-60; Sir Samuel White Baker, "Experience in
Savage Wa"fare", (less coherent), J.R.U.S.I. 17 (1873), 904-21; Col.
J.C. Gawler, "British Troops and Savage Warfare, with peoiaJ. Reference to
the Kafir Wars", Thid, 922-39; "Memo 'by Sir John Mitchell regarding fight-
ing Kaffirs in S. 1rica", (28 Jan. 1878), Chelmsford Papers. Files 1-2.
121. "Notes on the Tactics of our Small Wars", Proc. R.A.I. 12 (1881-
84), 531-52; "Notes on the Strater of our Small Wars", jbid,, 13 (1885),
403-20; "Lessons to be Learnt from the Campaigns in which British Forces
have been employed since the Year 1865", J.R.U.S.I. 31 (1887), 357-412.
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Stationery Office and. under the auspices of the Intelligence Division.
Caflwell and like-minded. authors all stressed that unmodified.
European methods were inapplicable to irregular operations. The
point was made admirably by Caliwell himself:
The conduct of small wars is in fact in certain respects an
art by itself, diverging widely from what is adapted to the
conditions of regular warfare, but not so widely that there
are not in all its braxes points which permit comparisons
122to be established.
This general perception was significant, but in analysing small wars
on a theoretical plane it was difficult to go beyond commonsense.
Even Caliwell could slip into banality. He closed a long discussion,
for instance, on the adoption of the breechloader by North-West fron-
tier tribes with the lame conclusion "that the reult of this traffic
in arms will be to sensibly increase th dangers to which the forces
of civilization are exposed") 23
 Useful as small wars were as tests
of new weaponry and equipment, they proved to be a barren source for
tactical lessons which could be applied in trnng. A brief ection
on "Savage Warfare" was included in the 1893 drillbook, but it merely
sanctioned close formations if waxranted by the occasion.' 24
 No
attempt was made to distinguish between conventional and irregular
operations in home training.
122. Small Wars (H.M.s.o. 1896), 21.
123. Col. Charles Callwell Tii'ah 1897 (Lond. 1911), 151-52.
124. Infrn±ry Drill (H.M.S.o. 1893), 109-10.
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The performance of the army in small wars was, however, of
immediate relevance to the controversy over short service. Evexy
success in imperial warfare was grist to the reformers' mill, arid.
even when circumstances were ambiguous they tended to defend the
reputation of the short service soldier. Conversely, his critics
found that small wars provided ample evidence wherewith to strengthen
their case against the new system. One of the better-known encoun-
ters between the opposing schools occurred during the Zulu war.
Surveying the chaotic situation upon his arrival in South Africa as
commanding general, Sir Garnet Wolseley told the Duke of Cambridge:
"It is no question of young soldiers, but of bad. leading." 125 Anti-
Cardwellites judged otherwise, and were confirmed in their prejudices
by a supposedly impartial observer, Sir William Russell. In a notor-.
ious Daily Telegraph article of the 21 November 1879, the great jour-
nalist launched an astonishing attack upon the character and. morale
of the modern British soldier. Troops in South Africa, he wrote:
are a positive terror to peaceable citizens ... Women
are flying to the large towns, where there are some guarantees
of safety in the shape of police, as though they were hunted
out by the Zulus or Swazis.
Undoubtedly, it was remarked in the United Service Magazine, Cardwell
126
was to blame for this collapse in morale and discipline. 	 However
valuable during the Crimean war, Russell' s searing rhetorical skills
were misapplied in this case. Nagistrates' reports conclusively
125. Wolseley to Cambridge, 4 June 1879, South Africa, Nilitary:
Private Letter Book, 13, Wolseley Papers, BA 2.
126. Anon, "Boy Soldiers in the Field", u.s.i. (1880), pt. 1, 481.
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demonstrated the exaggeration and. even fantasies of Russell's assevera-
127tions.	 Corroboration of his charges were requested by the Natal
Witness, which received no response.' 28
 Indeed., for the entire force
in South Africa, only eight convictions for assault and eighteen for
theft were recorded from the 1st July to the 10th October, 1879. The
local press as well as British generals testified to the admirable
behavioui. of the troops. Even Chelmsford conceded that short service
soldiers lacked nothing in military discipline so long as (he added
as a tactical conservative with an eye to the main chance) they were
moved in close formations and under the tight surveillance of their
129
officers.
Wolseley himself was deeply angered:
I now hear that all these Royalties who wear the outward
appearance of soldiers, have agreed to back up Billy Russell
in his controversy with me because they hope that by so doing
they may injure or break down the present army system.
During the official enquiry into the allegations he emphatically
defended. the performance and reputation of the rank and. file)30'
But intent as he was to exculpate short service soldiers from blame
127. Army (Conduct of the Troops in Sith Africa), 15-31. P.P. (1880) 42.
128. Wolseley to B.C. Childers, S. of S. for War, 2 Feb. 1880. Thid, 3-4.
129. Lord Chelmsford to Gen. Sir Charles KLlice, A.G. to the Forces, 16
Feb. lE8O; Maj.-Gen. Newd.igate to Elliee, 13 Feb. 1880; articles in
Natal Witness, 31 Jan. 1880, the Times of Natal, 2 Feb. 1880, enclosed
in Wolseley to Childers, 2 Feb. 1880; Natal Witness, 12 Feb. 1880,
enclosed Li Landdrost .0. Ueckormrn to Lieut.-Col. Renry Brackenbury, 5
Feb. 1880. All in Army(Conduct of the Troops in South Afrc), 1-2, 6-7,
P.P. (1880), 42.
130. Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, 11 April 1880,, Wolseley Papers, V/P 9,
and. Wolseley to Childers, 2 Feb. 1880, op. cit.
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for military defeats, Wo].seley did not hesitate to praise them in
victory. Writing of his suppression of the Basuto chief Sekukuni
in 1880, Wolseley coimnented. that the young soldiers whom "H.R.H. is
never tired of abusing behaved very well".131 Wolse1eys famous
Tel-el-Kebir dispatch gave his infantry the highest enco''iuxns, arid
explicitly criticized those who still harped upon the youth and
unsteadiness of the modern British private.132
Experiences in colonial warfare contributed directly to another
area of tactical change training of troops with machine-guns. prom the
early l870s ontTards, this was one of the leading qiestions of the
day, to ue a contemporary phrase. Discussion focused, typically,
upon the exact status the nevl arm should possess; whether it ought to
be ittegrated with artillery or infantry, or form an independent corps.
Most commentators were agreed, however, upon the importance of machine-
guns, and felt that their performance in Rmi 1 wars shnuld. be thoroughly
examined. Such debate was strictly professional, arid the machine-gun's
potential for human destruction was treated in a clinical xnanner)33
131. South African Journal 1879/80. Entry 28 Nov. 1879, V.0. 147/7.
132. Wolseley to H.C. Childers, 16 Sept. 1882, enclosing report on Tel-el
Kebir, 13 Feb. 1882, V.0. 32/6096. Siriilarly on the Nile expedition:
Gen. Lord Wolseley to Lord Hartington, S. of S. for War, n.d. ('ec'd. 2
Feb. 1885), V.0. 32/6115.
133. Anon, '!Machine-Guns: Their Status in Warfare", , S.M. (1881),
pt. 3, 127-48, 330-40, 439-51; Lieut. Charles Callwell, "Notes on the
Tactics of our Small Wars", Proc. R.A.I. 12 (1881-84), 551; Lieut.-
Col. George Fosberry, "Machine-Guns and Their Enployment", U. S.M. (1883),
pt. 1, 278-92; Capt. J.R. Jocelyn, "The Equipment of Field Artillcry",
(Gold Medal Prize Edy for 1881), Proc. R.A.I. 11 (1879-81), 566-68;
Lieut.-Col.. W.V. Knollys (here, atypically, on the side of chanRe),
"The Importance of .iIachine-Guns in the .Lrny", U.S.M. (1883), pt. 2,
542-57, "Awake, Lord Hartingtonl", tbid, (1884), pt. 1, 639; Capt.
W.N. Lloyd, "A Machine-Gun Battery in Burma", Proc. R.A.I. 15 (1887),
377-82.
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In particular, the journal of the R.U.S.I. became a forum for
advocates of machine-gun corps, who frequently adduced examples from
colonial wars in support of their arguments. Even mishaps such as
the j rnmthg of the Gardner at Abu Klea in the Sudan (17 January 1885),
a matter actually raised in the Commons, failed to dampen their
enthusiasm) 34
 As Captain E. Rogers remarked:
It can, indeed, scarcely be doubted, that as an auxiliary
arm, Ga-tlings are peculiarly suited to colonial defensive
operations as well as for retaliating demonstrations against
troublesome neighbours, in. countries where our er9mies axe
numerous but ill-armed, where roads are few and. unsuited to
wheel traffic	 135...
Practical changes followed in the wake of theoretical discussions.
Chelmaford used Catlings at GingiIthlovQ4 (2 April 1879) and. tllundi
(4 July 1879), the armoured train at Alexandria in 1882 was mounted
with a Nord.enfelt and Gatlings, while their use in. the Afghan and
Sudan campaigns of 1879-80 and. 1884-85 is a matter of common knowledge.136
134. Hansard. ,3rd. series , 295 (19 March 1885), col. 1713, and:
LG. Gardner "Machine-Guns and How to Use Them", J.R.U.S.I. 26 (1882),
103-14, espec. 108-14 (discussion); Maj. N.R. West, "Suggestions for the
Adoption and. Adaptation of the Single Barrel Machine-Gun for the Various
Branches of Land Service", J.R.U.S.I. 30 (1886), 21-36; Capt. R.H.
.Armit, "Machine-Guns, their Use and Abuse", J.R.U.S.I. 30 (1886), 37-
- 68; Lieut. G.E. Benson, "Machine-Guns: Their Tactics and. Equipment",
J.R.U.S.I. 31 (1887), 937-72; Capt. W.J. Robertson, "Horse Artillery",
J.R.TJ.S.I. 32 (1888), 634, 645, 650; Naval and Military Notes, J.R.U.S.I.
40 (1896J, 472-75.
135. "The Gatlirig Gun; its Place in. Tactics", J.R.U.S.I. 19 ( 1875), 47.
136. Narrative of the Field Operations Connected with the Zulu War
(LLS.Q. 1881), 162, 1(4; Col. J.P. Maurice, Military History of the
Campaign in rpt (Lond. 1887), 14.
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Finally, after prolonged, experiments at Okehampton, the War Office in
1887 enforsed. the principle that inachine- .guns should form part of the
standing equipment of the home arm)r) 37 By 1893 every brigade of
infantry possessed a machine-gun corps maintaining two guns, some
battalions held additional guns, and. a proportion of officers and.
N.C.O. s were annually trained in their v.se) 38 The fact that this
service was not represented in any other European arn during the
nineteenth century indicates that, at least in one respect, British
reformers were displaying a more flexible attitude than their continen-
tal counterparts. 139 While the Germans ar1 renoh looked back to the
unhappy performance of the mitrailleuses in 1870, the British had
first-band experience of the machine-gun's dreadful efficacy in war.
The period under review witnessed a transformation of tactical
ideas, but it took a generation or more to work out their implications.
When the British arnj was forced to grapple with the conditions of the
magazine rifle battlefield, new ideas were still at an early stage of
implementation. Enough evidence of practical change exists, however,
to make nonsense of the offhand condemnations of nineteenth century
training so often found. in contemporary arid, historical writings.
Statements to the effect that the army as a school for war resembled
in 1899 "nothing more or less than a giant Dotheboys' Halll,14o tiiat
the "Brown Bess mind predominated, looking upon war as an unending
137. Capt. R.H. Armit, "Machine-Guns, their Use and Abuse", 1LR.U.S.I.
30 (1886), 37; Hansard, 3rd.. series, 311 (25 Feb. 1887), col. 577.
138. Army Book, 156, 159.
139. Thid, 507.
140. L.S. .Ainery- (ed.) The Times History of the War in South Africa II
(Lond. 1902), 33.
141.
succession of Peninsula engagements - of shoulder to a1iou]4er forma-
tions, of volleys in rigid lines and. of,a1].-1ike bayonet assaults",141
require more than qualification; they are simply incorrect. After
its initial disasters in 1899, the aruty's adjustment to the tactical
conditions of South Africa owed. much to prewar developments in thought
and training. Lord. Roberts' famous "Notes for Guidance in South
African Warfare", 1ke his preface to the Infantry Training of 1902,
the	 142
were not simply a response to/second Boer war. 	 They read, in fact,
very much as a textbook summary of the advanced tactical ideas of the
previous two decades. Insofar as faulty tactics played a part at
all in the British defeats of 1899, they resulted., not from the
Aldershot teaching of the 1890s, but from a failure to act in accor-
dance with it.
This is not to imply that twentieth century trench warfare was
generally anticipated. Even the most perceptive of reformers were
confident that solutions to modern tactical problems would. not elude
the scientifically trained soldier. For every writer who uneasily
anticipated a "long, laborious, and sanguinary war of sconces",143
a score were assured that "men are either victorious or beaten in
one day •••,,•144 Just occasionally, the intuition was recorded.
that Plevna had not been an aberration in European warfare, but an
adumbration of its future course:
141. J.F.C. Puller, The Last of the Gentlemen's Wars (Lond. 1937), 19-20.
142. Report of His Naesty's Commissioners appointed. to Inquire into
the War in South frica Report, appendix H, 531-33 (repr. of Roberts'
"Notes"), P.P. (0.1789, 1904), 40.
143. Capt. E.Rogers, "Fieldworks", U.S.M (1878), pt.1,
144. Capt. J.P. Cadell, "Ammunition Columns aid Parks ••.", (Duncan
Cold Medal Prize Essay for 189 6), Proc. R.A.I. 23 (1896), 294.
142.
There will be a new departure in strate€y, the ruling condition
and. keynote of which will be that the pieces wherewith the
stretegists play will be, for the moment, and. for an uncertain
145time to come, irremovable from the board.
145. LieuL.-Col. H. Eladale, "The Evolution of the Art of War", U.S.L
u.s. 11 (April-Sept. 1895), 586. Simflitvly his "The Coming Revolution
in Tactics and Strategy", Contemporary Review 62 (July-Dec. 1892),
245-57.
C!?APTER 5.
Cavalry and Mounted Infantry: Debate and Thaining.
143.
By the late nineteenth century, the cavalry was on the eve of
obsolescence. It remains, nonetheless, a subject of interest and
importance. Even the most progressive reformers failed to foresee
the imminent demise of horse-mounted soldiers as a weapon of war,
and. theL..' future was debated as one of the great issues of the day.
Moreover, until well past the turn of the century, cavalry remained
a major way to gather and transmit information on the field of battle.
With respect to the theme of this study, the cavalry debate is of
particular significance. For in Great Britain alone of European
powers were mounted infantry established as part of the regular
organisation for war, and. this measure was a direct response to
observation 'f a non-European army (that of the u.s.) and to the
exigencies of colonial campaigning. It is still true to say that
much of the cavalry controversy displays the limitations of army
reform in this period. The sentiment and. romanticism enveloping the
long history of the horse in warfare could render otherwise shrewd
and conimonsensical reformers quite njopic and. misty-eyed. Not only
conservatives would. have sympathized with the young officer who, when
eirn,fned. on the role ol' cavalry in modern war, allegedly wrote: "The
chief role of Cavalry on the modern battlefield is to give tone to the
proceedings, and. thus prevent what, in their absence, might otherwise
degenerate into nothing but a vulgar Infantry brawl."
1. Discussion on the battle of Vionville, comment by Naj. W. Verner.
U.S.M. n.s. 10 (May-Sept. 1894), 46 (like many good stories,
probably apocryphal). Lord. .Anglesey, The British Cavalry (2 vols.
Lond. 1973 and 1975), is the standard. work on the cavalry from 1815 to
1870, and conveys the atmosphere of the period, with a v'ass of fascinating
and. meticulous detail. H. Moyse-Barlett, Nolan of Balaclava Louis
Edward Nolan and his influence on the British Cavalry (Lond.. 1971),67-93, and. Brian Bond, 'Doctrine and. Training in the British Cavalry,
1870-1914", in Michael Howard (ed.), The Theory and Practice of War
(Lond. 1965), provide valuable analyses of the mid and. late Victorian
cavalry respectively.
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The immediate lessons of the Pranco-Prussian war for the cavalry
were twof old.. First, it was apparent that it must learn to diversify
its functions. No longer was it merely the arm of shock aM the
charge; it had also become the chief channel of communication from
the forefront of the newly-extended battlefield to the comminder- .in--
chief. Secondly, continental writers stressed that the cavalry had
a major and. spectacular role to play in future warfare by preceeding
the main arnr and. destroying the enemy's screen of security in a great
cavalry encounter. Then, at the decisive moment, the troopers were
to secure the fruits of victory by charging the disintegrating enemy
units aM launching the pursuit. Sta.idard cavalry doctrine focused,
therefore, upon the service of security and. the strategic role of
shock. Emphases upon these two functions were nicely balanced iii
Kraft's famous Letters on Cavalry, of all forei studies of the
smbject perLaps- the one most frequently cited by British iriters.a
Recormaissance was the theme of General Verdy du Vernois' case-study
of cavalry on patrol, a work which went throu.gi five English editions
in the nineteenth century. 3 His approach was imitated in a French
analysis of a squadron on recormaissa.n'e, also translated and set, as
its foreword indicates, as a Staff College text.4
2. Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe, Letters on Cavalry, traxisl. Lieut.-Col.
N.L. Walford. (Lond. 1889).
3. Studies in Troop Leading The Cavalry Division, transi. LT.
Harrison. (Lond. 1887) Editions recorded. in the catalogue of the
British Library.
4. Capt. R. de Biensan, The Conduct of a Contact Squadron, transl.
Maj. C.W. Bowdier Bell. . (Lond.. J.d83) Similarly F.C.G. Pelet-Nrwbonne,
Cavalry on Service, illustrated by the Advance of the German Cavalry
across the Mosel in 1870, transi. Maj. D'A Legard. (Lond. 1906);
Lieut.-Ccl. Bonie, . "The French Cavalry in 1870 with its Tactical
Results", Cavalry Studies from two Great Wars, ed. Capt. A.L. Wagner
(u.s. army). (Kansas 1896).
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As the experiences of 1870 receded, the obsession with cavalry
action en masse grew. Genera]. du Nogrier, for instance, assured the
Prench cavalry in 1897 that no existing weaponry could resist its
"raging attacks". It must abjure its firearms in the assault; all
that was needed was cavalry sceptical of science, "believing only in
the immense moral force it has within it". 5 The manoeuvres carried
out in accordance with mis advice demonstrated to the general satisfac-
tion that "CAVALRY CAN A11]) SHOULD CHARGE IN TEE PRESENT flAX AS IT WAS
USED TO CHARGE IN TEE DAYS OP TEE PIRST	 Precisely the same
conclusion bad. been derived from the Prench maxioeuvres of nearly twenty
years previously.7
German and Austrian cavalry likewise were trained to use shock
tactics in large masses, and. German manoeuvres became celebrated for
their magnificent mock charges. The very spectacle could be convin-
cing, as P.N. Naude's description of a charge by . sixty squadrons
suggests:
the sight was not readily to be forgotten. A long dark
wall, a mile or more in lengih, sweeping diagonally across
the slope of the bill - eating up the ground like the shadow
of a dark eclipse. Presently, as it struck the enenr, it
broke forward like the surf of a breaker foaming over rocks
5. "No hare-brained cavalry enthusiast" he, remarked the translator
of Negrier's peroration, Naj.-Gen. R.A. Talbot (comTn19ir1g the Cavalry
Brigade, Aldershot). "Nanoeuvres in Prance of two ])ivisions of Cavalry
and of an Army Corps in September, 1897 ...", J.R.U.S.I. 42 (1898),
1357, 1358.
6. Thid, 1366.
7. Lieut.-Col. Chenevix Trench, "Some Cavalry Topics", J.R.U.S.I.
25 (1881), 546-48.
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I afterwards learned that this attack was meant in the Napoleonic
style, as against a shaken eneuj but not yet broken - to achieve
victory at any cost.8
Attention was paid in Russia to the dismounted training of cavalry, but
this aroused widespread criticism arid, according to one observer, by
the 1890s there was "no more talk about extending the employment of the
dragoon dismounted". 9 Otherwise, no European army established a force
resembling mounted infantry. The reintroduction of the lance into the
German army in 1890 testified to the power of tradition over the horse-
mounted am of western Europe.'°
Within Britain, the sigeificance of cavalry experiences in foreign
wars was endlessly debated. Many acknowledged that the achievements
of the troopers in the .Aiuericazi Civil war were as great as their status
was uncert	 Was, bwver, the lack of d.ecisive victories in that
prolonged conflict due to the absence of true cavalry? On the other
hand, modern examples of cavalry attempting to act decisively were
hardly reassuring. General	 s charge at ?roeschwiller
8. Cavalry Its Past and Future (Lond. 1904), 256-57; similarly
Capt. J.F. Manifold, "The German Imperial Manoeuvres", Proc. R.A.I.
17 (1890), 22. A more sceptical later observer was sirgular].y uriim-
pre6sed by this spectacular "eyewash". Naj.-Gen. Lord Edward Gleichen
(Military Attache'at Berlin, 1904-06), A Guardsman's Memories (Ed.in.
and Lond. 1932), 264-67.
9. Maj. C. Peters, "Tho Russian Cavalry Nanoeuvres, 1893", U.S.M. n.e.
8 (Oct. 1893-April 1894), 668; Thilo von Trotha, Tactical Studies on
the Battles around Plevna, transi. Carl Reichmmri. (Iansas 1896),
219-20 ; J.F. Maurice, The Balance of Ntlitary Power in Europe (Lond.
1888), 55-59 (cites German, Russian, and French criticisms of Russian
disrunted. training); Col. Sir Lumley Grthm, "The Russian Cavalry in
1882", J.R.U.S.I. 27 (1883), 206-47 (a valuable survey).
10. Lieut.-Col. E.T.H. Hutton, "Mounted Infantry and its Action in
Modem Warfare", P.P.R.E. 16 (1890), 23, and. generally: Michael
Howard, "The Aimed Forces", New Cambridge Modern History XI, ed.
P.H. Hinsley. (c.u.P. 1962), 209-10.
147.
(6 August 1870), for instance, cost the 2nd.. Cuirassiers some 3CP/ of
the men and. 57% of the horses, and. the 3rd. Cuirassiers 3 and 37%
respectively. At Vionville-Nars--la,-.Tour, the charge of the French
cuirassiers of the Guard against the Prussian 52nd. Infantry caused
the astounding losses of 69.7% of the men and 73.EP/ of the mounts.
Few sought to defend such quixotic gallantry, but the successful
charge of Von Bredow's six squadrons at the same battle was hailed
by cavalry conservatives the world. over as the final vindication of
shock tactics. This assault, lasting some thirty minutes, put
roughly half the men and horses out of action.
To many officers, such degrees of ioss were perfectly acceptable.
There was no lack of those wno, in the face of such evidence, continued.
to worship the power of the charge and the terror of cold. steel. On
the other hand, numerous British reformers rejected to a greater or
1esstextent the commoi heritage of European cavalry doctrine, and
sought to replace the time-worn principles of cavalry training with
practices both more suitable to modern weaponry and the specific
requirements for colonial warfare. The former group may be discussed
with some brevity, first because of their predictable repetition of tie
seine few basic ideas, and secondly because they seem to have influenced
official reform less than the more progressive school.
One of the most eloç .uent cavalry conservatives was P.N. Maud.e.
- Hi preoccupation with war on a massive scale and his calm acceptance
of hugo losses led him to advocate the iatest extremes of European
doctrine. German cavalry, with its perfection of massed manoeuvre
and. the wall-like front it presented in the grand charge, commanded
his utmost adniration. He felt that since armies now fought at
11. For the figures: Vet.Capt. F. Smith, "The Loss of Horses in War",
J.R.U.S.I. 38 (1894), 287-89; and. on the engagements: Michael Howard,
The Franco-Prussian War (Lond.. 1961), 115, 156-57.
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unprecedented. ranges, a greater premium than ever had been put upon the
speed of the horse. The moral disintegration of infantry under modern
fire had increased the opportunities for shock. Reliance on a firearm
or dismounted action he regarded as deleterious to the cavalry spirit.
Mounted inantry he called a "mongrel deity", whose hybrid ineptitude
would be apparent if they were caught in the open by true cavalry.
The normal practice at British inazioeuvres, where umpires usually judged
it impossible for cavalry to charge artillery or well-formed infantry,
met with his disapproval, and he mused on bow easily a spirited soldier
could defy modern weaponry:
The advantage of either sword or lance in. cavalry work is that
it drops a man at once. A man may be mortally wounded. by
revolver or rifle bullet and. fight on for a couple of hours.2
Th fine, in the future- as hitherto, "precision of nianoeuvre and a boot-
to-boot charge will be the chief factors of success".13
Examples of such views may be multiplied by the score and perhaps
to little point. Lieutenant-General Sir rederick Pitzwygram happily
believed that magazine rifles would redound to the beneit of the horse-
mounted arm; all it needed to do was to feint, precipitate a bail of
misdirected bullets, and to charge the infantry in flank. Indeed, he
told his audience at the RU.S.I., the magazine rifle will "probably be
the most dangerous arm you can place in the hands of infantry ...";
meaning as a liability to their own side, though perhaps his listeners
12. "Dr. Conan Doyle and. the British Army. A Reply", C'orrthill Magazine
9 (1900), 735-36 ; quo. re. mounted infantry from Letters on Tactics
(Kansas 1891), 264. For Mauile'.a cavalry views: ibid, 55, 56, 67-73, 167,
169, 264-65, 305; Cava].r versus Infantrv (Kansas 1896), 45, 46, 104, 206;
Cavalry Past and Future (Lond. 1903), 173, 174, 253, 264, oh. 5, passim.
13. 'etters on Tactics, op. cit., 55-56.
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were anm.sed by the unconscious irony.'4
 Colonel J.P. Brabazon
entertained the E].gin Commission at lengih with a doxo1or upon the
tom}iak. Rapiers were fine weapons, he argued, but the Anglo-Saxon
races were born to use the edge; no other arm would have "the same
demoralisirig effect as my tomahak". 15
 To one student of the anco-
Prussian war, the functions of cavalry lay in its "reckless sacrifice
16
of human life ... in fact, by substituting one target for another".
Such delusions were fostered by uncritical war correspondents who
allowed, their romanticism full rein when 'writing of the cavalry arm.'7
There were certainly conservatives who did not defy logic and.
common-sense so blatantly as did. Maude cnd those of his persuasion.
Even the Duke of Cambridge felt that "probably the day of heavy
cavalry has somewhat passed by". 18 General Sir Beauchamp Walker,
Military Attache in Berlin during the anco-Prussian war, typified
t}ze relatively flexible attitud& of the more moderate traditionalist.
Walker made a distinction between the zone of fire and the bat1efie1d
proper. In the former, to his mind, the cavalry ought to ue a long-.
range rifle (rather than the carbine which the British horse employed
14. Comment upon Naj. P. Graves, "The Functions of Cavalry in Modern
War", J.R.U.S.I. 29 (1885), 17, and 40-42.
15. Minutes of Evidence taken betore the Royal Commission on the War
in South Africa, 297. P.P. (C.1790, 1904), 40.
16. Capt. F.G. Stone, Tactical Studies from the ranoo-Prussian War
of 1870-71 (Loncl. 1886), 79. (With reference to Mars-la-Tour and
Vionville). Similarly: Lieut.-Col. W.W. Knoilys, "The Fighting of
Cavalry on Foot", U.S.M. (1877), pt. 2, 403-10; IIaj. S. Boulderson,
"The Armament and Organization of Cavalry", J.R.U.S.I. 28 (1878),
378-96. Boulderson led the cavalry charge at Ulundi (despatch by Col.
Drury Lowe, 8 July 1879, appended co report by Lieut.-Col. Redvers
Buller to Col. Evelyn Wood, W.0. 33/34).
17. E.g.; Archibald Forbes, "The Cavalry Arm of the British Service",
Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine 156 (July-Dec. 1894), 168-81.
18. Comment upon Capt. CC. Chesney, "Sherman's Campaign in Georgia",
J.R.U.S.I. 9 (1865), 220.
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throughout this period), but in the latter to propose using firearms
was "nothing short of insanity". 	 Furthermore, several we11-knojn
reformers argued that the future of cavalry would be assured if it
could accept that its functions had changed, concentrate upon recon-
riaissance, and learn to cooperate with horse-artillery and. machine-
guns. Francis Graves, Valentine Baker, and. John French were amongst
those who may be regarde as reformers within the conventional frame-
work. All were preoccupied. with the employment of cavalry in large
masses, looked to Germany for a model of the modern use of the arm,
and, with the exception of French, opposed or ignored mounted infantry.
Thus, Hozier urged che British authorities to adopt the German
organisation of independent cavalry divisions and. to trair' them as
such. 2° Baker, who had. been regarded as an authority on cavalry
since his publication of The British Cavalry in 1858, argued to simi-
lar effect. So long as Britain s cavalry remained in its current and
permanent dispersion, it could not, in his view, learn its proper
duties in modern	 21 Graves constituted himself an unremitting
19. Comment upon Naj. S. Boulderson, "The Armament and. Organisation
Cavalry", J.R.U.S.I. 22 (1878), 388-90.
20. Capt. HJt. Hozier, "The nployrnent of Cavalry in War", J.R.U.S4
16 (1872), 168-82. His volumes of bound and signed. pamphlets, deposited,
as mentioned on p.11O, in the Institute of Historical Research, London,
testify to the range of hi professional interests.
- 21. "Organization and np1oyment of Cavalry", J.R.U.SI.I. 17 (1873),
375-98 and 389-410 (adjourned, discussion). It should be pointed out
that Baker felt that Britain had. nothing to learn from the continent
about military horsemanship. The British Cavalry with Remarks on its
Practical Organization (Lond. 3858), 23.
151.
critic of the British cavalry, using the practices of Germany, Prance,
and Russia as his standard for judgment. The growing concentration of
cavalry on Prance's eastern frontier, on the two German fronts, and in
Russia from the Baltic to the Black Sea, indicated to him that the
great powers had all recognised. the principle that the British persis-
tently refused to accept; the strategic employment of the mounted aim.
The type uf war he envisaged for the British army of the future was
abundantly clear:
It is the growing opinion on the Continent that the nexl great
war will be opened by cavalry engagements on such a scale, and.
of such a desperate and. sanguinary character, as has never been
witnessed before. I believe it, and only hope that, should we
take part in it, we may do so with an organization, armament,
and equipment equal to those of our opponents •22
With regard to the cavalry question, French is chiefly and rightly
remembered for his rearguard defence, with Douglas Haig, of the azrme
23blanche tradition against critics such as Erskine Clulders.	 As a
rising stz in the nineties, however, French was very much the modern
scientific soldier, and his stress upon horsed firepower made him seem
the young radical. In his first R.U.S.I. lecture, which was well
received, he expressed his faith in 1ar4 e and. highly-trained cavalry
22. "Cavalry Equipment, Organization and Distribution", J.R.U.S.I.
34 (1890), 710, and 695-718 passim; "The Functions of Cavalry in
Modern War", J.R.U.S.I. 29 (1885), 1-43.
23. See, for example, French's inzroduction to Lieut.- Gen. Prederich
von Ber,hardi, Cavalry in Future Wars, transi. Charles Sydney Coldmazm,
(Lond. 1906); Rrskine Childers, War and the Arme Blanche (Lond. 1910),
and his German Influence on British Cavalry (Lond. 19113.
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masses. Acting by division, supported by horse artillery and machine-
guns, cavalry could piay a role unsurpassed in modern history.
Nanoeuvres should be designed, he argued, to bring the British cavalry
into line with its continental neighbours, to put it on "a parity of
footing with foreign countries in Europe".24
Continentalists such as these plainly contributed to certain
aspects of cavalry reform. Nany improvements carried out during thia
period were designed to enhance efficiency within the traditional
framework; that is, to enable the cavalry to do better the sort of
thing it had always done. One such reform was the introduction of
the squadron system. In the converse direction, however - the
regular training of cavalry iy brigade and division - reformers were
thoroughly frustrated.
Throughout most of the late nineteenth century, Britain was
distinctive amongst the great powers in lacking virtually any organi-
sation for cavalry training either larger or smaller than the regiment.
The localisation scheme of 1873 had. passed the cavalry by; all depots
were concentrated at Canterbury and no connection existed between
yeomanry and the regular mounted regiments. Recruits enlisted for
particular regiments, and could not be transferred involuntarily from
one to the other. No training took place by squadron, the smallest
tactical unit for cavalry in prance
	 25 As for the higher
- units of brigade and division, universal in the greater European
armies, they did not exist even in name in the British an until the
24. Col. J.D.P. French, "Cavalry Nanoeuvres", J.1LU.S.I. 39 (1895),
559-88, quo. 574, (remark by Graves in support of French).
25. Naj. Arthur Griffiths, The British krnty, 159; Arn&y Book, 100.
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close of the century. The strategic importance of cavalry action in
such units was officially accepted by 1891, but purely as an academic
26point.	 Shortly afterwards, the cavalry was divided into four great
corps (household, hussar, dragoon, and lancer), but merely for aIlmini-
strative convenience; rank and file could now be transferred from one
regiment to another so long as they rem.ii,ed within the same corps.27
A similar alteration on paper in 1897 organised the home regiments into
four brigades. 28
 These found only a transient embodiment during
manoeuvres, and no cavalry division was provided for in the field army
regulations of 1898.29
Reformers urged the adoption of the squadron system on the contin-
ental model many years before some action was taken on the issue. As
early as 1869, at Valentine Baker's insistence, cavalry regiments were
experimentally divided into four squadrons, each of which was to be a
distinct tactical and administrative unit. The measure seems to have
foundered upon the reluctance of junior officers to relinquish their
relatively independent troops commands (two of which formed a squadron
for drill purposes). 3° During the 1880s the question was taken up by
french, who urged the adoption of squairon system upon tne then coTmnPn-
ding officer at Aldershot, General Sir Evelyn Wood. Wood proved
26. Cavalr Drill, (H.M.S.o. 1891), 553.
27. Army Book, 100.
28. A.0. (1897), La.
29. Lieut.-Col. S.S. Long, "Army Transport", Aldershot Military Society
(21 Feb. 1905), 3.
30. Capt. R.S. Liddell, The Memoirs of the Tenth Royal Hussars, (I.ond.
1891), 351.
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responsive to the idea, and squadrons as partially self-contained
adnLthistrative and tactical units were introduced unofficially at
Aldershot in 1890.31 This measure received the stamp of approval
two years later, when the squadron system was authorized for the
entire army. Troops were abolished, a serjeant-major was to execute
details of every squaiIron's interior economy and drill, and each was
32to be commanded by a major and. captain.
Concurrently, some of the cavalry's flamboyance was sacrificed
to the dernnds of modem training. Colonel Prancia Graves, who had.
tried to persuade an equipment committee of 1875 to abolish the mag-
nificent tmd. cumbersome sabretache, roce of it in 1890:
at Aldershot, on the Pox Hills, to see a hussa.r trussed up
in a skin-tight tunic, white belts, white gloves, tall busby,
long boots, carbine in one hand, sword in the other, one foot
in a rabbit-hole, the other hung up in his "swagger appendage",
falling face foremost into a prickiy furze-bush, is a sight
for the gods.33
In that year, the sabretache was abolished for all privatin cavalry
regiments. 34
 Other measures reflected the growing diversity of
cavalry functions. Pioneer instruction was introduced in 1887, a
- 31. F.L Sir H. Evelyn Wood, Prom Nidshipman to Pield-Marshal, (Lond.
1906), II, 208.
32. A.O. (1892'), no. 37.
33. "Cavalry Equipment, Organization and Equipment" J.R.U.S.I. 34
(1890), 704.
34. A.O. (1890), no. 200.
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class in fieldwork training being formed at the School of Nilitary
Engineering, Chatham. 35
 Rangefinders were supplied in the following
year, and in 1889 annual machine-gun drill for cavalry was authnrised.6
How good these courses were is debatable, but the fact of their estab-
lishment is significant.
Our discussion thus far has been concerned with the common
heritage of European idea3 and. practices. The ensuing pages survey
the body of opinion which was distinctively British, or at least, with
respect to mounted troops, Anglo-American. This school tended to
adopt radical notions as to the efficacy of cavalry in modern war and
to advocate the introduction of some forn of mounted infantry into the
British army. To combine the virtues of cavalry and. infa2iry was not,
of course, an entirely novel idea. Similarly, purist resistance to a
hybrid arm was inherent in the cavalry tradition. To them, the unin-
tended irony of Samuel Johnson' s definition of a dragoon as "a kind of
soldier who serves indifferently either on foot or horseback' t , showed
that the good. doctor had had the right idea. Something that was based
upon a "bastard principle" would perform unhappily in both its func-
tions. 37
 In contrast, many reformers of the l870s argued that the
American Civil war had. revived the dragoon in a new ansi exciting form
which need not endanger the continuance of true cavalry.
- 35. C.0. (1887), no. 80.
36. A.0. (1888), no. 177 (rangefindcs); A.0. (1889), no. 397
(machine-guns).
37. Col. Valentine Baker, "Organization and nployment of Cavalry",
J.R.U.S.I. 17 (1873), 400. Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary- of the English
Language (3 vols. Lcnd. 1777), I, "dragoon".
38.
, 34.
39. Ibid., oh. 3, and. 127-49.
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One of the first to bring the issue into public debate was Sir
Henry Havelock, son of Genera]. Henry Havelock of Lucknow. Havelock-
Allen, as he was later known, based his famous Three Main Military
Qjiestions of the Day
 partly upon his experiences during the Indian
Mirtiny and partly upon his observation of the American Civil war.
Much of the work is a coruscating and delightfully witty flow of
satire upon the average cavalryman's resistance to change; to choose
one example of many such:
But when we come to the cavalry, we find not only a theory of
action, and consequently of instruction, apparently behind. and
at variance with the spirit of the times, but symptoms, only
too evident, of an intention to shut the eyes to the mrdfest
directioi in which all progress in military art and practice
is tcrnMrg .... prod: mi aloud, that we pin. ou faith. on. spurs,
lance, and. sabre
His argument was clear and. simple. Rejecting all forms of shock, he
espoused the mounted. rifleman, whose potential, to his mind., had been
fully realised. in the American Civil wax. Havelock's two chief
examples, discussed at leng-ih, were the outfianking and. detaining
operations of General Phillip Sheridan which had precipitated Robert
EL Lee's surrender in April 1865, and. tie Indian campaign of General
- Lord Lake during the Second Maratha war (l8o3-o6).
	 Lake's light
cavalry regiments, ecjiiipped with small "galloper guns", were seen by
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Havelock as the prototype of the roving and. independent contingents of
Sheridan and the Confederate coum'riiiers Nathan Porrest, John Morgan,
and. J.E.B. Stuart. As for cavalry proper, Havelock showed little
inclination to mdntain it at all. If it were continued, he advised,
cavalry should carry breecbloaders and. form a minority of the mounted
40establishment.
Havelock's stress upon the bankruptcy of shock tactics alone was
sufficient to make his book unacceptable even to moderate cavalrymen,
but much else in it detracted from its virtues. Its style is strained
and excitable to an extent which lends credence to his reputation for
mental imbalance. 41
 He presented mounted riflemen almost as a general
panacea for the problems of imperial defence. Widespread adoption of
the new arm would, he argued, permit Great Britain to reduce her Indian
garrison by a third, to save
	 m. annually, and to form a home
reserve with part of the surplus. The "three main questions", there-
fore, would be answered. Plainly, however, it was as much Havelock's
cavalry heresies as his rather wild oversimplification of a complex
problem that made his work singularly unconvincing to contemporaries.
It was the writings of the Canadian militia officer, Colonel
George Denison, which hail, more relevance to practical reformers,
1O. Ibid, 58-63.
1. He was reputed a madman, wrote Wolseley: "... I have no doubt
that he has a tile off omewhsre." But he added: "One has seen
a woman occasionaUy whom one felt just missed being a very great
beauty: in the same fashion Havelock has in my opinion just missed
being the first soldier of his time ... He has an intimate knowledge
of his profession whi.ch he studies scientifically: he is most zealous
and untiring as a staff officer and admirable in all the details of
Staff work, but he can never get on with men." South African Journal
1879/80 , entry 30 Nay 1879, W.o. ]J17/7.
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although he was influenced to some extent by Havelock.
first study, indeed, was written at Havelock's suggestion, and the two
men seem to have been on friendly terms. 42
 Monetheless, Den.ison was
too much the plain man to adopt Havelock's extravagent and metaphysical
approach. Modern Cavalry was straightforward. and coinmonsensical, and.
also manifested its author's strong faith in shock tactics. Pure
cavalry, Denison insisted, bad au existence independent of other
varieties of the mounted arm. Though sceptical of the value of the
sabre, he eulogized the lance as the "queen of weapons", and empha-.
sised that cavalry should be taught that "the fighting does not
commence until they begir to ply their sword or use their lances or
revolvers ...'. Unsupported artillery, he believed, would "almost
invariably succumb to the attacks of cavalry". In these respects
Denison was quite unoriginal.43
A new departure and some sinalarity to Havelopk were evident in
his assessment of the American Civil war as the arena in which the
modern use of cavalry and mounted infantry was tested and established.
The latter, he felt, were capable of patrolling, reconnaissance,
strategic grand-scale raids, defence of positions, and even of shock
with revolver. Indeed, his own arguments cut the ground from under
his insistence upon the ineluctable necessity of true cavalry.
Denison my have come to feel this himself, for a decade later, in
his History of Cavalry, cavalry proper was relegated to a decidedly
42. Lieut.-Col. G.T. Denison, Soldiering in Canada (Lond. 1900),
142, and 140-52; A History of Cavalry (Lond. 1877), 388-90.
43. Modern Cavalry: Its Organization, Armament, and Employment in War
(Lond. 1868), 6, 39-48 (on the lance), 59-73, 153-61 (cavalry and. artillery),




 Panegyrics of shock action, common in his first
work, are noticeably absent. The Pranco-Prussian war had, to his
mind., "settled conclusively" and in the negative, the question of
whether or not cavalry could charge infantry armed with breechloaders.
While in 1868 he had written that "great care must be taken to teach
horsemen to believe that no infantry can stand a charge of cavalry in
an open field", by 1877 he had no doubt that infantry had indubitably
benefited from recent developments in weaponry. 45
 Moreover, he seems
to have lost his admiration for the lance, and recommended that pure
cavalry itself be trained, to charge with the revolver. Pm'-1ly, he
repeated wore forcibly his views on mounted infantry. Cavalry should
form only a quarter of the mounted establishment; his cherished new
arm was to be no mere ancillary support.6
As one might expect, Denison's views had. a mixed reception in
Britain. Although Wolseley knew and admired Denison personally, he
felt that the Canadian did not quite have a professional appreciation
of "what real cavalry can do". As this did not exist during the
campaigus of the Civil war, they provided no lessons, Wolseley argued,
for the traditional mounted	 0n3 reviewer of Denison's History
44. A History of Cavalry from th Earliest Times, with Lessons for the
Puture (Lond. 1877) Denison claimed to have consulted some 700 works
in the preparation of this book.	 -
45. ]lid, 410-12, 418, and ch. 30, passim; Modern Cavalry, o. cit.,
163-64
46. A History of Cavalry, op. cit., ch. 32, espec. 422-27; 356, 429-33.
47. P.M. Viscount Wolseley, The Story of a Soldier's Life
(Westminser 1903), II, 148, .225; commot upon Lieut. P.J. Graves,
"On Military Equipment", J.ILU.S.I. 22 (1878), 154.
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was rather more acerbic; of its recommendations for the future, he
commented: "Where they are sound they are seldom original; where
they are original they are seldom sound.."48
 Despite his rejection of
the American experience as irrelevant to European warfare, the reviewer
put his finger on the contradiction at the heart of Denison's writings.
Troopers capable of undertaking the range of duties Denison prescribed
for them were not merely infantry carried on horses, but rather,
indistinguishable from European cavalry trained to fight dismounted.
If this were so, then Deriison's distinction between properly trained.
cavalry and. mounted riflemen was groundless. In fact, the editor of
the American "International Series" ins!sted that the troopers of the
Civil war had. been real cavalry, and was distressed that ".ome stubborn
or ill-informed European critics still term it 'so-called cavalry' or
'mounted infantry ... ".'	 General Sir Keith Fraser used the same
argument 5n a vain attempt to impugn new-faagled ideas. The American
horse, he insisted, were cavalry pure and simple; no hybrid arm could
50have performed so well.	 Whether they had been cavalry, or mounted
infantry, or mounted riflemen (for some sought to maintain three
categories), troubled the, minds of British cavalry officers. There
was much in a name.
During the decadea under review interest in the mounted infantry
question and its bearing upon cavalry training rapidly developed until
it became, like topics such as the infantry attack or the education of
officers, a subject of continua], debate. This centred upon two main
48. J.R.U.S.I. 21 (l877, 1225-33, quo. 1230.
49. Capt. A.L. Wagner (ed.), Cavalry Studies from Two Great Wars
(Kansas 1896), pref.
50. Comment upon G. Saunders, "The nplo3nnent of Large Cavalry Jfasse,
of Smokeless Powder, and. of Noveable Fortificaticns ...", J.R.U.S.I.
34 (1890), 884-85.
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issues; the exact status of the new arm, and. the form in which it
should be introduced, if at all, into the British army.
It is abundantly clear that much of the controversy was fuelled
by the use of irregular cavalry in British imperial warfare. This
was no new thing; the Cape Mounted Rifles had. existed since the 1790s
and were employed continuously during the Bantu wars of the 1820s and
1830s. 51 Sir Henry Havelock had. raised a small force of mounted
riflemen against the Sikhs in 1858.52 But in the Zulu war and. the
Erptian campaigns of 1882 and. 1884-85, unconventional, mounted units
were employed. to an unprecedented extent. This, coming at a time
when the .uture of cavalry proper was under interrogation, gave
immediate relevance to the mounted infantr question. Nonetheless,
the great majority ef reformers who espoused the cause of mounted
infantry were also cavalry enthusiasts. Their aim was not to phase
out cavalry, but to comp1emeit it. Havelock-Allan's denigration of
the regular arm was anathema to most commentators on the subject,
whether they were reformist or otherwise. Writers such as Erskine
Chi1des, who rejected all forms of shock and was obsessed with the
concept of the roving mounted marksman ("let that ideal figure have a
universal quality", he wrote53) belonged to a later stage of the con-
troversy. With the occasional exception, 54 none of those whose
opinions have been noticed by the prese't writer would. have wanted. to
51. Richard Cannon, Historical Records of the Britisi' Army: History
of the Cape Mounted Rifles (Lond. 1842), passim.
52. Mounted Infantry (Intelligence Branch 1881), appendix I. V.0.
33/3 1.
53. Times History of the War in South Africa V (Lond. 1907), xii-iii,
and 68-70, 91, 263-70.
54. "Expertus", "Mounted Men: Their Work and Weapons", National
Review 43 (1904), 521.
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obliterate all distinctions amongst mounted. troops. What caused
excitement was not the thought that here was an arm to succeed tradi-
tional cavalry, but the realisati'n that at last Britain was carrying
out some military innovation of her own volition, arid not merely trying
it out in peace but proving its value in war. Lieutenant-Colonel E.T.H.
Hutton, a leading advocate of mounted infantry, expressed his views upon
the general context of the subject in a passage illustrative of the
attitudes of the Imperial school of reformers:
It seems to be an accepted fact that we Britons are, in all
things military, to follow the lead of others. Some of us may
well recollect when, after the Crimean and. Italian campaigns,
we worshipped at the shrine of the Prench. We wore trousers
that were bagr and caps that had. peaks. Since the collapse
of thc Prench military power we have slavishly bent the. kaae
to everything German. We prefer to ask what the opinion of
Berlin may be upon all military problems rather than to trust
to our own judgment, or to believe our own experiences and.
follow the dictates of our own coonsense.
In every line of life - whether it be commercial,
mercantile, naval, or the fine arts - we take our position
at the very front rank, if indeed we are not unrivalled.
In things military we are ready to bufr our heads, and. take
an insignificant position. We wilfully forget that we have
lived, and. live, by +he sword, and that we have created, are
at this moment creating, this vast Empire of ours by campans
in every part of the globe
55. "Mounted Infantry and its Action in Modern Warfare", P.P.LE.
16 (1890), 37-38.
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Some authoritative voices attempted to deny that colonial warfare
could teach the cavalry anything. Lord Chelmaford., who commanded. the
British forces during the Zulu war until June 1879, adopted a somewhat
ambivalent stance on the issue. Although he spoke highly of the
services of his regular and irregular mounted corps in the Zulu war
and preceding Bantu war, he was equally insistent upon their necessary
inferiority:
but I am bound to say, could I have had the same force of
cavalry instead of Mounted Infantry, I would have changed it
the very next day that I had the offer.
He felt, too, that his mounted corps had been greatly handicapped in
lacking an "offensive weapon", being armed only with the rifle. This
remark reflected the assumption, still lingering, that fire was
56inherently defensive.	 In point of fact, the mçunted troops under
his commmnd in South Africa sometimes carried the sabre and attempted
to use it. 57 1*)hen faced with the realities of the South African
situation, Cheinsford had. been a little less doctrinaire. In his
urgent requests for reinforcements after Isaxidlilwana, he emphasised
that "the Cavalry must be prepared to act as Mounted Infantry and
should have their Carbines slung on their shoulder, and a sword
shorter tian the regulation pattern fastened to the saddle".58
56. Comments upon Lieut.-Col. E.T.H. Hutton, "The Mounted InfantryQuestion in Relation to the Volunteer Force of Great Britain", J.R.U.S.I.
35 (1891), 809-10. No cavalry at all were sent out in Chelmsford'a first
field force, although two regiments accompanied the reinforcements dispatched
after Isandhlwana. Narrative of the Field Operations C'rnnected with the Zulu
War (H.M.S.O. 1881), 141-54 ("Composition of Columns and. Distribution of
Troops on 11th January 1879"; "State of South African Field Force, end of
Nay, 1879").
57. See dispatches on Gingilhovo, cited notes, 62, 63.
58. Chelmsford to rederick Stanley, Secretary of State for War, 27
Jan. 1879, Che].xnsford. Papers, file 8. Similarly his Isand.hlwana
dispatch, 27 Jan. 1879, ibid.
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Elsewhere, Chelmsford's defence of tradition showed some disregard.
for accuracy. His reports on the action of Gingihlovy, 2 April 1879,
which occurred during his advance to relieve Colonel Pearson's camp at
Ekowe, stated that the "sabres of the Mounted In.fantry did. great
execution", "some 50 or 60 men having been sabred". As nearly 700
Zulus were found dead in the vicinity of the British laager, even
sixty was less than 9%. Moreoever, in a detailed report on the role
of mounted troops in the action, their coTnmnder, Major Percy Barrow,
reckoned that only a few had been killed with the sabre although, he
added, "the moral effect on the retreating Zulus as the swordsmen
closed in on them was very great". 59 Barrow himself was an interest-
ing example of conservatism. His command of regular and volunteer
mounted contingents in the Zulu war brought him distinction, and he
did not deny their value in irregular warfare.60 But as "the best
cavalry officer in the country" he was obviously hankering after a
force of genuine troopers.6l Mounted tnits in small wars were
frequently swordless, so he was delighted by the equipment of the
mounted infantry in the Ekowe Relief column:
I saw a sight today which pleased my eye more than anything I
have seen for a long time. 80 mounted men with the "arme
blanche" attached to the saddle. I don't anticipate that
59. Te1eram from Cheluisford to Col. Bellairs, D.A.G., Durban, n.d.
(presumably 2 April 1879); Chelmsforcl to rederick Stanley, Secretary of
State for War, 10 April 1879; Naj. Percy Barrow, "Report upon the part
taken by Nd. Troops at Gingilhovo", (6 April 1879); all Chelmsford
Papers, file 9.
60. "Memo, on 'Training Mounted Infantry", Mounted infantry (1881),
V.0. 33/37.
61. Chelmsford to Col. Pearson, 31 Dec. 1878 (instructions upon his
advance to Ekowe), chelmsford Papers, files 1-2.
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they will ever kill anybody but (will have) the moral effect
I have been taught to believe in from my youth.62
After Gingi1ilov', he wrote predictably: "1 have no hesitation in
saying that had a regiment of English Cavalry been on the field of
battle, scarcely a Zulu would. have escaped •63 ¶rhns his tradi-
tional. convictions remained unshaken by his colonial experiences, and
in subsequent years at Aldershot, accordixg to his close friend Maude,
Barrow sought to bring the British cavalry out of Its state of
"timidity" and to work out how "German methods could be applied to
English conditions	 ,,64
Nonetheless, the weight of influential opinion leaned towards
more progressive views. Colonel Redvers Buller's Frontier Light
Horse did. not carry swords and. he himself thought the arme blanche
uperf1uous foi, colonial campaigning. under his rough tutelage, the
Frontier Light Horse, composed. of coast boatmei, miscellaneous
foreigners, and .Afrikaners, became the most famous irregular mounted
corps of its day in South Africa.6
	 Sir John Mitchell declared that
British cava].iy had. shown themselves to be "utterly valueless in the
bush t
 and believed that all troops fighting therein should abandon the
62. Barrow to Col. North Crealock, 25 Feb. 1879, ibid., file 7.
Wolseley, however, considered Barrow to be useless, and wrote with
reference to the pursuit of Cetewayo after tJlundl: "How different (sic)
- miller would have acted in his place", South Ifrican Journal, 1879-80,
entry for 18 Aug. 1870, V.0. 147/7.
63. "Report upon the part taken by Nd.. Troops at GingUhovo", p. cit.
64. Col. F.N. Naue, Cavalry Its Past and Future (Lond. 1903), 241-42.
65. C.H. Melville, Life of General the Right Hon. Sir Redvers Buller
(Lond. 1923), 126-27; Lewis Butler, Redvers Buller (Lond. 1909), 33;
Col. Redvers Buller, Report to Col. Evelyn Wood., 5 July
 1879, W.0. 33/34.
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blanche. 66 Captain C. Lacon Harvey, a staff officer in the
Transvaal during the Zulu war, felt that mounted riflemen had proven
themselves to be invaluable, and. was confident of their moral impact
upon impressionable Africans: "the Kaffir, teirified. ..., will not
venture to cultivate the 'mealie' fields in the valleys, he will feel
himRelf unsafe even in his mountain fas-tnesses, and scarcity of food.
will soon drive him to submit".6
At all events, the South African campaigns led to much discussion
of mounted infantry in the service press, and the subject was thought
worthy of investigation by the War Office. Several distinguished
officers were asked. by the Intelligence Branch to comp.le memoranda
assessing the pros and cons of mounted. infatry. The contributors to
this symposium, who included Lieutenant-Colonel C.F. Clery, author of
a leading elementary textbook on tactics, Buller, Lieutenant-Colonel
Carrington, commanding the Cape Mounted. Riflemen in 1881, Lieutemt-
General Sir Archibald Alison, and. General Sir Charles Ellice, the A.G.
to the Forces, all cautiously approbated. the suggestion to introduce
mounted infantry into the home arnry. Their conclusion laid. down the
standard. x9formist view of mounted infantry:
it is pretty .1ear that there are two descriptions of
Mounted Infantry which have been proposed. -
(1) The Infantry soldier who uses his horse simply as a means
of locomotion.
-
66. "Memo, by Sir John Mitchell regarding fighting Kaffirs in S.
Africa", (28 Jan. 1878), Chelmsforj. Papers, files 1-2. Sir A.T.
Cunynghame was then commanding the troops in South Africa; Chelmsford.,
as the Hon. F. Thesiger, was appointed 11 March 1878.
67. "The Secocoen.i War 1878-79", U.S.M. (1879), pt. 3, 504.
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(2) The highly-trained Mounted In.fantry soldier who requires
many months of careful instruction to reach a really efficient
state.
Corps composed of the latter would. soon inevitably become Cavalry
under another name - only they would, not be such accomplished
horsemen. They would not be worth the trouble and expense
expended upon them. The same result would. 'be better and. more
quickly attained by carefully training a Cavalry regiment at
68dismounted work. The former is what we want.
This concept of mounted infantry was rendered more popular by the
Erptian campaigns of 1882 and 1884-85. Lieutenant-General Sir F.
Fitzwygram happily remarked that they had not only demonstrated the
value of the new arm but proven that it was quite compatible with pure
cavalry, a point applauded by Sir Archibald .kiison.6 	 Both emphasised
that mounted infantry should 'be trained at home as a leavening scattered
throughout the line regiments, rather than as a separate body which
would soon develop into inferior cavalry. Proponents of this view
multiplied, their ranks including E.T.H. Hutton, Wolseley, G.F.R.
Henderson, the compilers of the Army Book, and relative unknowns.7o
68. "General Conclusion" 'by Allison and, Ellice. Also see memoranda 'by
Buller, Clery, Carrington, and. "Precis" by Lieut. G.P. Browne, Secretary
to the informal enquiry, in Mounted Infantry (1881), V.0. 33/37.
69. Memo, by Fi'tzwygram in m.s. file on mounted infantry, presumably
collected for the perusal of the secretary of state, with marginilia by
A].ison, (Jan. 1886), Smith Papers, W.0. 110/8; similarly comment by
Fitzwygram, as Inspector-General of Cavalry, upon Capt. C.W. Bowdler Bell,
"The Strategic Service of Cavalry ...", J.R.U.S.I. 25 (188l),440.
70. Army Book, l7Ori.; "Borine Esperance", "Is Cavalry the Arm fcr Sor'th
Africa?", U.S.?!. (1 886), pt. 2, 311-17' comment by Hamley upon Maj. C.G.
Edwards, "Tre xeomanry Cavalry Considereà as an Auxiliary and as a .iieserve
Force", J'.R.U.S.I. 27 (1883), 349; prolonged discussion upon Lieut. G.
Han4lton "Mounted: Marksmen and the Dismounted Service of Cavalry$L, J.R.0 S.I.
27 (l883), 280-87; Col. G.P.R. Henderson, The Science of War (Lond._L)1U3,
109; Col. E.T.H. Hutton, "The Military Q, estion of Today: or the Pacts
about Mounted Infantry", U.S.?!. u.s. 7 (April-Sept. 1813), 7.8-58; Col.
I.F. MacAndrew, "Mounted Infantry", U.S.?!. (1885), t. 2, 416-31; Lieut.-
Cen. Niddleton, "Mounted Infantry", U.S.?!. u.s. 5 (April-Sept. 1892),
178-84; Gen. Viscount Wolseley, The Soldier's Pocket Book (5th. ed. Lond.
1886), 37.
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Less frequently, one finds proposals to establish mounted infantry as
an independent service. 7' The amount of public attention attracted
to the issue is indicated by the number of occasions it was raised in
parliament. Sir Baidwyn Leighton inquired of the government's inten-
tions regarding mounted infantry in 1881, but was rather brushed aside
by Hugh Childers. 72
 Later that year, during the supply debates, Sir
Robert Lloyd Lindsay moved that a force of mounted infantry be provided
for in the estimates, and. the motion was seconded by Leighton. Childers
pointed out that it was too late to add to estimates already under
debate, but stated that the government intended to raise, in due course,
a body of mounted infantxy, not as a new service but as specially
trained men spread throughout the army.73 Leighton
	 ously enquired.
a year later what, in view of the secretary of state's pledge, had. been
done about the matter. Childers sophistically informed him that he had
confused an assurance to look into the question with a promise to do
something about it. Leighton again raised the issue in November of
1882, and was once more adroitly silenced. 74
 But notable figures in
the Lords took up the cause, including Lord Morley, under-secretary ol
state for war, and Che].msford, who seems at last to have decided that
mounted infantry in the form proposed would not taint the British
cavalry.75
- 71. Lieut.-Col. Charles Ford, "Mounted Rifles", Army and Navy Magazine
6 (May-Oct. 1883), 44-62; Lieut. J.W. Thrrnay (u.s. army), "Mounted
Infantry", U.S.M. (1881), pt. 1, 416-24.
72. Hansard., 3rd.series, 261 (19 May 1881), cols. 810-11.
73. Hansard, 3rd.series, 264 (4 August 1881), col. 853.
74. Ibid, 269 (4 Nay 1832), col. 90-91; 274 (23 Nov. 1882), col. 1909.
75. mId, 277 (5 April 1883), cols. 1467-69.
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The upshot of all this talk was the formation of a mounted infantry
corps in the economical manner favoured by the civilian army reformers
of Victorian Britain. Like the force specially trained for transport
duties, mounted infantry were to adopt a double role; to possess extra
skills without being lost by their regiments or causing the expense (or
having the prestige) of becoming a separate service. The determ4ri.tion
of cavalrymen to mii-intain the purity of their arm thus neatly dovetailed.
with the demands of econonr. In 1888 an Arir Order laid. down a course
of training for mounted infantry, and. authorised the issue of a certifi-
cate of proficiency to all infantry men who completed it satisfactorily.
An arn register of all such qualified men in the ranks and reserve was
to be midritained. The synopsis of training to be undergone looks more
impressive on paper than it probably was in reality; t was to include
drill, mounted and. dismounted, in companies, battalions, in combination
with all other arms and especially cavalry, field tiring with horses,
reconnaissance, and. patrol work.6
The implementation of this reform was largely the work of three
distinguished officers, all of whom had close links with the leaders of
army reform and. practical experience with mounted infantry: Naj ox-
General Edwin Alderson, Colonel E.T.H. Hutton, and Njor-General Sir
Henry Hallain Parr.
Alderson, a Staff College graduate, worked with mounted infantry
during the First Boer War, the Erptian campaign of 1882, the Nile
expedition, the Nashona war of 189 6, and the second Boer war, when he
became Inspector-Genera]. of N. I. in South Africa. At home, he served
as adjutant to the first mounted infantry corps established at A].d.ersbot
in 1888 by Hutton. Alderson was much wlmired by Evelyn Wood and was
76. A.O. (1888), no. 360.
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praised in Blackwood's as one of the finest commanders of mounted
infantry in the army. Despite his background, Alderson adopted the
typical view of mounted infantry as a supplement to the distinct and
far superior arm of true cavalry. Mounted infantry were merely, he
wrote, footmen supplied with extra locomotion, "helpless" if attacked
while riding, and. immeasurably inferior in spirit to cavalry, whose
creed should be: "Swords out, knee to knee, and. we can smash any-
thing". 77 Indeed, Alderson wrote an entire book on the cavalry spirit
anti the way in which it could be developed by devotion to the chase:
the chief characteristics required by those who canpaign. in
the pink coat of the chase are identical with the characteristics
required by those who do so in the scarlet coat of war
Hutton, also a Staff College graduate, established the nucleus
of a mounted. infanti corps in Egypt, and directed the triig of its
British counterparts from 1888. By 1891 nearly every battalion in the
U.K. had. its mounted infantry detachment, and the contingents were
trained annually for two months as a single corps. Evelyn Wood,
whose advocacy of mountec. infantry dated from the 1870s, enthusiasti-
cally supported Hutton and. later generously acknowledged. his work:
Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Hutton had. been training Mounted
Infantry before I ever took command. (at Aldershot), and
77. Iieut.-Co1. E.T.H. Ald.erson, With the Mounted Inftntry and the
Mashonaland. Field Force (Lond. 1898), 6.
78. Pink and Scarlet or HQnting a
1900), 217. Also on Aiderson see:
"Our Officers", Blackwood's Ed.1n1
Sir Evelyn Wood, Winnowed Nemorie
a School for bo1&ierin (Loud..
Hart's Army List ( 1904), 33, 39;
h Naazine 168 (1900), 21; P.M.
(Lond. 1917), 126.
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continued to do that work, and much other, throughout uty time
at Aldershot. I have often been congratulated. on the efforts
I made in training Mounted Infantry, but I had little to do
with it except to give Hutton a free haM
Wood's circle also included Hallani Parr, who but for ill-health
would have succeeded him as Sirdar of the new Egyptian arxr. The
wars of the late seventies in South Africa had given Parr considerable
staff experience with mounted corps formed in haste and often from the
most heterogeneous and. unpromising material. (As Captain Lumley
remarked of his volunteer mounted unit: "At first they perfectly
diusted me."). 80 There Parr worked wit}' Wolseley, Brackenbury,
Sir George Colley, and was on close terms with Redvers Buller. After
the First Boer war, Parr organised a reg-ular mounted infantry corps in
Natal, and was appointed Coirndant of N.T. in Egypt during the 1882
campaign. 81 When the formation of mounted infantry was authorised. at
home, he compiled a brief study of their training and. functions, which
was issued as a semi-official supplement to the first official manual
on the subject.
?g little book presented mounted infantry as an arm for future
79. P.M. Sir Evelyn Wood, Prom Midshiv!nan to Field-Marshal (Lond..
1906), II, 207. Hutton's lecture, "The Mounted Infantry Question ...",
J.RJT.S.I. 35 (1891), 786, gave all the credit for the tab1ishment of
the corps to Wolseley's foresight when A.G.
80. Capt. J.R. Luniley, "Mounted Riflemen", J.R.U.S.I. 25 (1681),
638-56, quo., 653. Luinley's Horse was one of the better known volunteer
units of the period.
81. Preceding paragraph derived from Parr's works: A Sketch of the
Kaffir and. Zulu Wars (Loud. 1880); Recollections and. Correspondence,
ed. Sir Charles Forte3cue-Brickdale, (Lond.. 1917), pasim, espec. 93,
151-53, 166-200, and Hart's Army List (1904), 6.
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European as wel]. as colonial warfare, and laid down for them wide-
ranging functions; to cooperate in flanking attacks, to reinforce
infantry under strain, and to act as an advance guard. But, defending
the principle of mounted infantry against its general rejection on the
continent, Parr insisted that they were not a hybrid arm and could not
rival cavalry. Indeed, he wrote, mounted infantry caught in the open
by good. cavalry "would probably never be heard of again".82
Likewise, the various M.I. drilibooks earnestly impressed upon
their readers that mounted infantry must remember their status as
mobile footmen. In the first manual a somewhat heretical statement
was indeed made to the effect that a mo'nted infantry section should.
be able, in open ground, "to beat off and defeat a superior number of
CavaL'y". 83 This did not reappear in the next edition. Otherwise,
the supremacy of cavalry in its own sphere was firmly upheld, the more
so as its distinctionfrom mounted infantry was alwaysthreateni.xig to
disintegrate. The 1889 edition, for instance, stated that mounted
infantry were to be the "perfection of infantry" but also to be skilled
in reconxutissance, vedette, outpost, patrol, and. advanced and rear-
guard duties; In short, to have "a good practical knowledge of what
is required from mounted men when acting as a covering body to
84	 .	 .Infantry".	 This being so, wherein lay their essential difference
from cavalry was far froi1 obvious.
82. Cot. H.H. Parr, The rther Training anti Employment of Mounted
Infantry (Lond. 1888), £essim, and. The Further Training and Employment
of Mounted Infantry and. Yeomanxy (Lond. 1900).
83. Regulations for Mounfed infantry (LM.s.O. 1884), 23-24.
84. Regulations for Mounted Infantry (H.M.S.O. 1889), 3, and, for
preceding remarks: editions of the Regulations for 1895, 1897, and the
Field. Service Manual Mounted Infantry (R.LS.O. 1899).
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Some reformers proposed that the Yeomanry Volunteers should take
mounted infantry as their model arid, stop behaving as mock cavalry.
Yeomanry who considered the suggestion, however, preferred to envisage
themselves as mounted riflemen; the term had. a touch of superiority.
The idea was attractive for several reasons. Regular officers had
always regarded the Yeomanry's claim to rival cavalry as something of
an affront. Mounted riflemen, vaguely assumed to be bimilar to the
early Con.fed.erate model, connoted. initiative, individual skill, arid.
amateur expertise rather than the anonymous bond of army discipline.
Moreover, the concept of such a force suited the notions of hedge and
ditchrow defence associated with the invasion scares. It was, there-.
fore, widely .rgiied that if the Yeomanry would, cease trying to iwhwi c
cavalry, aid simply combine their skills in horsemanship and shooting
with their knowledge of the countryside, they would become the ideal
auxiliary arm for domestic defence. Amongst others, Wolseley, G.P.R.
Henderson, Hallain Parr, and Hutton, concurred in this. The discussion
eventually bore fruit in the dispatch of Yeomanry as mounted riflemen
to South Africa during the 1899-1902 war. But until then, although
the occasional company adopted the title of "Mounted Rifles", the
Yeomanry largely ignored the comments of army reformers and. clung to
their traditional status.85
Some 'onc1uding reflections may be made on the cavalry views of
85. Preceding paragraph 'ased upon: L.S. .Amery ed., The Times
History of the War in South Africa (Lord. 1902-09), III, 15, i6, V,
72, 78-82, VI, 268-72; Anon, "The Army", Blackwood's Edinburgh
Magazine 101 (1867), 264-65; Col. Willoughby Verner, The Nilitary
Life f H.R H. George, Dule of Cambridge (Lond. 1905), II, 363 (for
Wolseley); Naj. (hG. Edwards, "The Yeomanry Cavalry Considered as an
Auxiliary and as a Reserve Force", J.R.U.S.I. 27 (188:5), 329-55
(comment by F&mi1 ey, 349); Henderson, The Science of War (Lond. 1910),
37; Lieut.-Col. E.T.H. Hutton, "The Mounted Infantry Question ...",
J.R.U.S.I. 35 (1891), 785-98; discussion: "The Best Mounted Arm for
the Volunteers", U.S.M. u.s. 1 (April-Sept. 1890), 305-40 (conclusion
by Wood); Maj. W.A. Baillie Hniilton, "The Truth about the Yeomrnry
Cavalry", U,S.M. n.s. 3 (April-Sept. 1891), 433-40.
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the major military- theorists of the period.. All d.isplayed. a curious
admixture of conservatism arid, readiness to change. Maurice, for
instance, did. not look to the cavalry for decisive action on the
battlefield, and was an enthusiast for mounted infantry. But, he
insisted typically, "Cavalry arid, mounted infantry are each invaluable
arms, but you cannot mash them together without destroying them for
their proper work.86 Moreover, he adnantly maintained the primacy
of the arme blanche for pure cavalry. It was not the weapon itself
which mattered so much as that reliance upon firepower would under-
mine skill in manoeuvre, wherein lay the horseman's real strength.
His aim should be to avoid the fire of infantry, not t compete with
it. Surprise and speed in small bodies, with horse and. man one unit,
as if they formed "the old. ideal of the arm, the centaur", were the
forte of cavalry.87
Similarly, Charles Caliwell havered. between. tradition and. chaxige.
In regular warfare, he felt, infantry normally had "nothing to fear
from cavalry", 'but whether the trooper's chief arm should be sabre or
rifle reynii-irted, to his mind, undecided. 88
 Sceptical of the value of
shock, he reaffirmed the distinction beween mounted infantry arid,
cavalry by the rather lame criterion that while the former were "only
supposed to fight dismounted cavalry fights both mounted and. dis-
mounted". In irregular warfare, however, he was convinced that
86. The Balance of Military- Power in Europe (Lond. 1888), 59.
Maurice also rejected the Russian Cosacks as a model for mounted
infantry, on the grounds that the Russians were trying to create a
dual arm (ibid., 55-59).
87. Col. J.F. Maurice, War (Loud.. 1891), 62-68.
88. Small Wars (H.M.S.0. 1896), 216; ibid., (u.M.s.o. 1906),
388, 404.
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cavalry traditions still held good, especially because of the alleged.
moral impact of the arme blanche upon impressionable natives. In
the last edition of Small Wars, Caliwell conceded that the South
African wax had virtually destroyed the assumption that cavalry would
be superior to mounted infantry if pitted against them in the open.
To be of any use against Afrflaner riflemen, British cavalry had
become, in effect, mounted riflemen itself. A characteristic instance
of this was the choice Sinith-Dorrien offered his Lancers; they could
staj in camp with their lances or fight without them.89
Henderson dismissed the expectation of using cavalry en masse in
modern war as absurd, and, by the end of the century, regarded cavalry
trained on continental lines as wholly obsolete. 9° It took him some
little time to reach this conclusion. Lecturing to the A.ldershot
Nilitaxy society in 1892, he expressed some doubt as to how American
troopers would have erforined against European horse. At that stage,
he tended to feel that the rarity of shock action in the Civil war was
due to the terrain, and not to the intrinsic inefficacy of such tactics,
and his general assessment was somewhat inconclusive:
when dismounted they were not considered. as efficient
as ordinary infantry, and as cavalry I do not believe they
would have been able to cope with good European troops in
open country. But they were admirably adapted for all
mounted work in the Southern forests, and no European
cavalry would haie been able to touch them on their own
ground. The American idea, to this day, however, is that
89. Thid, 401 passim (quo. 404); Naj.-Gen. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien,
Nemories of Porty-Eight Years' Service (Lond.. 1925), 260-61.
90. The Science of War (Lond. 1910), 52, and. 50-54, 64-69.
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good mounted riflemen are more than a match, on any ground,
for European cavalry.91
By 1902, and after the publication of Stonewall Jackson (1898),
he appears to have assented to the "American idea". The horseman of
the Civil war, he wrote emphatically, was the very model of the
efficient cavalryman in modern war. 92
 Nonetheless, and. quite
inconsistently, he had no aoubt that, in the British Army, cavalry
and mounted infantry must remain distinct services. Like Wolseley,
Maurice, Evelyn Wood, 1:Iwnl.ey, Callwell, and. Sir John. Ardagh, Henderson
saw mounted infantry as a way to modify and. extend. the role of mounted
troops in battle without destroying the cavalry spirit. 93
 In the
great cavalry controversy, British reformers and. traditionalists
shared some 'oimnon ground. Many years later, J.P.C. Puller wrote
of the "fantastic Crusadr training" of the late Victorian cavalry.94
Such a phrase was an exaggeration but not without warrant. At the
opening of the twentieth century, almost no-one doubted that horsemen
were to play a major role in future warfare. This was to be the era
"of the Cavalryman, the Dragoon, and the galloping gun
	 Even
91. Ibid, 247, and also see 269-74 (a discussion of Frandy Station,
9 June 1863, as illustrative of their deficiencies when the cavalry tried
to use shock tactics) and ch. 8, "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War",
which argued that it was chiefly a war of amateurs.
92. Thid, 57.
93. Maj.-Gen. J.C. Ardagh, "Diary and. Notebook: Dec. 1898", Ardagh Papers,
P.R.0. 30/40/6. Ardagh considered that M.I. were far better suited to
Egy-ptian conditions than conventional cavalry, and wrote, with reference to
Omditrman, that to charge dervishes was "sheer waste and folly". Discussion
following Lieut. G. 1mi1ton, "Mounted Marksmen ...", J.R.U.S.I. 27
(1883), 261-87; Maj. E.S. Nay, "The Action of Cavalry and Horse Artillery
Illustrated by Modern Battles", J.R.U.SII. 38 (1894), 18-19; Gen. Viscount
Wolseley, The Soldier's Pocket-Book (5th. ed. Lond. 1886), 14, 15, 38, 39;
F.M. Sir Evelyn Wood, The Achievements of Cavalry (Lond. 1897), 247.
94. The Last of the Gentlemen's 1lars (Lond. 1937), 267.
95. Naj.-Gen. Sir H.H. Parr, The Further Training of Mounted Infantry
and Yeomci-rrry (Loud. 1900), 16-17.
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amongst reformers, the old shibboleths were dying slowly, and.
Henderson, one of the most flexible and advanced military thinkers
and teachers of the period, could express in 1902 views which would
have been applauded half a century earlier:
The cavalry soldier mast be taught to consider himself as,
first and. foremost, the soldier of the charge and. of the
inle. It is this that he mast be led to look upon as the
consummation of his training, the justification of his existence,
as well as the finest, the most manful act of war.6
96. The Science of War, op. cit., 61-62.
CHAPTER 6.
Utghv E.ucain and gii wition in the Rayal til1ery.
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For the student of Victorian ax reform, the Royal Artillery,
like the Royal Engineers, possesses particular interest. It was in
these services that the British arxrr approached nearest to continental
standards of education and. technical excellence, and advanced ideas
concerning officer education and military study found least resis-
tance. With regard to the main theme of this inquiry, the Royal
Artillery display in an especially acute form the difficulty of giving
due weigiat to foreign examples and ensuring that reforms took account
of the army's role as an imperial police force. The technical
features of the artillery profession encouraged its officers to focus
upon pre;aration for war in its most advanced contemporary forms.
Debates about artillery education were preoccupied with the need to
develop a system of advanced training which shoif.d bring the British
arny- into line in principle, if not in scale, with European nations.
Obviously, continenal models exercised a potent influence in this
area of reform. But in discussions of organisation, a far greater
concern with imperial defence is evident. The ensuing pages con-
eider each of these aspects of artillery reform in turn.
The crown of the scientific knowldge of the Royal Artillery,
if not of the whole army, was the Royal Artillery Institution. This
worked in close collaboration with the department of Artillery Studies;
indeed, both occupied the same building until 1889, when the latter,
as the Artillery College, was transferred to the Red Barracks,
1Voolwich..	 As a forum for military discussion, the R.A.I. was pre-
dated only by the R.U.S.I. The R.A.I. was founded in 1838, as a
Society for the scientific advancement f the regiment, by J.H.
1. Fourth Report on the Education of Officers, by the Director-General
of Military Education (Lieut.-Gen. Robert Bid.d.ulph), 39-40. P.P. (C.5793,
1889), 17.




.-Gen.. R.A. and F.R.S
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Lefroy and. F.M. Eardley-Wilmot, then both subalterns. Their woxic
in artillery education complemented their achievements in other
fields; Lefroy as founder of the Staff College (as the Senior depart-
ment) and Eardley-Wilmot as a reformer of cadet education. 2
 For
sixteen years they maintained the society as a private institution,
until it received public recognition with the grant of funds for the
erection of the R.A.I. building in l854.
The Institution's activities reflect the growing concern in the
period for professional military knowledge. Membership steadily
expanded, amounting to nearly seventeen hundred by 1890 and to over
two thousand by the end of the centur. 4
 A wide variety of militazy
periodicals - 22 in seven languages in 1887 - was regulaLly received,
and officers with the relevant lLguistic qualifications were
appointed to translate or snmnl.rize noteworthy articles for publidar-
tion. 5
 Prom the v1untary con&ributions, which, apart from. the
goveinment's provision of accommodation, were the Institution's sole
support, funds were provided to officers wishing to study foreign
lanuages. 6
 In 1891 a system was established whereby officers at
stations at home and. ab.'oad were appointed as correspondents, to
send inforination of any interest to the Et.A.I. and receive from it
3. Royal Commission appointed to InQuire into the Present State of
Military Education Minutes of Evidence, 330.
	. (C.25, 1870), 24;
Maj .-Gen. Sir Charles Callwell and Naj .-Gen. Sir John Headlam,
History- of the Royal Artillery from the Indian Mutiny to the Great War
(Woolwich 1937), 1, 75. Henceforth cited as Caliwell and. Headlam.
4. Abstract of the Iroceedings of t'ie 52nd. Annual General Meeting, Proc.
R.A.I. 18 (1890), 133-49; 62nd.. A.G.M. , Proc. R.A.I. 26 (1899), 294.
5. 50th. A.G.M., Proc. R.A.I. 15 (1887), 387-90.
6. Royal Commission, op. cit., Minutes of Evi'ence, 24, P.?. (C.25,
1870), 24; 52nd. and. 53rd. A.G.M.s., Proc. R.A.I. 17 (l8J, 133-49;
521-35.
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reports on the latest developments. The arrangement appears to have
worked, well. 7
 The Institution's role as a centre of lmowled.ge was
confirmed by the expansion of its library, which housed some 30,000
volumes by 1890.8 During the early 1890s, the sale of the
Proceedings to the public suddenly doubled, surely indicative of
an increasing national interest in affairs military. 9
 Indeed, the
R.A.I. publications themselves are the best testimony to the pro-
fessiona]. expertise of artillery officers of the late nineteenth
century. The scientific content of the Proceedings is impressive,
but the sheer range of subject matter is equally so, and proves that
at least a substantial minority of the artillery officer corps was
preoccupied with issues of national, importance. Members of the
R.A.I. may have been atypical of officers generally, but their numbers
were substantial and their influence was marked.
By the early 1870s, institutions of higher officer educatioi
were well established in Europe. An array of foundations apart from
the various Staff Colleges afforded postgraduate training to individual
arms: the school of application in Italy, the Michael Artillery
Acadeny and, engineering schools in Russia, the advanc.ed artillery
school in. Vienna, the war schools in Germany, and the school of
application at Fontainebleu. 1'° Great Britain came into line with
other poiers when she established a permanent department of Artillery
Studies in. 1864.
7. 54th., 55th., 56th. A.G.M.s., Proc. R.A.I. 18 (1891), 334-35;
19 (1892), 431-32; 20 (1893), 328.
8. Captain. V.J. Robertson, "Arny Customs One Hundred Years Ago",
Proc. R.A.I. 17 (1890), 343.
9. 56th. A.G.L, Proc. R.A.I. 20 (1893), 332.
10. Lieut.-Col. Thory Upton, The Armies of Asia and. Europe (N.Y. 1878),
133-34, 152-58, 201-23, 239-49; Capt. W.S. Cooke, Memorandum on the
System of Military Education in Austria (Topographical and, Statiical
Dept. 1872), 4; Cen. E.B. 1mley "The Armies of Russia arid Austria",
The Nineteenth Century 3 (Jan.-J'une 1878), 858.
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This reform resulted directly from the observation of scientific
military education abroad by three leading ar-Lillerists: Colonel J.H.
Lefroy, secretary of the Ordnance Select Committee, Major C.F. Young,
Director of Artillery Studies, and Major C.H. Owen, Professor of
Artillery at the R.LA. Their exmnation of foreign examples led.
them to urge the authorities to establish a coherent system of
higher artillery instruction in Brita..n. Its pinnacle was to be
the Advanced Class, a course of study in the most complex scientific
knowledge of the day for a select handfuJ. of officers, who should then
assume high appointments in the manufacturing departments and generally
contribLte to the technical excellence of the whole ..'egiment. In
short, the Advanced Class was to be a specialist equivalent to the
Staff College; to provide for the artillery thc expertise that
Camberley sought to make available to the entire army. A syllabus
and. the procedure t form such a class were then outlined. More
generally, Lefroy and his colleagues pleaded. for a basic change of
attitude amongst the military arid. civilian authorities. Dwelling on
the need for formal military education to an advanced. level, they
wrote:
We believe there is no Artillery in Europe, except our own,
where this is not acknowledged. arid. where it is not the subject
of what we may term a policy on the part of the Government
In England. alone, so far as we know, has it until very lately
been taken for granted. that qurilified. officers would. be
forthcoming without any trouble on the part of the state to
11form them
11. "Observations on the Present State of the Higher Scientific Education
of the Royal Artillery", (10 Sept. 1862), cix, and "Letter t the Deputy
Adjutanl—General, Royal Artillery (by the same officers)", (Jan. 1863),





Other reformers were equally concerned with the lower levels of
artillery education. A Director of Artillery Studies had been
appointed iii 1850, but his department consisted only of five officer
instructors besides himself. Moreover, it seemed to exist only on
sufferance, and the appointment of Director fell into abeyance in
1857.12 With the impetus given by Lefroy to educational reform, the
department of artillery stuiies was put on a firmer foundation. His
appeal of 1862 prompted the formation of the first Advanced Class;
its regulations were published in November 1863 and. the entrance
em4mtion held in April 1864.13 Concurrently, the department was
made permanent and had its staff much aunented. During the late
sixties, it became a rea]. institution rather than an app cndage to an
individual appointment. By the time of the Duff erin enquiry of
1868-70, the department had developed a full array of courses, from
the Advanced Clasa -t the "short", "long", and F re aw coes
for officer and other rariks) 4
 Moreover, the department embraced
the School of Gunnery at Shoeburyness, founded in 1859 at the instance
of Lefroy. This permitted men and officers to work with the guns and.
devices whose mechanism they had studied at Woolwich. The purpose of
the school was primarily experimental, to allow officers the chance to
test different types of ammunition and weaponry against different
types of material.'5
12. Lieut.-Col. C. Young, "Memorandum on the Department of Artillery
Studies", (1 Nay 1869), cviii. Ibid, appendix IX.
13. "Note on the Institution of the Advanced Class of Artillery Officers",
cviii-cix.	 appendix IX; Anon, Some Notes on the History of the
Advanced Class (Woolvich 1926), 4.
14. "Memorandum upon the Department of Artillery Studies", (1 May 1869),
cviii. Royal Commission, op. cit., appendix IX.
15. Col. J.F. Maurice, "Memoir of General Sir Henry Lefroy", Proc.
R.A.I. 18 (l8)l), 312; "School of Gunnery, Shoeburyness", cxiii-cxiv.
Royal Commission, .oi. cit., appendix X. P.P. (c.25, 1870), 24.
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By 1870, therefore, Great Britain possessed a system of higher
artillery (and engineer)16 education similar in principle if not in
scale to the centres for advanced instruction maintained in other
European countries. In Britain, however, higher officer education
remained, selective throughout the nineteenth century. Whether
individual officers, therefore, benefited from the burgeoning line-
up of courses at Shoeburyness or Woolwich was very much a matter of
chance or their exertions. Moreover, some conservatives continued
to oppose the idea of professional training, and made the Advanced
Class a special object of their criticism
	 It was, they argued,
a new-fangled continental import and an unnecessary luxury.
Unfortunately for the cause of artillery education, evidence
laid before the Duff erin enquiry of 1868-70 seemed to indicate that
the Class was not fulfilling the purpose envisaged 'by its founders.
It was unpopular - in 1869 only seven candidates sat for the entr-dnce
examination, one less than the quota - and therefore it could. hardly
have been seen as a catalyst to professional improvement in the
regiment. 17
 Reformers insisted, however, that the original concept
of such a course was sound. and. that its conduct merely needed to be
improved. Charles Brackenbury, then Assistant Director of Artillery
Studies, criticized the course for "an idolatry of mathematics" and.
unwarranted formality. Attention should be paid, he urged, to
tactics and military history, and a lecturer in the art of war should
be attached to the department. The candidates for the P.A.C.
16. "Royal Engineer Establishment", ci-cii. Thid, appendix VIII.
17. Royal. Commission, o'. cit. Minutes of evidnce, 53-54 (Maj.-.
Gen. W.C. Napier).	 C.25, 1870), 24.
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certificate, being officers of at least six years standing and also
qualified in the Shoeburyness gunnery course, should be t2eated in a
mnner suitable to their regimental standing: "It appears to me to
be a mistake to set father of families down to desks like schoolboys".18
Young and. Lefroy testified to similar effect, and laiti the blame for
the unsatisfactory performance of the class upon administrative short-
comings. Their contentions seem to have been well-founded. Officers
who gained the P.L.C. were not assured of appointments, aiid the vital
need to make officers supernumerary during the course had not been
recognised despite the emphasis upon this point in the original scheme
19for the Class.
Witnesses echoed these points before a committee under Major-
General E.C. Warde, appointed in 1871 to examine the education of
junior artillery officeis. The report expressed a high opinion of
the Advanced C1aa and itm pr,thzct, end are witness- tte& that P.L.C.
instructors at Shoeburyness were far superior as teachers to those who
had never passed through the Class. Several officers complained. as
to the schoolboy treatment meted out to candidates, and the committee
accordingly recommended that they "should be allowed as much liberty,
and be treated with as much consideration, as students in the great
universities".20
Nonetheless, these criticisms had left an nnh.ppy impression upon.
the minds of the authorites and confirmed existing prejudices. When
18. Thid, 339.
19.i! 323-25, 330.
20. Report of a Committee on the Ed.j.cation of Artilleiy Officers,
xvii; Minutes of evidence, 2-5, 18-19, 20-23, 26-29, 30 (Capt. A. Ford.,
Capt. James Morgan, P.L.C., Lieut. W.B. Harvey, Lieut. Thmilton Geary,
Capt. F. Close, Capt. Richard Oldfield, who commented upon P.L.C.
instructors). P.P. (C.258, 1871), 14.
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a shortage of candidates occurred at the next entrance eirination,
a committee under Major-General William Napier, Director-General of
Military Education, was appointed to assess the whole question of
higher scientific education for artillery officers and to judge
whether the Advanced Class deserved to continue. The evidence
gathered by the Committee indicated that the unpopularity of the
Class was more apparent than real. It found. widespread support in
the artillery officer corps, and its difficulties were clearly
attributable to the way in which the official regulations were
loaded against those who wished to reach the highest scientific
levels cZ their profession. But amongst certain senor officers,
the new courses aroused profound. antagonF-zn.21
The two groupe presented a striking contrast of opinion.
Major-General D.E. Wood, for instance, considered. that the Advanced
Class was sapping the manhood of the reginent, and added:
21. Report of a Committee on the Advanced Class of Artillery Officers
P.P. (C.589, 1872), 14. The general import of the evidence may be
summarized in tabular form:
Witnesse5	 Opposed Class	 Approved	 Uncertain
6 Generals or Major-
Generals.	 2	 3	 3.






I also consider that the Short and Long Course, the Advanced
Class, and the two years at the Staff College, are all used.
by married officers to give them and. their families the quiet
repose of English life, and. that after the years so passed
you have an officer with, no doubt, great abilities, but
22quite unfLt to discipline men.
General Richard Dacres showed a similar antipathy towards intellectual
pursuits. "1 fancy many things in the present day are overdone", he
remarked, "and. science is one of them."23
Such members of the old school were quite out of step with
regimental opinion. Young and. Eard.ley Wilinot urged the continuance
of the Class, and found. almost unanimous support amongst the witnesses
from Lieutenant-Colonel downwards. Wilmot believed that the abolition
of the Class "would be a very serious national loss", Ij1ytenant
Thmilton Geaxy declared that it would be "suicidal", and. others
claimed. that rumours of such a step had aroused protests throughout
the regiment. 24
 It seems to be clear that the Class was far from
unpopular in the sense that it aroused. general antagonism. Jud,ged.
purely from the number of formal applications for admission, however,
it was evidently on the verge of failure. In 1872 there had been
four candidates at the entrance examination, of whom three were
disqua].ified. 25
 The importance of this committee's report lies in
22. Ibid., minutes of evidence, 11.
23. Ibid., minutes of evidence, 9-10.
24. Ibid, minutes of evidence, 11-12, 21, 47, 51, 53, (Wilmot, Young,
Capt.''Duncan, Lieut. Charles Jones, Lieut. Hini1ton Geazy).
25. Ibid., report, 4.
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the way in which it established that the breakdown of the Class was
attributable to defects in its administration, and not to an in-
superable opposition amongst the officer corps to advanced profes-
sional education.
In the first place, the continued failure to second candidates
naturally made officers reluctant to leave their batteries and entail
extra work upon those who remained. Almost every witness on regi-
mental service commented to this effect. The problem was exacerbated
by low officer establishments, a persistent feature of these years but
one beyond the control of educational reformers. According to the
Assistant-Director of Artillery Stores, there had. bern "numerous"
applicants to enter the course in 1872, but their commanders had. been
obliged to refuse them permission to sit the entrance exunination on
account of the paucity of officers.26 Secondly, the entrance
reqmireuenta, especially in the mathematics which cotatted for 7C9
of the total marks, were unrealistically high 27 The committee
therefore concluded that syllabus reform and. the supernumerary
principle should be introduced, and urged that the Class be resumed.
Other difficulties existed;which, though obvious from the
evidence, the report did. not dwell. A certain amount of resentment
persisted at the way mature officers were kept to fixed hours of
study and. put in classrooms like "a lot of schoolboys". The
recommendation of the Warde committee on this matter was, however,
-	 .	
.	 28being put slowly into effect.	 More seriously, it was felt that
prospecttve candidates were deterred from applying because of the
widespread conviction that the authorities disaproved of the Class
26. Ibid., minutes of evidence, 39.
27. Ibid., report 4.
28. Ibid., minutes of evidence, 17, 23-23, 50 (Col. Geoffrey Field,
Lieut.-Col. Charles Owen, Prof. of Artillery, R.M.L, Lieut. Charles
Jones, P.A.C.).
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and its graduates. Naj or-General Warde's position gave him the free-
doin to speak his mind on the subject:
if it was made clearly apparent to the co:rps at large that
those in official positions were as honestly desirous of
supporting the Class as it is now almost universally believed
that they wish to abolish it, and that instead of officers
who seek to avail themselves of it gairtirig any credit by so
doing, they are regarded as men who wish to shirk their
other professional duties, the difficulty which would then
arise would be in selecting from the number of candidates
ins bead of finding a sufficient number to compel.e.29
In short, considering the general problems army reform faced iii
Victorian Britain, and the particular difficulties under which the
A&iranse& Class laloured, it is rem1b1e that by l87' it had
achieved even a limited success. By then, sixteen P.A.C.s filled
high posts in the manufacturing departments, and, according to a
number of younger officers, the Artillery College courses had gained
acceptance in the regiment generally. Lieutenant Charles Jones
summed up majority opinion on this point by rem.virtg that the
Advanced Class and its allied courses were unpopular only with "a
small section (but noisy) of the regiment who affect to despise
science".3°
Nevertheless, the impression that the authorities were opposed
to the Advanced Class received rapid confirmation. Barely had the
report been issued when a regimertal circular axinoanced the
29. Ibid, minutes of evidence, 10, and. similarly 11-12, 14-15 (Wilmot,
Col. W.J. Grant).
30. Thid, minutes of evidence, 49, and. similarly 21, 28-29, 41-47,
(Young, Naj. Richard Oldfield, Capt. J. Owen, Capt. F. Duncan).
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abolition of the course as hitherto constituted. Officers desirous
of instruction in the subjects of the former Class were to sit a
qualifying exinin.tion and, if successful, were to educate themselves
privately at the School of Nines or King's and University Colleges,
London. Prospective candidates were reassured with the promise of
assistance with expenses to the amount of £25. per quarter and £100.
if the final ermnination were passed. Protests within the War Office
seem to have prompted a reconsideration of this decision. Cardwell
resolved to give the class another trial, although the principle of
secondment was still not sanctioned. Moreover, the haste with which
the War Office reversed its decision gave candidates little time for
preparation, and an insufficient number reached the required standard.
At length, the authorities agreed to secondinent in August 1873, and.
at a further attempt to re-establish the course, the number of satis-.
factory applicants w'as comfortably above the quota. 	 Thereafter
the future of the Advanced Class (known as the Senior Class from
1889) was not seriously jeopardized and it developed as the leading
course of the expanding Artillery College.
It is appropriate here to survey the College in its mature form
and the roles of its various courses. The Advanced Class reini-tned
concerned strictly with the latest applied scientific knowledge.
Charles Brackenbuxy's plea for attention to be paid ti. the bearing
of technology upon the art of war found. no acceptance and the Class
never encroached upon the functions of the StaIf College. P.A.C.s
31. Regt. circular, Lbici,	 61-62;	 rd, 3rd.. series, 217
(10 July 1873), co1..44; Second Report on the Education of Officers
by the Directoi'-General of Military Education (Naj.-Gen. EJ.




emerged as experts in applied mathematics, metallurgy, and chemistry
relevant to military purposes. As the century advanced new subjects
such as armour plating, steam mechrn'isms, and electricity were
introduced. 32 In 1894 standards were further raised when the Class
was thrown open to competitors from the entire officer corps,
excluding the R.E., and. to the Royal Navy and. Marines. 33
 Apart
from the R.A.'s right to half the available places, open competition
was the only basis on which they were filled. The tiny numbers of
the Class - its bi-amiva.]. output never rose above eight throughout
the period - may lead one to suppose that it was of slight importance.
This impression is ad.ji4.sted when the appointments reeived by Advanced
Class aduates are considered. Between December 1872 and. 1876, for
instance, twelve Lad been appointed to postof vital educational or
technological significance, including those of Superintendent and
Assistant Superinteident of the Royal Small Arms Factories, Inspector
of Gunpowder Factories, two District Inspectors of Warlike Stores,
Director of the Experimental Branch of the Department of Artillery
and Stores, two Instructors and. one Professor of Artillery at the
R.LA. 34 With occasional exceptions, all the P.A.C.s of 1884, 1886,
and 1888 received similar appointments immediately upon passing out
of the Class. 35 Circumstantial evidence suggests, therefore, that
the Class by the late l880s was fulfiiing the role envisaged by its
founders, of working, as one subaltern admirably phrased it, "...
32. Third. Report a	 ation of Officers by the Director-Genera.].
of Military Educati	 .-Gen. Sir Beauchamp Walker), 27-28.
(C.3818, 1883), 15.
33. A.O. (1894),	 35.
35. Fourth Report on the Education of Officers by the Director-General
of Military Education (Lieut.-Gen. Sir Robert Bidduiph), 36.
(c.5793, 1889), 17.
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beneficially on the regiment, by diffusing a large amount of useful
professional information, and. exciting an interest in the science of
its profession which otherwise would not exist".6
At other levels, a range of less academic courses provided for
the more practical needs of the regiment. Charles Brackenbuxy, as
Director of the College, outlined these classes before the committee
of 1888 on the arnr's educational establishments. Advanced technicdl
instruction was provided by the ten week Long Course held at Shoebury-
ness annually for a group of about twenty-five selected officers.
Specialist traird-ng in gunnery manufacture could be obtained through
the	 Course, open to R.A. officers of "some standing"
and to Ordnance Store officers. The Junior Class was the third
regular course for officers, and was attended. by subalterns newly
commissioned from the R.LA. A variety of specialist and occasional
courses was also ruri '
 in order to acquaint some offica-s with. new
inventions such as telephony, position-finding, and hydro-pneumatic
mountings for heavy ordnance. 37
 Save for the Junior Class,
abolished in 1889, this remained the general pattern of courses
until the end of the century.38
It is not possible to determine exactly what number of artillery
officers passed through such classes, but an. informed guess mac' be
36. Repert of a Committee on the Advanced Class of Artillery Officers
Minutes of evidence, 49.
	
. (0.589, 1872), 14.
37. Report of the Commi4tee on Military Educational Establishments
(1888), 119-28 (evidence of Col. C.B. Brackenbury, Director of the
Artillery College), V.0. 33/48.
38. ieen's Regulations and Orders for the Army (1898), 226-27.
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made. Brackenbury's evidence indicates that, apart from those who
qualified in the Junior Class, about forty annually took the Advanced,
Long, and. Piremaster's certificates, and. had. been doing so for a
considerable time. prom 1870 to 1888, therefore, roughly 720
officers should have received some form of advanced artillery
education, and. to theso must be added the uncomputed. numbers of those
who took the occasional courses. By the late nineteenth century
the Royal Artillery had developed something approaching a system of
full postgraduate education.
The need for every officer to participate in this was never
officially accepted. By 1898, the only mandatory iiiitruction for
regimental rrtillery officers was the Junior Class and forty-two
days field training at stations where staff officers were avai1able
to supervise. 39
 That, in the face of this, the R.A.I. possessed. so
many members and the Artillery College flourished, shows that at
least one branch of the officer corps was hardly unaware of its
professional advancement.
With respect to organisation, contemporary debate centred. upon
two issues; the formation of higher units and. the division of the
regiment into specialised. branches.
During the nineteenth century, the British artillery possessed
a structure unique amongst the armies of the great powers. Since
its organisation into two battalions in 1747, the Royal Artillery
had been one regiment; all officers were on a single list as regards
promotion and postings. In harmony with this simple arrangement of
peronne1, the chief unit of artillery tactics, training and
39. Qjieen's Regulations and. Orders for the Army (1898), 233.
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administration was the battery. This situation was clearly the out-
come of the haphazard development of an arm which had originated as a
subsidiary to infantry and. cavalry, but in time the organisation of the
British artillery had come to be regarded with affection and defended
as ideal for a small aa'n- with scattered responsibilities. By the
1870s, however, it was an article of faith amongst reformers that such
an arrangement was inadequate to the demands of modern trinng.
As early as 1859 the old battalion organisation of the regiment
had. been replaced by a system of brigades. Although the chief unit
of interior econor and triining remained the battery, this was more
than a paper distributbu of batteries, since reliefs were to take
place by brigade.40
 Experience soon showed that it was impossible
to combine the needs of a detached service with the brigade system in
its entirety. Brigadea, supposed to serve together, were scattered
as before save at the very largest garrisons; Malta, Dover, Plymouth,
and Gibraltar. By 1871 there were approximately 100 stations at home
and. abroad in which the brigade system was merely an administrative
convenience for the facilitation of correspondence. 41
 It was soon
suggested, therefore, that it had. been misguided to introduce into so
small and scattered a service a principle of organisation more suited
to the massed and wholly localised armies of the continent. The
Horse Guards and the War Office exchanged arguments on this question,
the former supporting and the latter (at least in the person of
General John Adye) condemning it. Cambridge, speaking for the
40. Brig.-Gen. John Adye, Director of Artillery and Stores,
Organisation of the Royal Artillery (Oct. 1871), 1, W.O. 33/23;
G.O. April 1859, repr. Papers on the Subject of the Organisation
of the Royal Artillery (1871), W.O. 33/23.
41. Adye, Organisation of the Royal Artillery-, op. cit., 4.
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Horse Guards, defended the system on the rather vague grounds that it
contributed to the esprit de corps of the regiment. Adye declared
that it made administrative nonsense, had no effect on training, and
was unsuited to the needs of an imperial power. The first brigade,
for instance, was scattered amongst Sheerness, Bermuda, Jami.ica, and
Barbados; the second amongst Ceylon, Mauritius, Singapore, the Cape,
42St. Heleiia, and Hong Kong.
Shortly after this exchange, and while the MacDougall committee
was esinining the whole question of arnr organisation, the Adjutant
General of the LA. undertook an enquiry into the brigade system.
His findings may be qui'kly summvized. Of the eighteen officers
examined, all save two were convinced that the brigade system had been
a valuable attempt to introduce modern principles of organisation into
the regiment, and that to revert to the old arrangement of battalions
wouId be a step in the wron. direction. Of these sixteen, four were
in favour of some form of district system, whereby an area rather than
an actual unit should be the basis for administration. The remainder
proclaimed themselves in support of brigades for staff and other
administrative purposes, but believed that for training and fighting
the battery must remain the most significant unit. Relief by bri-
gades was generally condemned as disastrous to the efficiency of the
larger fortresses, regularly bled, as it were, of the expertise
developea within them during garrison periods. The Adjutant General,
therefore, recommended minor administrative changes only. In accor'-
dance with his suggestions, the number of batteries in each brigade
42. Horse Guards minute, 28 Nov. 1870 and W.O. minute, 28 Nov. 1870,
Papers on the Subject of the Organization of the Royal Artillery (1871),
W.O. 3/23.
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was equalised, and. a partial district system was established by die-
associating regimental colonels from the command of particular
brigades aM placing them over military districts at borne.
Lieutenant-Colonels assumed direct command of the brigades.43
As an administrative device, therefore,the brigade system survived.
But the exigencies of colonial warfare ensured that it never became more
than this. Reformers certdri1y continued to advocate various foxmi of
higher orgaxiisation which should be more than distribution tables and
yet not be so inflexible as to interfere with the far-flung defensive
requirements of the empire. Change in higher organ.isation, however,
seem to iave been little more than reshuffling of the details of
a,iminstrative procedure, and could hardly have had much impact upon
pre,aration for war. These reforms may be briefly smmnaized.
In 1877, the primacy of the battery as the unit for war was re-
ln.forced by a regmital order directing that henceforth all reliefs
were to be exclusively by battery. Overseas brigade staffs were
broken up altogether, and. the brigades into which the regiment was
organised - three of Horse artillery, six of Field, and five of
garrison - were no more than paper divisions for the convenience of
office work. This arrangement persisted until l882. 	 In that
year, the artillery was drawn into the localisation scheme. The
Royal Horse was divided into two brigades and. given a depot at
Canterbury, the Field into four brigades each with its own depot,
43. Report of the Adutant-Cenera1 upon the Organization of the
Royal Artillery-, p.P. (c.561 , 1872), 14; Caliwell and. Head1ctn,
I, 67, 70-71; A.G. was Gen. Sir Richard Airey.
44. Maj. Arthur Griffiths, The English Army (Loud. 1878), 132-33;
c.o. (1877), no. 22.
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and. the Garrison into eleven divisions. The district system was
taken a stage further by the abolition of movable brigade staffs,
who were converted into permanent district staffs. Eleven terri-
torial divisions were created to serve the Garrison branch, artillery
militia officially became part of the R.A. and formed junior brigades
in the divisions. 45 The term brigade petered out altogether in 1889,
when the Royal Horse batteries were numbered from A to T, the Field
from 1 to 80, and. the Garrison organised, into three great athnin stra-
tive	 Save for recruiting puxposes and correspondence,
the battery remained the primary unit for preparation for war.
By and large, therefore, the attempt to introduce real higher
units of artillery into the British army was a failure. To a con-
tinentalist such as Sir Edward May, whose general attitude is clear
from his dismissal of the American Civil war as irrelevant for the
serious military student, this was lamentable. So long as the
artillery service remained one of "detachments", its professional
horizons would, in his view, stay equally lirxLtted. 47 As be wrote
in old age, having at last eiperienced the great continental war he
had so often envisaged, the small war mentality held sway throughout
the period:
In those days the army thought in batteries. The Major was
supreme in his co ymnmd, the Artillery Brigade as we know it
45. Col. E. Mar1chin (Dep. A.G., R.A.), '!Memorandum on the Organisation
of the Royal Artillery, from its formation up to the present time",(2.9 Nov. 1887), 231. Report of the Committee ot.. the Organization of
the Royal Artillery P.P. (C. 5491, 1888), 25.
46. Callwell and Headirin, I, 101; Army Book, 214-21.
47. Naj. E.S. May, "The Story of the Civil War in America", Proc.
R.A.I. 22 (1895), 109; "Cooperation between Guns and. Cavalry",
ibi, 207-39.
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did not exist, and. the Lieutenant-Colonel was not expected to
interfere with the Major unless it were absolutely necessary
In consequence the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel had, become one
to which the phrase otium cuin dignitate aptly applied. So
jealous were the Majors of any interference, and. so strongly
did public opinion in the regiment back them up, that it used
to be said that when an officer oecame a Lieutenant-Colonel
"he changed his sex". Such a state of things was very bad
for any gunners who bad. any ambition. It tended to make
seniors lazy, and it became very detrimental to Artillery
eficiency when guns were employed on any but ttie coznpara-
tively small scale demnided by our little wars. It was a




To more imperially minded reformers, however,, th3t the British
artillery did not approximate to continental models was no bad thing.
Many officers who were far from conservative were convinced that the
battery must remain the primary element in artillery organisation.
Nonetheless, they equally accepted that some form of training beyond
it had. to be established if the fighting ability of the regiment was
to keep pace with its technological advance. Thc Artillery College
was helping to close the gap between theoretical gunnery and the
practical skills of the average officer, but it was apparent that
regular instruction of men and officers in their normal locations
was also needed. The battery alona could not properly supply this
need. On the other hand, it hM not proved possiDle to apply con-
tinental models of higher organisation to the British artillery.
48. Naj.-Gen. Sir Edward May, Changes and. Chances of a Soldier's
Life (Lond.. 1925), 93.
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As a compromise, therefore, some reformers suggested the specialised.
training and. organisation of particular branches of the arm. To
propose this deeply alarmed conservatives wedded. to the concept of
the artillery as a vast agglomeration of single batteries. A pro-
longed dispute over the division of the regiment ensued, conducted.
with extraordinary fervour on both sidea.
The reformers' case was strengthened both by technological
advances and the crisis of morale through which the Garrison artillery
appeared to be passing. Imperial expansion during the last tlird of
the century enhanced the importance of its role as the navy's conrple-
ment in the defence of ..iarbours and. coaling stations. Concurrently,
the working of heavy ordnance became increasingly sophi&-icated.. The
period under review saw the introduction of hydro-pneumatic carriages,
hydraulic mountings, position range-finding, photography, and tele-
phony into the Garrison artillery. 49
 At the same time, it was
universally acknowledged that the esprit de corps of its batteries
was declining and. that their practical skills were far from commen-
surate with the demands of these new devices.
The causes of this situation were plain. Garrison locations,
such as Jamaica or Halifax, or even those closer to home such as
Portsmouth and. Cork, were isolated. and exposed. The young officer,
especially if single, faced. a bleak prospect if posted to a Garrison
station. As Major LW. White gloomily observed:
In winter, day after day, the rain pours down, and the spray
washes over the place; when (the young officer) wants to go
49. For technical information, I have relied upon Callwell and
Headlam, I, pt. 2, "Armament".
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into the neighbouring town, he has to go in an open. boat;
he is very lonely; his work is dirty and greasy and. carried
oi in dark holes and corners 	 50
Talented or otherwise, the great majoiity of officers in such postings
cordially dislflced. them and constantly appealed for transfer. Second-
ly, time and. means for tring both men and. officers were very limited.
No regular concentrations for instruction took place, and. batteries
which were sent to Woolwich found there almost no facilities for
garrison training. 51
 Finally, there was the deleterious effect of
constant transfers. Since the Crimea, the Garrison branch had. been
used to maintain the officer establishments of the Horse and Field.
The burden of low officer establishments fell upon the dismounted side
of the aerv..ce, and in 1870 the number of subalterns in Garrison
batter±es had been actually reduced from three to i52 Moreover,
the inherent attractions of the Field. and Horse were aunented. by the
authorities' habit of permitting a transfer from the Garrison artil-
lery if an officer were particularly well reported upon. Such a
practice was damaging in principle. It ensured a constant stream of
young officers through the Garrison batteries having rio permanent
interest therein, and. feeling that retention in them was a form of
punishment.
-	 By the 1880s, standards in the Garrison artillery were
50. Report of the Committee on the 0ranization of the Royal
Artillery, 150. PJ. (C. 5491, 1888), 25.
51. Thid, 93 (Maj.-Gen. G. Le M. Tupper). Apparently during the
1880s Woolwich Common was closed for six months annually, otherwise
the overworked groimci would have become a quagmire.
52. Report on the Garrison Artillery, (31 Aug. 1883), W.0. 33/46.
This W.0. committee, chaired by aj.-Gen. Sir Charles Arbuthriot,
recommended restoration of the third subaltern.
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sufficiently low to be causing grave concern in informed circles,
and. to many reformers it seemed that its problems could be solved
only by a complete separation of the mounted and. dismounted branches
of the regiment. The question had been in the air for some time.
In 1872 the German artillery was divided into two distinct services,
Field and Garrison. 53
 At this date, such a move naturally commanded.
respectful, but, in the view of one leading artillerist, unthinking,
attention in Britain. Major Le Geary argued that the great virtue
of the existing system iay in its flexibility, whereby batteries
from any branch could be sent wherever they were needed, and officers
(allegedly) could. cope with any type of ordnance under a variety of
circumstances. Prussia's arrangement was inapplicable, he wrote:
(to) our comparatively small army, with the constant obligation
of being prepared for war on a small scale. Po inflict trpon
our army such an artillery organisation, would produce the
same results, probably, as would ensue from arming a dwarf
with the club of Hercules.54
It was inaccurate, however, to see the advocates of division as
simply responding to the German example. Concern that the Garrison
artillery was inadequate to its role in imperial defence and to
specialist demands of inidern technology- were the driving forces
behind the issue, as the relevant enquiries of the 1880s were to
chow. Moreover, H.W.L. Rime, whose resistance to continental
examples has been noticed above, urged division in a letter of 1870
53. "Artillery and Education", Times 26 Aug. 1872.
54. Maj. Le C. Geary, "An Endeavour to Determine a Tactical Basis
for the Artillery of England.", Proc. R.A.I. 8 (1871-74), 238.
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to the Warde coumiittee. In response, its 	 report pronounced itself
firmly on behalf of the regiment "one and indivisible". Verde also
expatiated upon the "beauties of our existing organisation" before
the enquiry into the brigade system. 55
 Despite the Warde committee's
progressive views on education, its members seemed to be unaware of
the effect of allowing the cream of artillery officers to enter the
mounted branches. "We consider it", they reported:
to be of essential importance ... that every officer, on
joining the corps should be posted, as formerly, to garrison
brigades, and that appointment to horse and. field. biigadee
should. be by selection, which should. be decided. by the
character made for themselves by the young officers, as
regards smartness, zeal, and. attention to their duties.6
There the matteif rested, until a&tation in .the service press
led the authori1es to reopen examination of it in l886. 	 Colonel
R.J. Hay, the then Adjutant-General of the Royal Artillery, composed
memoranda which tentatively endorsed. the case for division and.
suggested the formation of seven distinct regiments. Hay also
criticised, the time-honoured but slightly illogical principle of
using Garrison batteries as mountain artillery on the North West
55. Report of a Committee on the Education of Artillery- Officers, ix,
52-53 (letter from Rime, 1 Nay 1870).
	
. (C.258, 1871), 14;
Report of the Adjutant-C-eneral upon the Organization of the Roy-a)
Artillery, 8. P.P. (C.56l, 1872), 14.
56. Report of a Committee on the Education of Artillery Officers,
op. "it., xi.
57. Anon, "Reorganization of the Royal Artillery", U.S.L (1879),
pt. 2, 414-20; Lieut.-Col. Charles Ford, "Our Field. Artillery",
Army and Navy Nagazine 7 (Nov. 1883-April 1884), 96-97; Col. W.V.
Knollys, "The Reorganization of the Royal Artillery", U. S.M. (1887),




 Shortly afterwards, the secretary of state, V.H. Smith,
appointed a committee under his financial secretary, Sir H.S. Stafford
Northcote, to assess the regiment's ability to supply two arn corps
with the necessary artillery. During its deliberations, the committee
discussed the question of division and. marshalled authoritative
testimonies as the poor standard of Garrison artillery officers. But
its recommendations were siinp].y that Garrison isolation should. be
reduced by regular concentrations for training, that every battery
should. have three subalterns, and. that mountain artillery should be
localised in India in order to reduce the call upon Garrison
batteriE's. 59 The last two proposals were eventuall; ? put into
effect, although the restoration of the third subaltern was accom-
panied by the abolition of the Junior class.60
Limited perhaps by its terms of reference, the committee cane to
no conclusion on th issue of separation, but tbe findings prompted
the appointment of a full-scale enquiry into artillery organisation.
This provided the forum for a vigorous clash of opinions between the
Duke of Cambridge and certain elderly officers on one hand., and.
61Wolseley and the majority of the younger witnesses on the other.
58. Memoranda of 15 April and. 20 May 1885, W.0. 33/46. Hay believed,
however, that the regiment should remain unified for administrative
purposes ("Memorandum on Artillery Organization", 18 July 1885,
Wolseley Papers, W/NEM 1).
59. First Report of the Committee on the Strength and Distribution
of the Royal Artillery, 5-12 (report), 54-63 (memoranda by Col. Le
Geary and Col. W. Pox-Strangeways, Commandant of the School of Gunnery),
W.O. 33/16.
60. Report of the Committee on the Organization of the Royal Artillery,
vi. P.P. (C.5491, 1888), 25; Naj. H.P.C. Simpson "Mountain 4.rtillery
Progress", Proc. R.A.I. 19 (1892), 552-56.
61. Report of the Committee on the Organization of the Royal Artillery,
op. cit. Tabular statement of evidence:
























Much purely instinctive antipathy to change was apparent in the
evidence of some senior officers. Cambridge predictably exemplified
this attitude. The artillery, he believed, was in excellent shape.
"Who has ever heard. of anything going wrong?", he asked rhetorically,
none of the committee's members venturing a reply. To his mind, the
urge for separation was generated only by Horse and. Field subalterns
who wished to stay in tLe more glamorous aide oI' the service: "Every
man has a fancy, but what do these young gentlemen know about it?
Nothing. A young gentleman likes to mount a horse, that is all he
cares about, and therefore he says, "I wish to have the coxps
divided. ,62
This allegation was reiterated in almost all defence.. of the
existing system, including those bised primarily upon more convincing
arguments. As Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Alison somewhat
sharp].y pointed out not indeed to the Duke but o Colonel Markham
(Dep. A.-G., R.A.) - such assertions were irrelevant to the evidence
before the committee, which had heard no direct opinions of officers
below the rank of major. Three gener.ls, seven colonels, and nine
majors could hardly be 'aid, Alison remarked drily, "to be young
Officers who have no experience and. who merely prefer to ride".6
Moreover, as witnesses repeatedly stated, the main drive for separa-
tion came from within the Garrison artiiiery.6
-	 The Duke's complacent dismissal of its problems arose in part
from a rather disdainful attitude towards the dismounted side of the
regiment. Social prestige lay with the field gunners (especially
62. Thid, 14-17, 166-91 (evidence of Cambridge), quos., 15, 17.
63. Thid, 170-171.
64. Thid, 109-18, 129, 158 (Col. Yeatman-Biggs, Maj. S. Gardiner,
Naj. S. Pym).
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the Royal Horse), and. this perceptibly inclined some officers to down-.
grade the Garrison artillery's importance. To Major-General W.J.
Williams (Commanding LA., Aldershot), for instance, the Royal Horse
were an elite corps, the Garrison an "inferior service" and its
officers manifestly not the equal of their colleagues in other
branches. He replied, in the affirmative to a loaded query from
Henry Bra.ckenbury: "Do you think that the proper place for an
Officer who is discarded from the Field Artillery is the Garrison
65Artillery?"	 As in the cavalry controversy, questions of social
prestige were interwoven with professional judgments.
Sucia discrimin.tiou perhaps helped to shape a scxleme drawn up
by Colonel Na*hni which seemed to aim at ceeping the Garrison
artillery in its sthordinate role. He proposed that a subaltern,
upon passing out of the R.N.A., should be posted first to the mounted
branches, then to the Garrison artillery, and. then permanently to
whichever side it was judged that he was the more suited. But
Markhin made it clear that a young officer's wishes would be respec-
ted if he were well reported upon. Thus, as the majority wished. to
enter th field. side, Markham's proposal was designed. to perpetuate
the system whereby subalterns who received mediocre reports spent
most of their careers in Garrison batteries. 66 Because most young
officers only wanted to go in one direLtion, Markham's point that a
65. Thi&. 86-91, quo. 89.
66. Thid. appendix I, 207-15, and. 165-85 (evidence of Markham).
He Rtatecl that, as D.A.-G., he received numerous applications for
postings f.com the friends and relatives of cadets nearing the end
of the R.N.A. course, and virtually all requested commissions in the
Horse or Field. His decision rested upon reports of the cadet's
personal qualities and. claims arising from the services of his family.
4, 4, 164.
205.
poor report would, prevent transfer in either direction had little
bearing on the case. By condoning the principle that entry into the
mounted branches was a reward for good. service, he was advocating, in
effect, that the Garrison artillery continue to be "the penal settle-.
inent" of the regiment.6
In support of his suggestions, the D.A.-G. adduced the well-worn
argument that the current orga.nisation had proven itself in the test
of actual war and. was eminently suited to the needs of a colonial
power. This view was endorsed, 'by other influential officers, inclu-
ding General Sir John Adye and the Inspector-General of irtiuery.68
But the 'utlook of such officers was essentially retrograde. The
examples they used most fr€quently were the Crimea, where Garrison
guniers reinforced the Horse and Field. before Sebastopol, and. the
Indian Mutiny, when again Garrison gunners ,ent on field service.
Such makeshifts of smoothbore days were hardly relevant to the 1880s,
and in any case, as the critics pointed out, had. merely made the best
of an "incredibly bad." system.6 	 As Henry Rime somewhat disrespect-
fully quipped: "When Gulliver had. no fire engine to put out a fire
in a certain city he used. other means".7°
Such problems as patently existed in the Garrison artillery were
attributed by Markham and those of like mind, solely to the shortage
of officers. Through.,-it most of the 1870s and 1880s, the number of
effective artillery officers was some sixty to ninety below the
67. _tbid,, 97 (Col. J.B. Richardson, Chief Instructor, Royal Military
Repository).
68. jbJ1,, 17-24, 269-73; also see Adye's Recollections of a Military
Life (Lond. 1895), 249.




minimum reajiired for the establishments as laid down by the estimates.71
The inabilitj or refusal of the authorities to second officers atten-
ding the Artillery College (with the exception of those in the
Advanced Class and Indian officers enrolled in the Long Course)
affected all branches to roughly the same extent. But low estab-
lishments had damaged the Garrison artillery to a disproportionate
degree in that, until the mid-eighties, field vacancies were auto-
maticafly filled at its expense. 72
 It was the Garrison batteries
which lost their third subalterns in 1870. Therein, in Narkhazn's
view, lay the whole problem. Restoration of the third subaltern
would see an end of the agitation to divide the regir.ent. Transfers
would be r&uced, the burddn upon battery officers lightened, and
proper levels of efficiency attained.73
The supply of officers was, however, only one aspect of the
problem, as the evidence of the proponents of division demonstratee.
To summarize their points of agreement first: it was generally felt
that only by making the Garrison service virtually a separate pro-
fession could their sense of inferiority be removed and esprit de
corps restored. All concurred in the proposal to render the dis-
mounted service more congenial by introducing additional ("armament")
pay for all ranks, and reserving for Garrison officers certain manu-
facturing posts in the Royal Arsenal. The specialised skills of
officers should be improved by obliging them to commit their careers
from the first to one or other side of the service.
71. Ibid., 167 (Ilarkharn).
72. Ibid., 191-200 (?Iaj. J. Ritchie, who had been in LA.
atlministration for 27 ,ears).
73. Ibid., 167.
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Many instances of low professional knowledge amongst Garrison
officers were adduced by witnesses. Henry Brackenbu.ry recounted an
episode in 1878 at Newhaven, when a 9-inch gun was sent thither to
be mounted on a Moncrieff carriage. The captain of the Newbaven
battery was away, the subaltern had just arrived from a Field untt,
and the Major had not seen a heavy gm mounted for twenty years.
Finally, recourse had to be made to Shoeburyness for expert assis-
tance. 74
 That many officers did not sufficiently understand the
material they were working with was plainly attributable to the
inordinate level of transfers. This in burn arose from the prac-
tice of granting transfers as a reward for good service rather than
from the low establishments. Major S. Gardiner estimated that from
October 1884 to October 1887, 95 of 110 Horse artillery officers were
transferred, 311 of 400 Field, and 350 of 453 Garrison. 75 Most were
therefore "birds of passage", 6
 rarely long enough with a battery to
develop a real interest in it or to gain a proper understanding of
position gunnery.
Regimental feeling definitely lay with the advocates of division.
A number of officers remarked upon "great restlessness" and discontent
abroad In the regiment, and maintained that the stbject had been unaer
discussion for years, with the majority of officers below the rank of
colonel in favour of the reform. As Colonel Yeatnian-Biggs remarkea:
"The only strongly dissentient voices that I have heard have been
amongst the superior Officers". 77 Nonetheless, the younger reformers
74. mid, 43.
75. mid, 130.
76. mid, 27 (Lieut.-Gen. LA. Smyth, member of Orclnnce Committee).
77. Thid, 111, and. 123-28, 129, 151, 158, 160 (Naj. E.0. Hay, Maj.
S. Cardiner, Maj. G.B. Martin, Maj. S. Pym, Maj. J. Wall).
208.
did. not lack	 support in the senior ranks. General Sir Charles
Arbuthnot, formerly Adjutant-General, had been urging division since
the early seventies. 78 Sir Archibald Alison, Brackenbury, and.
Colonel R. Harrison pointed out that, with. the separation of the
mounted. from the dismounted branches:
The Garrison Artillery, having trained its Officers, will be
permitted to keep them, even if they are of exceptional
ability and smartness, and will not be called up, as now,
to give the pick of its Officers to the mounted branches ...
Most notably, Lord Wolseley was categrical on the issue. He full'r
agreed with the opposing side as to the special requirem..snts of
colonial service; wherein he differed was as to the degree of
specialisation needed to meet these. Indeed, he envisaged the
eventuaJ subd.ivisio?i of the artillery into a nun,ber of small regiments
in order to meet the increasingly disparate imperatives of coast and
fortress defence, mountain warfare, and field service: tithe necessary
tendency is to subdivide". Discontent with the traditional system,
he believed, was widespread. amongst the "younger and more educated
portion" of the 	 80
78. In evidence, Major Ritchte stated that Arbuthnc.'s spell in
administration had caured. him to execute a volte-face on the issue,
(ibid, 191-200). But in a letter of protest to Markhiim, Arbuthnot
reiterated his earlier stand and. wrote that Ritchie's evidence
could have arisen only from some "extraordinary misunderstanding
on his part." Correspondence as to Evidence Given Before Committee
on Organization of R.A. P.P. (1888), 67.
79. Report, op. cit., xi-xiii.
80. Thid, 7-14, quos. 7, 8.
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Finally, it is interesting to note that the senior officers who
supported Wolseley in evidence before the committee were involved in
practical instruction. Acquainted with the capabilities of junior
officers, they were rather sceptical of the time-honoured and ideal-
istic interpretation of the regiment's motto: tibigue. Colonel
Charles Brackenbuxy, who bad spent his entire career teaching officers
and. was currently Artillery College Commandant, judged that it was
impossible for Field artillery subalterns and captains to add. a sound.
knowledge of Garrison duties to their proper skills. This opinion
was confirmed by Colonel S.J. Nicholson, Commundant of the School of
Gunnery, who in fact wanted specialisation to begin t the very
commencement of the R.M.A. course. SimLar views were expressed by
Lieutenant-General H.A. Smyth, formerly Commandant at Woolwich, and.
Colonels C.C. Trench and. J.B. Richardson, respectively Chief Gunnery
Instructor at Shoebiiryness and Chief Instructor of the Royal Military
Repository. 81 Their comments form a striking contrast with the
insistence of Markham, Adye, Bidduiph, and Goodenough - officers all
occupied with administration - upon the unity of the artillery
82profession.
Despite the tenor of the evidence befure the committee, its
report was a rather confused document. It condemned the principle
of using the Garrison artillery as a reserve to the other branches,
aM recommended that each section bear the burden of its own vacancies.
To reduce the isolation of Garrison gunners, the comr'.ittee advised.
concentration of batteries in each district command at some central
81. 27-31, 51-58, 65-68, 74-75, 97 (Snyth, Brackenbury,
Nichoison, Trench, and Richardson).
82. Thi, 32-37 (Goodenough).
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station, at least during winter. Schools of instruction should be
formed in each command and. the Garrison officers should receive
armament pay. Beyond this, the members of the committee found
unanimity impossible, dividing over the issue of separation. The
chairman, Harrison, Henry Brackenbury, and. Alison recommended that,
after two years in each branch, a subaltern should be committed to
a career in Garrison or in Horse and Field artillery. Bidduiph,
Markh'n, Major-General William Stirling and Ralph Knox, the
Accountant-General, dissented.83
Its inconclusion ot the main issue, however, did. not render the
committee's work nugatory. Regimental feeling on the subject and
the defects of the existing organisation had. been brought to public
attention, and. it became increasingly difficult to maintain that the
artillery officer could become an adequate all-rounder. The entire
committee had forcibly stressed the implications of he low standards
of the Garrison artillery for imperial defence. Under the tradi-
tiona.1 arrangements, they wrote:
no higher reward can be offered to an exceptionally good
officer of Garrison Artillery than his transfer from that
branch ... That such feelings should exist with regard to
a service of pre-eminent importance, to our Colonies and to
our Indian dependency (with a land frontier, as well as a
sea-coast to protect), the Committee view with the very
strongest appreher3ion.84
Military journals continued to discuss the subject. Maurice
allowed his United Service Magazine to become a forum for debate
83. iii-xiii (unanimous report), xiv-xviii (divided reports).
84. Ibid., Report, v.
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on the issue, and. it was implicitly made part of the LA.I. Prize
Essay topic for 1891. Only one author of the four essays published
considered himself bound by the prescribed title to eschew the
question of organisation. Nevertheless, he subtitled his contribu-
tion vitn the proverb quoted by Wolseley to the Harris committee:
"Jack of all trades is master of none". The other three writers
insisted that all reforms in training would be vitiated "unless some-
thing is done to give the officers of the Garrison Artillery a more
permanent interest in that branch than they have at present".85
At length, on the eve of the South African war, an arnr order
divided the regiment into two corps. Colonels were o be described
as belongin' to the whole regiment, but all officers below them per-
forming regimental duties were to be appointed to the Royal Garrison
artillery or to the Royal Horse and Field. Save in exceptional
circumstances, officera ccmld not transfer from one branch to the
other. With a wise obeisance to tradition, however, the ancient
title of the Royal Regiment of Artillery was retained..86 Provisions
87for Garrison armament pay accompanied the reform. 	 A fe'u months
85. Title: "Having Regard to Recent Improvements In 'xnateial'
Could. tha Trdriing of the Personnel of our Garrison Artillery be
Further Perfected to ensure Greater Efficiency", Essays by Lieut.-
Col. R.W. Rainsford-Hannay, Capt. G. Osborn, Capt. W. St. P. Bunbury,
Capt. A.C. Boileau, Proc. R.A.I. 18 (1891), 355-71, 413-35, 453-73,
495-509, quo. 495-96.
Also see articles discussing in detail the recommendations of
the Harris Committee and associated issues: U.S.M. n.s. 4 (Oct.
1891-March 1892), 101-08, ibid., 13 (April-Sept. 1896), 32-41, ibi.,
14 (Oct. 1896-March 1897), 125-30, 131-39, 438-44, 499-503, 504-507,
ibid, 15 (April-Sept. 1897), 210-18.
86. A.0. (1899), no. 96.
87. Anon, "The Royal Garrison Artillery", U.S.L n.s. 20 (Oct.
1899- March 1900), 47.
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previously, the Artillery College had been renamed. the Orim,ce College,
and. transformed into an a.rnr rather than a regimental institution, a
tribute to its growing prestige and standards.88
Debate over officer education in the Royal Artillery provides a
fairly clear-cut instance of reform versus reaction in the Victorian
army. Observation of continental examples gave the immediate impulse
to found the Artillery Collegthereaftcr the institution developed
its own strengths and. impetus. Issues of organisation caused a more
complicated pattern of opinion to emerge. Most reformers appear to
have become rapidly convinced that Britain could not emulate the
contineLtal powers in maintaining higher units ot ax' illery. Atten-
tion became concentrated upon the need. for professional specialisation.
Advocates of division certainly seem to have spcen for a relatively
young and progressive sector of the officer corps, thougn their
opposition cannot be regarded as purely conservative. Sir John
Adye was the very reverse of a bow-and-arrow general, while Biddulph,
as Cardwell's biographer, was a Cardwellite of the purest water.
Dispute over artillery organisation, therefore, arose not only from
the natural resistance of conservativEs to change, but from differing
interpretations of the needs of imperial defence.
88. Caliwell and Headlam, II, 384.
CHAPTER 7.
Supply and. Transport: Experience and. Debate.
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Pew aspects of Victorian military history display more clearly
Britain' s differences from her continental, neighbours than the logi-
stics of her co].onia]. campaigns. These were, as Sir Charles Ca].lwell
often remarked, wars against nature more than against man; it was
generally more difficult to reach the enemy than to defeat him in
battle. Communications in small wars exemplify the disparity between
the late Victorian army's active service and. certain European-
oriented aspects of its domestic organisation. Nonetheless,
colonial warfare prompted much discussion of supply and. transport
systems. The ensuing chapter assesses the degree to which practical
reforms emerged from this experience and continua]. debate. Pertinent
developments up to 1830 are outlined first, then two Victorian cam-
paigns are discussed. in some detail, and. fim1].y the sequel at home
to these and. similar wars is analysed.
Two main features of foreign supply and transport systems seem to
have impressed themselves upon British observers: military control of
supply and communications, and the existence of distinct transport
departments. During the 1860s, it was the rench Intendance which
attracted. most a&niration in Britain. In constitution, the Intendance
corps was wholly military; its officers formed part of the General
Staff. All supply services and arnr brazisport (the Train des
- Eguipages Nilitafres) came within the province of the Intendants,
although they did. not control the permanent cadres of regimental
transport. In war, an Intendant of the relevant rank was to be
attached to the commander of each army, and. to the general of each




Developments in the Prussian army during the 1860s were based
upon the concept of articulation, namely, that upon inobilisation a
supply and transport network should be formed stretching from the
field of operations to tne home base. The idea was summed up by the
German term etappen, meaning not only the unified organisation of
communications but the command structure it involved. Significant].y,
the word had no precise equivalent in English. From the Austro-
Prussian war onwards, control of communications formed a distinct
command in the Prussian army, under a genera]. officer and his staff.
This included officers of the General Staff, the engineer and. medical
services, the railway depar'inent, and an Intendance similar to the
Prenrth
 but exercising less power. As part of the articulated system,
German corps transport was highly developed. The principle was that
each corps should possess, In peace as well as war, its own permanent
and military transport to convey supplies between its Immediate zone
of activity and the depots of the nearest branch of the line of
communications. All other transport was the responsibility of the
Intendant-General, under the commnd of the Inspector-General of the
1. Lieu-L--Col. D.S. St i rling, "International Supply Notes??,
Army Service Corps Journal, 7 (1894), 73-83, and "The French
- Intendance in Peace and War", Ibid, 8 (1895), 3-10, 61-71,
247-55, 293-300; Report by a Committee of Officers on the French
Intendance (March 1855), 431-59, Sketch of the French Intendance
•#J .IJ.#jJk& 1J '.J'.#a	 -	 S.JSaM	 £L%F.ã.
Major-General Sir Hugh Rose on Military Transport in the French
Army (Jan. 1856), 468-79, Maj.-Gen. G. Codogan, Notes on the
Intendance Militaire or Commissariat of the Italian Army (1866).
492-96. All pub. in Report of a Committee Appointed to Enquire
L?. (0.3848, 1867), 15. President: Lord Stra
hereinafter cited as Strathriairn Report.
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etappen. 2
 In Russia too, after the Crimea, food. and. genera]. supplies
arid, ordnance services were combined. under a Chief Intendance Board.
During the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, independent troop transport
was organised under the command of officers in the field.3
In all major continental armies, the existence of permanent
railway units was in striking contrast to their absence in Britain.
Not until after the E rptian campaii of 1882 did the British army
possess even a nucleus of trained, men for railway work, whereas
military control of Prussia's railways was well developed before
1870. After the Pranco-Prussian war it was carried, further when
the Railway Division became part of the General Staff and. composed.
schemes to e"p1oy Germany's railway network in time of war. Further-
more, in 1871 a Railway battalion (later a regiment) was formed to
supply the ariry with technicians and, being a standard military unit,
could 'be expanded when necessary with reserves in the normal way.
Similar developments occurred in Prance and. Italy. 4 At the outset
2. "The Transport Corps of Germany and Austria-Hungary", transi. from
the Russian Voenni S'born.ik, in Army Service Corps Journal 3 (1892),
32-85, i'bid, 4 (1893), 29-34; Prussian Etappen Regultion g as Revised.
from the War of 1870-71, transl. Lieut. Doriatus O'Brien, ed. Lieut.-Col.
W. Lennox (Portsmouth 1875); Report of a Committee under Ralph Thompson,
Assistant Under-Secretary of State, (1876), 20 (Capt. J.W. Hozier),
W.0. 32/6071; Rztract from Report on the Prussian Army by Lieut.-Col.
E. Reilly (11 Aug. 1866), 497-98. Strathnairn Report; "Memoranda on
Transport Arrangements in. the Prussian Army by Colonel Beauchamp Walker",
(1865), 498-504. Strathriairn Report P.1'. (C.3848, 1867), 15.
However, as Professor van Creveld has shown, the German etappen of the
1860s was rather more impressive on paper than in reality; it collapsed.
during the Pranco-Prussian war and. the invading troops were forced. to
live off the Prench countryside. Martin van Creveld., Supplying War
Østics from Wallenstein to Patton (c.u.P. 1977), 85-96.
3. Report from Colonel Robert Blane, Military- Attach(at St. Petersburg,
on the Administration of the Russian Ar
	 (Oct. l866),515-20 , Strathriair
"The Supply Organization of the Russian Army on the ])enube Theatre of War
in 1877", transi. from Voenni Sbornik by Capt. Cyprian Bridges, in
Arixty Service Corps Journal 9 (1896), 21-28, 72-79, 153-61, 255-64.
-
4. Otto Waldau, "Military Railways in Germany", Army and. navy
azine 12 (May-Oct. 1886), 382-86; Edwin Pratt, The Rise of
Railpower in War and. Conquest (Lond. 1915), provides a general and
very dated survey of the subject.
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of the period under review, foreign systems of supply and. transport
seemed to be far more sophisticated than their British counterparts.
The civilian element was reduced to a minimum, the line of coinnmnica-
tions had. become a recognized branch of military science, and national
railroad infra,-structures rendered. an integral part of the preparation
for war.
Within Britain, the late nineteerith century was marked by a steady
clarification of the functions of military supply, storage, and. manu-
facture. A few words may suffice upon the last two services, with
which this chapter is not directly concerned. The old. Store Branch
bad been replaced by the Military Store department ir 1857. Four
years later it was committed to the Director of Stores and. its super-
intendents received relative rank. In 1865 the Army Ordnnce Store
corps was created by Royal Warrant, and. in the reorganisation of 1870
it became the second exectrtive b-uith (as the Military Stre depart-
merit) of the newly formed department of Control. With the establish-
merit of the Ordnance Store department arid. corps in 1881, the ordnance
received. its modern form as a distinct service incorporating a regular
military unit. Thereafter an increasing proportion of the executive
wonk of manufacture and. storage was carried. out by civilians, who
were employed side by side with Ordnance corps rank and. file. All
came under the cominn1 of the officers of the Ordnance Store depart-
ment, numbering 126 in 1893. Royal Artillery officers almost mono-
polised the higher manufacturing posts until 1868, when the Morley
reforms threw open such appointments to civilian experts, and. "drove
the first wedge into the bastion of military control which had
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dominated the factories from time immemorial
The origins of the Commissariat were not only purely civil but
financial. It was a subsidiary of the Treasury until 1854, when it
was transferred to the War department, and some years later formally
constituted as the Commissariat department. 6 This reform was accom-
panied by an attempt to infuse a military element into the refurbished
service; subalterns of two years stazding could. henceforth be re-
cruited, but were obliged to resign their commissions if they desired
a permanent Comxnissariat post. 7
 The new department, therefore,
remded effectively civilian. Supply and transport were altered
as much as the body of the arny by th great reorganisations of the
Cardwell era. In 1870, the creation of the department -'f Control
drew all administrative services of supply and conveyance into a
single body, headed by the Surveyor-General of the Ordnance. These
changes were part of the reordering of War CiTice business into the
areas of supply, finance (under the Financial Secretary), and coTnmnd
8(under the General Commanding-in-Chief).
5. O.F.G. Hogg, The Royal Arsenal Its Background, Origin, and
Subsequent History (o.u.P. 1963), II, 787-907, (quo. 859), covers
the late Victorian period. This and A. Forbes, A History of the
Army Ordnance Services (Lond. 1929), II, 11-156, are the chief
secondary sources. Also see Walter Ba.rgery, A Si mry of the
History of the Army Ordnance Department and the Army Ordnance Corps
(1916); Army Book, 281-82. The minutes of evidence before the
Morley committee are a mine of information on the manufacturing
departments before 1887: Report of the Committee Appointed to
Inquire into the Oraniation and Administration of the Manufacturing
Departments P.P. (C.5116, 1887), 14.
6. Report of the Select Committee on Cominissariat Services (Egyptian
Campai) Minutes of evidence, 716-18 (statement by Commissary-General
C. Watt).	 (C.285, 1884), 10.
7. Thid, 170 (Sir Arthur Haliburton).
8. A.C. 1 Jan. 1870; Forbes, op. cit., II, 151, Report of the
Committee on Commissariat Services, op. cit., 716-18; W.S. Earner,






Control, replacing the former franentation of services amongst
the Military Train, Commissariat, Barrack, Purveyor's, and Military
Store departments, exemplified the overriding influence of continental.
models in the sixties and early seventies. In 1867 a major enquiry
under General Lord Strathd rn recommex4ed the formation of a control
department explicitly on the model of the French Intendance. 9 As
Queen's Commissioner with the French army during the Crimea, Strath-
nairn had an intimate knowledge of its admjn stration. His committee' a
proposal was based upon evidence taken at a time when Prance was regax-
ded. with a&niratiori by the military world. 10
 The fanfare with which
Control as introduced, and the disconcerting brevity of its existence,
often led contemporaries to regard it as en unfruitful experiment.
In some ways it does appear to have been a foreii graft which failed
to take on the Eciglish tree. The Commissariat retained its hold upon
transport. Hopea of giving that body a military character
	 to
nothing. Pay and the nature of the work made the Control department
unappealing to most officers, so that although it was open to the army,
most recruitment was from outside by way of civil service examination.
The political nature of the Surveyor-General's appointment (the office
of "(jef Controller" in the Strathriiirn recommendations) reinforced.
the civilian character of administration. Control Officers were also
accused of being supercilious, inefficient, and liable to offend the
9. Strathnairn Report, xi-xocviii.
10. E.g.: G.R. G].eig, "The Army", Llackwood's Edinburgh Magazine
101 (Jan.-June 1867), 459; Archibald Alison, "On the Reorganisation
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P. P. (c.285, 1884), 10.
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arnr officers with whom they worked)2
This growing volume of criticism led. to the abolition of Control
in 1876 and. its replacement by a Gommissariat and. Transport department.
Yet the failure of the Strathndrn scheme was more ostensible than
real. Efforts to tranfo:rm the Commissariat into a military unit
persisted. The retention of a supreme head of supply services gave
at least some unity of direction to their ai mi rstration. 13 Under
its Director and. freed from the process of supplying troops, the
department of Artillery and Stores could develop with comparative
independence. Formation of the first store depot at Woolwich in
1878 gave the army a centre where goods for overseas service could.
be sorted, examined, packed and dispatched. 14
 Following an enquiry
in 1874, contracting both at War Office and. district commmd level
was placed under a uniform system. 15
 These and. subsequent reforms
reflected creasing readiness to think in terms of the entire
organisation of communications, from the home to the war front.
12. Archibald Alison, "On the Government Scheme of Army Reform",
Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine 107 (Jan..-June 1870), 489-90; Gen. Sir
George Chesney, A True Reformer (Lond. 1874), II, 296-97; Anon,
The System of Officering the Administrative Branch of the Control Staff:
Its Dangers and. Defects (Lond. 1871) Tracts 1870-75; Naj.-Gen. Sir
Garnet Wolseley, "Our Autumn Manoeuvres", Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazin
112 (July-Dec. 1872), 641; Documents having reference to a Committee on
the Control Department, which met in January 1874, but which did not
report, 13-31, W.0. 33/26. Duties of Surveyor-General of the Ordnmce
and. his dept. set out iii A.C. (i June 1870), clause 79, V.0. 123/8;
Control established by Royal Warrant, embodied in A.C. (1 Jan. 187G),
V.0. 123/8.
13. Appendix I suminvizes War Office organisation from 1870 to 1888.
14. Memoranda on the Administration of the
and. the Audit of Accounts,
6, V.0. 33/46; Hansard,
pply and Transport Services
memo, by Sir Arthur
3rd.. series, 285 (7 MarchHaliburton, (1887
1884), col. 904.
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Those who wished to milItarize the Commissariat scored a notable
success in January 1880, when a Royal Warrant directed that all re-
cruitment therein from civil life should cease. The department was
to be divided into two sections: the suborain.te section, composed of
warrant officers, and. the superior, composed of officers holding full
army commissions. AU new appointments to the superior division were
to be for five years only, and. officers receiving then were to be
seconded from their regiments. Thereby, it was hoped, a Comuzissariat
reserve would be built up as a corps of experts scattered throughout
the army, who could. be drawn upon in an emergency. In accordance
with the military standing of the department, it was given a new chicf
in the form -f a Commissary-General on the staff of the G.0.C._in_C.16
Obviously, this reform was a signal triumph for military profesE'ional-
ism, but one whose effects would. be  felt only gradually. By 1883,
only about one fourth of the Coumissariat was of pi1itary origLn.17
In the short term, moreoever, many commissaries regarded the principle
of temporary appointments as a threat to the integrity of their corps.
Their disquiet was paralleled at War Office level. George Watt, the
new Commissary-General (H.Q.), felt that he had no re1 function and.
that his position was "anomalous and. humiliating".'8 These changes,
therefore, added to the long'-standirig conflict between those who wished
to augmert the military element in the Comxnissariat and those who did.
19
- not.
16. Thid., 611 16.
17. Thid, 170 (Sir Arthur Haliburton).
18. Ibid, 717, 453 (statement by and evidence of George Watt).
19. Evidence accompanying untitled report of committee on the
Commissariat (1876), W.O. 32/6071.
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There was no clarification of responsibility for transport before
1870. A Military Train bad. succeeded. the Lard Transport Corps of the
20Crimea, but its powers were never officially defined. 	 This was
reflected in the variable procedures, often accompanied by acrimonious
disputes, adopted in the course of operations. During the Third New
Zealand war, for instance, control of transport oscillated between the
supply department and. the naval contirieent. 21 In the Abyssinian
campaign, after a struggle with his Commissary-General and. the Bombay
government, Sir Robert Napier instituted a separate Land. Transport
22Corps.	 When Control was formed, however, the Military Train was
abolished, and. transport was officiall3 committed intc the hands of
supply officers. Arthur Haliburtori, as head of "Control 2" received
administrative direction of transport and. travelli.ng services. In
the field., controllers and, from 1876, commissaries, were "to supply
and. direct all land and inland-water transport". 23 Kow little this
was adhered to in active operations will be shown below.
Before these are discussed., some remarks upon professional
discussion of communications may be made. Most late Victorian
soldiers were aware of the revolutionar y implications of railways
and telegraphs. Indeed., they could hardly be otherwise, with the
example of Prussia in 1870 before them, telegraph offices established
20. Minute by J.C. Kennedy, Colonel Commandant, Military Train, (10
July 1866). Strathnairn Report, 419.
21. Report by Dept. Assistant Conxmissazry-Gen. J.L. Robertson (Sept.
1864). Ibid., 419.
22. Col. George .Armand. Purse, Provisiorting Armies in the Field
(Lond. 1899), 234-35.
23. A.C. (1 June 1870), clause 59, V.0. 123/8; 1'Tanual for
Commissariat Officers (m.d. but between 1876 and 1880), 6.
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at every major railway terminus in Europe, and the steam engine on sea
and. land so compelling a symbol of industrial progress. One can find
lectures and. articles of considerable insight on the significance of
this technology- for the structure of command and. the power of the home
government, for strategy and. staff pb'nnng. 24
 However - and. surely
this arose from the late Victorian arns limited experience of sophi-
sticated warfare - such writings tended to be divorced from current
problems of supply and. transport. As T.N. Naguire wrote pointedly:
While looking at the stars we may tumble in a ditch; and.
while lost in wonder .t how to move effectively from Strasbourg,
Nayence and. Metz towards Paris with many divisions of cavalry
and armies consisting each of from three to eight corps, we
may forget how to handle a few battalions in the passes of
the Suleiman Range or in the deserts of Upper gypt.25'
At the other extreme, rule-of--thumb advice and random jottings
gleaned from colonial experiences abounded, scattered throughout
26hundreds of reminiscences in books, articles, and lectures.
	
There
was a general lack of professional discussion of communications which,
although possessing an element of theory, addressed Itself to prac-
tical issues. The wildest fancies could receive solemn attention.
One writer envisaged the entire British coastline guarded by inter-
24. E.g.: Capt. C.E. Luard, "Field Railways, and. their General
Application in War", J.R.U.S.I. 17 (1873), 693-724; Lieut.-Col.
Robert Home, "On the Organization of the Communications of an Arxry,
Including Railways", Thid., 19 (1875), 382-98; Lieut. J.M. Grierson,
"Railways in War", Proc. R.LI. 12 (1881-84), 97-108, 145-50.
25. "Our Art of War as t Ivlade In. Germany", U.S.N. u.s. 13 (Apri].-.
Sept. 1896), 126.
26. E.g.: Sir Samuel Baker, "Experience in Savage Warfare", J.R.U.S.I.
17 (1873), 904-921 ; Naj. C.B. Norgan, Hints o' Bush Fighting (Lond.
'899) David E. Burn, Notes on Transport and Camel Corps
(H.M.s.o. 1887)
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locking rings of military railways, manned. night and. day. Another
predicted "A Coming Revolution in Nilitary Locomotion"... mounting
infantry on roller skates. In this, he hoped, the British army at
last would. "anticipate others, and not follow them".27
For the commissa.riat services, as for other aspects of warfare,
the effect of the new technolor in communications was indeed revolu-
tionary. Even though its impact upon the British forces was greatly
modified. by the terrain and. scale of their colonial campaigns, by the
late nineteenth century a fundamental change had been wrought in the
position of commiasariat officers. No longer were they functionaries
of great power, virtually severed. from the home autho.ities and. charged
with almost every stage of the gathering and. delivery of supplies in
the theatre of war. The telegraph permitted the development of a
world-wide system of contracts, organised from Woolwich and the War
Office. In small 'wars outside of India, most oi the general and. war-
like stores were provided. from the home base. Reliance upon railways
and telegraphs in the field. of operations further restricted. Coxnmissar.
nat functions. Railw.ys were variably under commercial or military
directioi. in Victorian campaigns. Field telegraphs, however, (as
distinct from mdn1ine) were constructed and controlled. outside of
India by the permanent R.E. telegraph company. This, with the
Institution of Army Sigralling and TeL graphy, was established. in
1869.28 Plainly, civilian authority within the theatre of war was
becoming increasingly out of place, but its cessation was a matter of
many years.
27. Col. N. Fox, "A Coming Revolution in Military Locomotion",
n.e. 10 (Oct. 1894-March 1895), 417-21; Lieut. Arthur Walker,







While the choice of campaiges as case-studies in this chapter has
been somewhat arbitrary, the Zulu and Erptian wars are both of Intrin-
sic importance and make an interesting stwiy in contrasts. The first
bore what are sometimes assumed to be the hallmarks of Victorian cam-
paigning; ad hoc preparations and. initial defeats followed by hasty
makeshifts at unwarranted expense. To contemporary reformers, the
war was a performance of the old school associated with the Duke of
Cambridge. The part played by Sir Garnet Wolseley, who succeeded
Lord Chelmsford as High Commissioner in the eastern portion of South
Africa on 29 May 1879, was limited to mopping-up operations; the
capture of the Zulu King Cetewayo, and the suppression of the Basutc
Chief Sekukuni. Even at celebratory banquet he could only be
rather lamely toasted as "... the finisher-up of the Zulu war, and
the conqueror of Secocoeni".29
The	 t1art expedition, art the other- hand, wae a campaign y
excellence of the Wolseley ring, both in style and. leading personnel.
Only three officers under Chelmsford' s command in South Africa can be
regarded as members of the ring: Colonel H. Evelyn Wood, Lieutenant-
Colonel Sir Redvers Bufler, arid Major-General H.E. Clifford. 30
 In
the E rptian expeditionary force, those closely associated with
Wolseley included Captain E.T.H. Hutton, Major H.J. Rudyard,
Brigadier-General Sir Baker Russell, Captain Henry Haflam Parr,
Major-General W. Earle, Lieutenant-Colonel W.P. Butler, and Major
J.P. Maurice, besides Evelyn Wood. 31
 To the general public,
29. Transva.al
 Arpus 20 Dec. 1879, enclosed in Wolseley to Sir Michael
Hicks Beach, Colonial Secretary, 26 Dec. 1879. Purther Correspondence
respecting the Affairs of South Africa, 108. P.P. (C.2505, 1880), 50.
30. Narrative of the Pield Operations Connected with the Zulu War
(Intelligence Branch 1881), appendix A, 141-54.
31. Col. J.P. Maurice, Military History- of the Campaign o. 1882 in
Egy-pt (Intelligence Branch 1887), appendix II, 112-20.
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Volseley's achievement seemed to be flawless, a repetition on a greater
scale of his swift, economical performance on the Red River in 1870 and
in West Africa three years later. It is illuminating to consider how
far this was true of the supply and. transport arrangements of the cam-
paign, and. to what extent it shared. with the Zulu war the general
defects or limitations of Victorian warfare. In both cases it is
instructive to assess each of the campaigns in terms of the infra-
structure which was established to support the forces in the field of
operations.
Like the carrier in West Africa, the pack-mule on the North-West
rontier, or the railway in Europe, in South Africa The ox-drawn waggon
was the bas4 '3 unit of the lines of communication. The deliberate pace
of the ox enforced a kind, of slow motion upon military operations. If
drawn by mimi in peak condition, waggons covered eleven or twelve
miles daily.	 tslaboriotzs traLspurt wurked within	 eomoue theatre
of war. The Transkei and. Zulu wars were conducted over an area of some
9,000 square miles, mostly devoid. of regular roads or bridges. Apart
from two lines running from the Lower Tugela and Doornberg to within a
few miles from the base at D'urban, there were no railways. 32 Initially
there were no field telegraphs, and cables were never used to assist the
tactical movement of troops. 33 Signalling and earthern. tracks, rarely
capable of taking more than one wagon abreast, alone provided the means
32. Lieut.-Col. W.P. Butler, Report on Transport Arrangements in
Natal, Zululand, etc., 5-6, W.0. 33/36. On oxen see Narrative
of the Field. Operations Connected with the Zulu War of 1879, op. cit.
appendix E; Chelinsford to Col. ñederick Stanley, War Secretary, 2
Nay 1879. Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of South
Africa, 10-12, P.P. (C.2367, 1878-79), 53.
33. Chelmsford to StaLley, 8 Feb. 1879, Chelmsford. Papers, file 7
(appeal for field telegraphs); Lieut. J.N. Grierson, "Field
Telegraphs", Proc. R.A.I. 13 (1885), 368.
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for contact among the scattered. forces. Thus the advanced camp at
Ekowe, for instance, was severed from regular communication with head-
quarters for three months, until the crudest of heliograplis - "an
eighteen-pemEy bedroom looking-glass" - was devised. 34
 Therefore,
although transport facilities were not quite so basic as in Ashanti
(makeshift bridges and the backs of indigenous carriers) the theatre
of war was largely a vacuum so far as £aodern communications were con-
cerned. The vast distances and. the absence of facilities taken for
granted in Europe complicated, as J.F. Naurice later wrote, "every
militaxy problem to a degree not readily intelligible to the student
of European warfare alone".35
By January 1879, Sir Bartle Prere, the High Commissioner, had
given Chelmsford full responsibility to break thc Zulu power. He
bad already decided to adopt what Kitchener was to establish on a
much grander scale d'uring the South African wat: the column system.
After reshuffling his plans several times, Chelmsford. resolved to
invade Zululand with three columns, converging upon the king's
kraa]. at IJiundi. Each was to be as independent as possible with
respect to coTmnrnd, subsistence, and conveyance. Fourteen posts
were established to serve as a series of depots, including that at
the base, Durban. Two further European columns were to remin
behind, one at the Limeberg depot and one to guard the Natal fron-
- tier. No proper staff organisation of communications emerged..
34. Lieut. W.N. Lloyd, "The Defence of Ekowe", Proc. R.A.I. 11
(1879-81), 451-65 (quo. 460).
35. MajCen. Sir J.P. Maurice, History of the War in South Africa
1899-1902, I (Lonci. 1906), 65.
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Towards the end of May NajoriCeneraJ. Sir Henry Clifford was belatedly
appointed Inspector-General of Base of Communications, but he re-
____ 36ceived. no formal powers of coirmr,d..
More decisive steps were taken as to the vexed question of trans-
port control. In contradistinction to the regulations, Chelmsford
formed a transport department partially independent of supply. Coluxm
transport was intrustet to an officer specially appointed in each force.
Base and oonmnmications were divided into three zones, each under a
military Director charged with the "entire control, payment and. working"
of the transport in his area. 37 Chelmsford established, therefore, a
transport department d.3tinct from th Cominissariat. Whether he e'i-
croached upon their preserves as a matter of principle c- purely from
force of circumstance is not quite clear. Some years earlier he had
supported a proposal of Arthur Haliburton to work out gradually the
civilian element from the supply department. 	 At a later sta€e in
the war, Chelmsford expressed dissatisfaction with the amalgamation of
supply and transport introduced. by Control. 39 Nonetheless, he author-
ised his new arrangements in a clistinrtly apologetic Tnaiiner. Officially,
at least, he stated thet they were emergency measures, and. wrote:
36. Chelmsford to Stanley, 4 Sept. 1878, 11 Nov. 1878, 22 Dec. 1878.
Correspondence Relative to Military- Affairs in Natal and. the Pransvaal,
3-4, 26-27, 39-42. L'. (C.2234, 1878-79), 54; Narrative of the
Field Operations Connected, with the Zulu War of 1879, op. cit., 20-21,
151.
37. General Orders for Transport (17 Nov. 1878), Chelmsford. Papers?
file 5; Chelmaford. to Stanley, 11 Nov. 1878. Correspondence Relative
to Military Affairs in Natal and the Transvaal, 29. P.P. (C. 2234,1878-79), 54.
38. Report of a Committee under Ralph Thompson (19 Oct. 1876), 13,
and appended memo, by Haliburton, W.O. 32/6071.
39. Chelmsford. to Stanley, 1 May 1879. Correspondence Relative to
Military Affairs in South Africa, W.O. 33/34.
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I shall be very glad to return to the normal system, when
I fee]. that the Commissariat department is able, from its
own numerical strength, to carry on the executive duties of
transport as well as those of supply.40
1'
Noreover, his Commissary-General, Edward Sickland, retained on paper
a general ar1m4rtatrative control of transport, and through him were to
pass all orders to the three directors. 41 Wolseley, by comparison,
never apologised for restricting departmental powers.
Chelmsford introduced the column system, therefore, in a somewhat
confused and hesitant fashion, failing to combine it with overall
strategic or logistical direction. Instead, of holding his forces
close to Durban, supplying them with the railways, and. waiting until
his depots had. been sufficiently developed to permit a concentrated
drive to tttundi, he sent almost self-contained units far into ene
country, with no clear purpose other than to make their way eventually
to the king t s kraal. Until Chelmsford rearranged his forces in April,
his right and left columns remained in their advanced positions,
"eating their heads off", as Wolse].ey crudely put it 42 and fulfilling
no useful strategic aim. Constantly drained of stores to supply
these columns, the avanced posts were merely conduits, lacking -the
reserves to support a rapid and substantial invasion. This disper-
sion of forces was condemned at the time (since it had begun with a
40. Chelmsford to Stanley, 11 Nov. 1878. Correspondence Relative to
Militarr Affairs in Natal and the Tranvaal, 29. P.P. (C.2234,
1678-79), 54.
41. Memo., 6 Nov. Thid, 31.
42. Wolseley to Stanley, 18 July 1879, Wolseley Papers, SA2.
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disaster) as a violation of one of the few principles of war to which
British military writers paid much attention.43 Upon his arriva]. in
South Africa, Wolseley adumbrated the point with dramatic coxnmurticar-
tions:
Flash immediately to Chelmsford. the following message from
me ... Concentrate your force immediately and. keep it
concentrated. Undertake no serious operations with detached
bodies of troops. ... I strongly object to the present
plan of operations with two forces acting independently of
each other, and. without possibility of acting in concert.44
The poor coordination of Chelmsford's subordfnte commands had
obvious repercussion upon the line of communications. Since the
magazines were insufficiently developed, an excessive anount of stores
was carried with the front-line troops. Thus, at the Isandiüwaxia
disaster, such a quantity of supplies was with the destroyed regiment
that the loss was temporarily crippling. Colonel Glyn's centre
column was deprived of 132 waggons, 140 oxen, 1200 rifles, several
hundred shells, 25,000 rounds of ammunition, and £60,000 worth of
general supplies. 45 As the compilers of the arid official record
43. Separation of forces, however, evoked no objection if it brought
success. Maurice's scholarly mind was troubled by the fact that Wolseley
won the Ashaxiti war with a three-pronged advance, and. in a remarkably
pedantic discussion at the Dublin military society endeavoured to show
that this dispersion was more apparent than real. "Theory and Practice",
(Dec. 1891), 20-22, Military Society of Ireland, publications no. 2.
On Chelmsford's strater also see Lieut.-Gen. Sir W.P. Butler, A'i
Autobiography (Lond. 1913), 196-208; Lieut.-Col. G.A. Purse, Military
Trans7ort (Lond.. 1882), 30-31.
44. Wolseley to Chelmeford, 20 June 1879, and 1 July 1879, Chelmsford
Papers, file 19.
45. Lieut.-Col. G.A. Purse, The Organization and Administration of
the Lines of Communication (Lond. 1894), 31.
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remarked, with a flicker of emotion:
This disaster also deprived the central column of the whole
of its transport, and rendered the troops who composed it
incepable of making any offensive movement. Officers and
men found themselves on the 23rd. Jaxruary with nothing but
what they stood in, for those who had. marched out on the
morning of the 22nd. had gone in light marching order, and.
those who had escaped from the camp had saved nothcng.6
The activities of fTo. 1 column under Colonel Pearson provide a
similar instance of the defects of Chelmaford' a organisation. In.
Januaxy the column marched north, brushed with some Zulus at Inyezane
on the 22nd., and on the following day settled down at the miss.on
station of Ekowe. Records of life there during the succeeding
months make absorbing reading. Trencies were built ?
 sanitation
carefully arranged, games, swimming and. sermons arranged daily in
order to occupy the troops. 47
 Admirable though Pearson's measures
were, it is hard. to resist the conclusion that, until relieved in
early April, a third of Chelmaford's invading forces aevoted its
energies to little besides keeping itself alive.
These remarks should be made, however, with an appreciation of
the severe practical problems faced by imperial troops in. South Africa.
Authorities at home could show a very limited understing of such
46. Narrative of the Field Operations Connected with the Zulu War of
1879, OD. cit., 47-48.
47. There is a considerable correspondence on thece subjects between
Chelmsford. and Pearson, Chelmsford. Papers, file 7.
231.
difficulties. In principle, if not in the way Chelmaford introduced
it, the column system was admirably suited. to South African conditions.
Isanilhlwana mattered the less in that those who opposed the whole con-
cept would have condemned it whatever the events. Thus, before the
disaster, Stanley pedantically rebuked Che].msford for departing from
the coimnissariat regulations. 48 Very reasonably, he replied:
I may be permitted to express a hope that it wil.l never be
lost sight of at home ... that we are obliged to adopt systems
simply based upon the requirements of the situation, rather
than upon existent regulations laid down for the most part for
operations in Europe of civilised cotm.tries.49
'om the first, Commissary-General Strick1an viewed Chelmsford'a
transport system with disfavour. Submitting to it with an ill grace,
Strickland made clear his expectation that, once comxnissaiiat rein-
forcements arrived, things would, return to normal and. his department
resume executive control of transport. In part, Strickland. was simply
carrying on the old quarrel the supply department had. with military men
who arrogated to themselves comnmissariat powers. After the China war
of 1860, for example, commissaries accused the Military Train of being
either "ignorant of their duty or above doing it". 5° Similar
48. Ralph Thompson, Perm. U.S.S. for War, to Chelmsford., 7 Nov. 1878
and 9 Jan. 1879 (conveying Stanley's opinions). Correspondence Relative
to Military Affairs in Natal and the Transvaal, 20-21, 34-35. P.P.
(c.2234, 1878-79), 54.	 -
49. Chelmsford. to Lord. Eustace Cecil, Surveyor-Gencra]. of the Ordnance,
19 Dec. 1878. Thid, 37-38.
50. Report by Assistant Commissary-General Bailey, C .B., on Transport
in the Campaign in North China; Memo, on Land Thanport by Kenneth
Mackenzie, (Dep. Q.LG., North China) Both 1861. Strathnairn Report,
304-11 (quo. 311). P.P. (0.3848, 1867), 15.
vice, 4-	 i.i.'i. lLony,
E.C. Nepean, Director of
eport of the Select Commit
gç.), 174-78 (memo. by Hali
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resentment was displayed towards the naval officers who controlled part
of the water transport during the New Zealand. campaigns of 1863-66.
Once supplies were in naval custody, one commissary asserted, no
reliance could be placed upon their reaching their destination.
Sailors "notoriously appropriated evexything they could lay their
hmr1s upon, and. were particularly partial to rum". Strickland,
whose reputation was lage1y made in New Zealand, endorsed. these
sentiments. 51 Prom the perspective of such officials, therefore,
the Zulu war was but another stage in their struggle to maintain the
integrity of their department.
Rtforts made to gainer sufficient transport for the campaign ar
an especially good. example of the problems of conducting an imperial
war from a colonial base. Few stpp1ies for the Zulu campaign, like
most late Victorian wars outside of India, came from local sources.
Within Britain, reghental supplies were issued. at district cormniirI
level, by the senior Coinmissariat official. For an expedition,
however, the whole process of contracting, storage, and. sea-conveyance
was the responsibility of the Director of Contracts and. the Commissary-
General of the ordnance. 52 No serious shortage of supp]ies, general
or warlike, was experienced in. the Zulu war. The real difficulty lay
in their conveyance from base to front.
51. Report by Dept. Assistant Commissary-General J.L. Robertson (Sept.
1864); Deputy Commissary-Gen. E. Strickland to Commissary-Gen. U.S.
Jones, 1 March 1865; Jones to Commissaxy-Gen.-in-Chief, 6 March 1865.
330-41.
52. Commission. iLDoointed. to
Under
Obtained and Passed fnr Her Majesty's S
Commissary-Gen. of the Oramince), 38-48
Contracts). P.P. (C.5062, 1887), 15;
on Cominissariat Services (Egyptian Camp
p.P. (c.285, 1884), 10.
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Colonists were an admirable source of manpower (for labour or
fighting), but they had. to be cajoled rather than exploited.
Africans might be flogged for desertion or unofficially pressed
into service, but colonist and. Boar sensibilities demanded consid-
erable respect. 53 Indeed, for the white population of Natal and
Cape Colony, the Zulu war was a superb financial windfall. Very
properly, Chelmsford left the procurement of transport to his
Commissary-General, but Strickland. showed little anticipation of
the transport requirements of the campaign. He was advancing in
years and rigid in approach. In accordance with his New Zealand
experieuces, he assumed. initially that all transport could. be  ox
and waggon, obtained by purchase. 54 As soon as the imperial
authorities entere'I the market, prices soared. 55 Before hostili-
ties commenced, Strickland had attempted to solve this problem by
requesting that transport cfficers and commissaries be permitted to
impress waggons and oxen at the going market price. 6 Both a
transport committee hastily convened at the time and a more deli-
berate enquiry during the war found pressing to be illegal.57
53. Lieut.-Col. C.E. Webber,
Major D.B. Burn wrote typicá]
(H.M.S.O. 1887), 21: "Flogging is sometimes necessary; fines are in
many cases inadequate; the effect is not immediate as in the case of
flogging, which natives understand, and. know when to expect."
54. Strickland to Chelmaford., enclosed, in Chelmsford. to Lord Eustace
Cecil, 14 Sept. 1878. Correspondence Relative to Military Affairs in
Natal and the Pransvaal, 8-9. P.P. (C.2234, 1878-89), 54.
55. South Africa (Financial Reports), 4-5, P.P. (1880), 51.
56. Strickland. to Chelmsford, enclosed. in Chelmsford to Cecil, 14
Sept. l8'8. Correspondence Relative to Military Affairs in Natal
and the Transvaal, 8-9. P.P. (C.2234, 1878-79), 54.
57. Ibid, 10-12; South Africa (Financial Reports), 4-5.
(1880), 51.
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In any case, Strickland's demand showed a surprising disregard for
colonial liberties.
Accordingly, although most of Pearson's column was equipped with
bought transport, full-scale purchase soon became economically un-
feasible. The next resort was to hiring, though purchases were still
made for regimental transport. Hiring was supplemented by contracting
local colonists to move stores as so much per ton per mile. 58 Thia
was conducted under no general authority. Both commissariat and
army transport officers contracted, hired or bought from whatever
local sources were available, each for the troops With whom he was
associa.ed. By early April a varieted series of civil contracts
had been developed from bade to front, directed by neither Strickland.
nor Chelmsford. Clifford was not yet appointed.. Por the first few
months of the war, Conmiissariat officers were responsible only to
headquarters at Pielermaritzburg, whence no effective control could
be exerted. 9
 They were therefore practically independent, and
spared no expense in securing freight livestock and vehicles. Only
the custody of local drivers, under loose military supervision,
protected the lines of communication. Although they were not
Immediately threatened, it became apparent by early 1879 that the
whole system, or lack of one, was dangerously exposed and getting
60beyond military contro!.
58. Lieut-Col. V.P. Butler Report cn Transport Arrangements in
Natal Zululand, etc, 7. V.0. 33/36. For the conveyance of stores
between Durban and. Kopje .A2Llein, fees rose as high as £75/ton.
59. Lieut.-Col. C.E. Webber, Report describing some of
Transport Arrangements in Zululand. and the TransvaaJ. in
V.0. 33/36.
60. Foregoing paragraph based upon ibid., 1-13; Butler, Report,
op. cit., 5-6; Capt. Edward Spratt, Report on Arrangements made
for Transport ..., (March 1880), W.O. 33/36.
26,
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Complete reliance upon oxen and waggons was no longer acceptable;
the death-rate of niTmI-15 had reached an appalling level. Major-
General North Crealock's No. 1 Division on the coast was losing its
61
oxen at the rate of some 400 a day by June. 	 Prom May to August,
the light grass crop (attributable to the drought of 1878) caused
starvation amongst the oxen with the troops in Zululand. Charles
Webber depicted the situation in a brief lapid.ary sketch: "The
rivers were thickly sprinkled with their dead bodies; and. here and
there, over the plains, numbers of broken-down nimL were
wanaering.62 Strickland, over-optimistic or perhaps assuming that
no operations would take place in winter, had made nc allowances for
the depreda'ions of disease and starvation upon his animals.
Chelmsford would have done well to have followed Major Francis
Clery's advice as to the need of appointing a controller of trans-
port who
should be something more than a mere superi.tendent of
wagons - he should I think have such a knowledge and under--
standing of his General' a plans as would. always enable him to
work his transport not only to just carry out what is required
for this week, but also with anticipatory provision for what
may possibly be req.uired. next week.6
61. Wolseley to Stanley, 50 June 1879. Further Correspondence Respecting
the Affairs of South Africa, 94. P.P. (C.2482, 1880), 50. On the 13
April the forces were reorganised as No. 1 Division, No. 2 Division (Maj.-
Gem. Ned.igate) and. Brig.-Gen. Evelyn Wooi' a Plying Column. Narrative
of the Field Operations Connected with the Zulu War of 1879,
	
cit., 84.
62. Yebber, Report, op. cit., 16.
63. Clery to Chelmaford, 24 Nov. 1878, Che].msford Papers,file 5.
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Gradually the entire organisation was rendered both less diffuse
and more flexible. Though placed under no single directing head,
military transport was established to complement the array of civilian
vehicles and conductors. Mules, cheaper than oxen and more resistan.t
to disease, were purchased locally and from South America, Kentucky,
Nissouri, Prance and spain.6	 With local carts or the much-
favoured American waggon, these ai'n	 were arranged in sections,
each consisting of twelve vehicles and. 124 mules and under the command
of a regular officer. Eventually, a train of twenty-one such units
was formed. In Zululand, on the coast road from Port Pearson to
St. Paus and Durnford., lines of communications were worked entirely
by the mule train on the efficient section system, whereby each unit
carried full waggons from post A in one day and brought back the
empty ones from post B the next. These arrangements seem to have
been eminently satifactory. Some strain and expense probably
would have been avoided if greater reliance had been placed upon
mules finn the first. Their inability to graze,however, obliged a
mule train to carry its own forage, and. this limited their value for
long-distance noveuients.6
After iJiundi, Wolseley organised a corps of Bantu and Zulu
carriers in the Ashanti style, who formed a useful and highly
mobile addition to nimi transport in the occupied districts.
64. Lieut.-Col. G.A. Purse, Military Transport (Lond. 1882), 66;
Narrative of the Field Operations Crmected with the Zulu War, •
cit. 172.
65. See remarks upon this pointin AnLrew Page, "The supply Bervices
of the British Army in the South African War 1899-1902", (Oxford
D.Phil. thesis 1976), 122. Foregoing paragraph based upon Butler,
Report, op. cit., 6-7; Butler to the A.G. of the Forces (n.d..),
ibid., 8-9; Capt. Arthur Gould.,
	 port on Transport Arrangements
in Zululand., from July to October, 1879, W.O. 33/36; Capt. Evelyn
Martin, Report on Transport in Zulularid, (March 1880), V.0. 33/36.
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In particular, they were cheap, costing the Government only rations
and. a daily shilling to each man, plus an initial pair of trousers
(which the Zulus preferred to wear as comforters round the throat).
The most significant innovation introduced, after the arrival of
reinforcements was the proper staff orgaxiisation of o3mmunications.
This measure bore the Wolseley touch. Arriving at Durban on 28
June, Sir Garnet instituted a policy of economy, delegation, and.
unified military control of communicatiors. Clifford's ambiguous
position was immediately clarified:
The divided control of the lines of communication ordered by
Lord Chelmsford. being, in my opinion, fatal to a proper con-
duct of operations, I at once issued orders placing Najor-
General Clifford in communications from all the columns
operating in Zululaiid. to the base
Seven staff officers, all bearing the title or Assistant or Deputy
Assistant Adjutant and quartermaster-General, were posted along the
communications. To them commissaries were xnad.e responsible and. no
longer permitted to correspond directly with headquarters. Chelms-
ford, of whose plans Clifford was in "absolute ignorance", Volsele3r
reported, was momentarily beyond his superior's reach and. determined
to end his nnhppy cornm-nd with a stylish victory. On the coast,
Crealock had been condu.ting an independent campaign for some six
weeks. To draw him into the general scheme of operations and. to
66. Maj. George Chwabe, Report on the Zulu Carrier Corps, V.0.
33/36.
67. Wolseley ± Stanley, 30 June 1879. Further Correspondence
Respecting the Affairs of South Africa, 95. P.P. (C.2482, 1880),
50.
238.
reduce his cumbersome waggon train (which included. some 3,500 oxen),
Volseley began to build up the carrier corps and. to develop the inter-.
68
mediate base at Port Durnford.
This access of efficiency underwent no prolonged test. Upon
the ruin of Zulu power at Uluni (4 July), Wolseley began to dismiss
superfluous native and. colonial volunteer corps. Pressure upon
transport facilities declined. drastically, and the existing infra-
structure was more than sufficient to permit the pac ification of
Zululand and. the defeat of the Basuto chief Sekukuni.
A general assessment of arnr services in the Zulu war is not
easily mc de. Every allowance should be made for the constraints
under which the men in the theatre of war were acting. In no res-
pect were these operations an absolute failure. Strategy and. tactics
cannot b ocnsidered here, but the Zulu power was shatteringly broken.
The eonlmi asariat and tra.isport system was, in the broadest sense,
successful. After the arrival of reinforcements, some 15,000
imperial troops and as many again of colonial and native were supplied.
along three hundred miles of waggon tracks by axiimaJ. transport, in a
country afflicted by drought, rinderpest, and tetse fly. Almost
never were rations not forthcoming, or medical services unavailable.
This was achieved, however, at a formidable cost, and. the commissaries,
especially Strickland, were widely condemned for reckless extravar-
ganoe. 6 The occasional instance of a patently inefficient use of
imperial funds can be found. Each mule section, for example, was
commii1ed by an officer who qualified. for staff pay and. allowances,
68. Ibid., 94-95.
69. Net cost ofthe Zulu. war, Jan. 1879-Sept. 1880: £4,095,528.
Financial Reports (South Africa), 1-13, P.?. (1880), 54.
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whereas an. N.C.O. could easily have taken his post. This, however,
was hardly a conmiissariat affair. There is little evidence to suggest
that supply officers were clearly inefficient in the day-to-day running
of business.
Rather, the matter of expense should be related to the basic
fashion in which the campaign was conducted. What effect a greater
use of railway and alternative Mml transport would have had upon
expenditure must remain speculative. But it is plain that Strickland's
reliance upon colonial transport was akin to Chelmsford' a massive re-
cruitment, at inordinate rates, of white volunteers. At a time when
the basic rate for a private was a shilling a day exclusive of stop-
pages, South African volunceers could expect twelve shillings per day
plua rations and forage. 7° Again, whether or not these troops were
necessaxy depends upon one's assessment of the conduct of operations,
and Chelmsford woul'ã. doubtless have preferred regular troops in the
volunteers' place. Indeed, he emphasized to Stanley "that the
cheapest force in. South Africa is, without doubt, a British regiment".71
But no allowances were made by the reformers associated with
Wolseley. To them, the Zulu war was an object lesson in strategic.].
and ai9ministrative incompetence. In retrospect, Sir William Butler
saw the campaign as an undress rehearsal for the South Mricar war of
72	 ._1899-1902.	 George .urse, the army's chief publicist on supply and.
transport, regarded Chelmsford as ignorant of what the organisation
70. Capt. P. Addison to Major Percy Barrow, enclosing schedule of
conditions, (n.d., prob. Feb. 1879), Chelmsford Papers, file 7.
Alan Skelley, The Victorian Army at Home (Lond. and. Montreal 1977),
182-95, mialyses the complexities of rank and. file pay.
71. Chelmsford to Stanley, 25 Nov. 1878. Further Correspondence
Repecting the Affairs of South Africa, 107. pp• (C.2222, 1878-
79), 52.
72. An Autobiography (Lond. 1913), 211.
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of communications entailed.	 Evelyn Wood harshly criticised
Strickland's conduct of affairs in correspondence with Chelmsford
himself, and expressed a preference for "British gentlemen for trans-
port and for all other arny duties". 74 Excepting Buller, Clifford,
and Wood, Wolseley held all the comrnj:,nders of Chelmsford's campaign
in contempt. His plans, Wolseley wrote with his usual acerbity,
were "commenced in madness and carried out in folly", and he himself
had "no finesse for war or warlike combinations ... no idea of econony
in public matters". Wolseley advised Stanley to "discharge your
Cominissariat officers in a block", and did. not hesitate to write
likewise to the Duke of Cambridge. "That blathering ass Mr. Strickland"
aroused Woleley'a especial animosity, to whom he exemplified the class
whose power in military matters had. to be broken. The Commissdry-
General whom Wolseley had. met in Cyprns, one Downes, had evoked a
similar response: '1an ass with the airs of a race-horse". 	 Thus,
the cessation of hostilities in Zululand only gave verve to the battle
at home over the standing of the Commissariat.
Certain obvious differences from the Zulu war ar displayed in
the Erptian expedition. Local sources of supplies and. transport were
exploited only to a very limited extent. Almost everything, including
73. Military Transport (Lond. 1882), 31, and The Organization and
Administration of the Lines of Communication in War (Loud. 1894), 346.
74. Wood to Chelmsford, 18 April 1879, Chelmsford. Papers, file 9.
75. Wolseley to Stanley, 4 and. 18 July 1879 (fc first and third quos.),
Wolseley to Cambridge, 11 July 1879, Wolseley Papers, SA 2, 18, 19, 27,
35, 38-39; South African Journal, 1879-80, entry 27 July 1879 (for
reference to Strickland), W.0. 147/7; Cyprus Journal 1878, entry
27 July 1878 (for reference to Downes), W.0. 147/6.
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trucks and locomotives, was sent to the theatre of war. Communications
were intrinsically more sophisticated. Railway, cl and steamships
were their primary elements, and cniiml transport was supplementary.
An armoured train was used for the first time in British warfare,6
A cursory survey of the two wars suggests a complete contrast between
them, and. this was indeed part of their contemporary reputation. The
one was marred by the Isandbiwana and. Inhiobana disasters, was drawn
out for eiglib months and cost four million pounds and 1,153 British
deaths in action. The other was immediately successful, lasted six
weeks, cost substantially less, and caused eighty-one British deaths in
action, 77 Butlei4s assessment of the E-ptian war my be compared with
his judnent upon the Zulu campaign:
whatever opinion history may arrive at, when with clearer
vision and more dispassionate judgment she reviews the
Erptian campaign of 1882, the need of exact caiculation of
the means to the end., of conciseness, thoroughness, and.
econolv in life, and. in expenditure and. finally, of great
unity in operations, will scarcely be withheld from the
verdict of the future.78
As one would expect, closer inspection reveals a good many flaws
76. H.G. Archer, "Armoixred Trains", (J.S.M. n.s. 15 April-Sept.
1897), 501.
77. South African campaigns (Casuaiti) P.P. (1880), 42. Cost of army
services in the Erptian war was £1,640,000; navy services, £1,776,000;
cost to the Indian exchequer, £1,142,000. Some 35,000 imperial forces
sent to Egrpt, as opposed to 15,000 to South Africa. Treasury minute of
17 Feb. 1883. P.P. (1883), 38. For Erptian casualties, see Col. J.P.
Maurice, Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egy	 (H.M.S.o.
1887), appendix 7. Henceforth cited as Maurice, Campaign of 1882. U.Williams, "The Erptian Campaign of 1882", in Brian Bond. (ed.),
Victorian Military Campaigns (Loud. 19 67), provides a good short
narrative of the expedition.
78. Quartermaster-General' a Journal of Operations in Egypt, 50,
V.0. 33/41.
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in Wolseley's operations. Maurice did not dwell upon these short-
comings in his superb official narrative. A close friend and
disciple of Wolseley, he was to some extent; a "court; historian", as
Professor Luvaas has written. 79
 The following pages consider these
defects within the general context of Victorian warfare, and seek to
assess the degree to which they undermine the reputation of the
Erptian war as a model campaign.
Within the confines of cabinet policy, Wolseley's strategy was
dictated by the time and lines of communication available. His
instructions were to break the military power of Colonel Abmed Arabi
and. his fellow rebels in order to restore the Thed.ive Ismail's rule
in lower Egypt. "Gladstone's bondage in Egypt", in Proessors
Robinson and. Gallagher's famous pLrase, developed under the pressure
of local and international circumstances, and. the question of occu-
pation ii1tial].y wa beyond. Wolseley's coneern. 80
 His aim was a
swift, decisive campaign and. a rapid withdrawal. A series of minor
successes would have complicated the situation by driving Arabi back
upon the cultivated land. west of Tel-e].-Kebir. Prom the personal
point of view, too, Wol3eley had more reasons than. most Victorian
generals to achieve immediate victory; as he remarked to his wife:
"If I had in any one instance made a mess such as Chelmsford made
79. Jay Luvaas, The Education of an &rny (Lond. 1965), 187.
Maurice was harshly attacked for partisanship by George Clarke in an
anonymous review of his Campaign of 1882, a charge against which be
defended himself with wit and spirit. See: G.S. Clarke, "Military
History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt", Edinburgh Review 167
(Jan.-April 1888), 284-319; Col. J.P. Maurice, "Critics and Campaign&',
PortnIgh-t;ly Review 44 n.s. (July-Dec. 1888), 112-35.
80. Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, with Alice Denny, Africa
and the Victorians (Lond. 1961), cia. 4 and. 5.
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repeatedly in South Africa, how all that loathsome crew at the Horse
Gds. would. have jumped. and trampled on me 	 This was his first
serious test on active service for neariy a dei.ade.
Sound logistics pointed. to the camel and railway leading from
Ismailia as the only desirable route to Tel-el-Kebir. Thence to
Isina].ia was only fifty-five miles, whereas it was twice as far to
Alexandria. Inland water transport, the potential of which had. been
demonstrated in the third. New Zealand war, was a great attraction of
both routes, but whereas the fringes of the Nile were heavily culti-
vated and. patterned with irrigation, the crii-1 was bordered by bard
desert terrain, idea], for marching and the passage of artillery said
cavalry. Unfortunately, the canal, misnamed the Sweetwa-ber or Fresh-
water, was foul in the extreme. "An open sewer is a polite desorip-
82tion of it", one officer wrote. 	 Ismailia was a good potential
base, with landing places which could. be
 augmented by portable stages,
an ample water supply, and. open to supplies from Suez or Port Said via
the Maritime canal. Inland., the pre-existence of a railway from
Ismailia to Cairo rendered overwhelming the desirability of the
shorter route. But this dictated speed. Delay would mean disaster,
because as soon as Wolseley revealed on 19 August that he was to
advance from Ismailia rather than Alexandria, the eneti began to
obstruct the cnl in order to out ofi the water supply. Condensers
81. Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, 5 March 1880, Wolseley Papers, W/P 9.
For Wolseley's official instructions, cee Hugh Childers (secretary of
state for war) to Wolseley, 4 Aug. 1882. Correspondence Respecting
tho Affairs of Egypt, 295-96. P.P. (C.3391, 1882), 83.
82. Anon, "A Few Faots from the Desert Camp", Arrty and. Navy
azine 6 (May-Oct. 1883), 369.	 -
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and storage tanks were rapidly erected at Ismailia in late August, but
without the canal they were useless. To ensure his water-supply, to
secure the life-line of his arn, Wolseley was therefore obliged to
contemplate advancing as far as Kassassin in a matter of days.
Thus, an astonishing burst of activity along the lines of commu-
nications followed the seizure of Port Said on the 20 August. Mike-
shift arrangements occurred everywhere, but a measure of coordination
existed which had been lacking in the Zulu war. Wolseley's reliance
upon handpicked. men provided a substitute for a general staff which
was reasonably effective in the small war. Distinct from the chief
of staff, General Sir John Adye, and. his immediate subordinates,
Major-General William Earle was placed in cownnind of the lines of
communication and base. Under his orders were five staff officers,
Commissariat officers of both Indian and British forces, and two
Directors of Transp;rt. Thirthermore, Earle commanded, the Telegraph
Company and, from 31 Au.ust, the Railaj Company. 83 Paper organisa-
tion did not, of course, necessarily entail efficiency in practice.
Nonetheless, this was a significant recognition of the need to have a
single directing authority over communications. The principle had.
been embodied in regulations issued just prior to the war, which
stated that "everything on the lines of communication will be placed
under the corn nd. of ax. officer of high rank, usually a general
officer •••,,•84 Not all responsibilities were clearly defined;
83. Maurice, Campaign of 1882, 112-13; Maj. V.A. Wallace,
"Report of the Railway Operations in Py-pt during August and september,
1882", P.P.LE. 9 (1883), 82.
84. Report of the Select Committee o'i Commissariat Services (Egg
Campaign, 286 (regulations quo. by Col. Richard Harrison), L.
(285, 1884), 10.
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upon his appointment as Coimnissary-General, Egypt, Sir Edward Norris
requested the War Office to specify his duties. As he rema&ed
ironically to the Cominissariat enquii- of 1884, he was still awaiting
85
a reply.
Procurement of supplies was no problem in a general sense for the
men in the theatre of war. The difficulty lay in their conveyance ±o
the front. It had. been assumed that no supplies could be gathered
from local sources, and accordingly not a single Conunissariat officer
was dispatched. on forage duties throughout the war.86 As Surveyor-
General of the Orifrionce, Sir John Adye began to organise the conveyance
of etores in early July. 87
 The XL importance of speed enforced
tremendous pressure upon the landing facilities at Ismailia. During
August, some 9,200 in.fazxtry, 2,600 cavalry, 2,500 artillery witn 60
guns, 860 engineers, and. 4,000 horses, all with accompanying munitions
and supplies, were landed at the single wharf. 88
 Certain dislocations,
therefore, were unavoidable. There was a general lag between the
landing of troops and. the arrival of general transport. 89
 During
the passage from Alexandria to Ismailia, the Highland brigade of the
Second Division was separated from its regimental transport. In the
85. mid, 4.
86. Geo2ge Lawson, Assistant Director of Supplies arid Transport,
Memorandum on the Supply and. Transport Arrangements Li the Egyptian
Campaii (Nay 1884); ibid, 679.
87. Thid, 132; Arthur Thiiburton, Memorandum on the Administration
of Suppl and Transport Services ... (April 1884), 4, outlined the
current procedures upon declaration of war, W.O. 33/42.
88. Col. V.P. Butler, Qjnrtermaster-General's Journal of Operations
in Egypt, 13 V.0. 33/41.
89. Report of the Select Committee on Commissariat Services, p.
cit., 24 (Sir Edward Norris).
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press of disembarkation, the brigade and. its transport were never re-
assembled, anti the Uighland.ers fell back upon the overworked Commissariat
and. Transport corps for annials and. carts until Zagazig was reached on
15 Saptember. For the closing days of the campaign, the distinction
between genera]. and regimental transport was suspended, and. the bri-
gade marched as one column to Cairo. 9° This episode, however, should
be seen in the light of the faet that this was the first expedition to
leave Britain fully equipped with regimental transport.91
Railway operations during this war provide a rather good. example
of what was so often the style of Victorian campaigning; ingenuity and
inte1lient makeshifts developing a service adequate to momentary needs
but amateur (especially in this instance), compared with similar organ!-
sations abroad. While the Indian arnr had main ained. a railway depart-
ment from the 1860s, no such body existed in Britain. Probably because
it was less difficult to equip and maintain, a permanent telegraph corps
had been established at home in 1869.92 This contributed to the fact
that while telegraphy in the Erptian campaign gave general satisfac-
tion, the railway system was much criticized. On lfiie 6 July the Royal
Engineers were ordered to form a military railway corps. This was
hastily gathered together as the 8th (Railway) R.E. Company, most of
whom had no experience with loccmotives. After eight days training
on the London-Dover line, and some opportunity to witness platelayig
by the South-Eastern, London, and South-Western Railway companies (all
by courtesy of civilian managers), they were sent to the front, arriving
90. Lieut.-Col. C.E. Webber, "Suggestions on the Transport oZ the
Future", J.R.U.S.I. 27 (1883), 297-98.
91. ?4emo. by Haliburton, op. cit., 6.
92. I'Taj. William Wallace, "Report of the Railway Operations in Erpt
during August and. September", P.P.R.E. 9 (1883), 80-81; Col. W.P.
Butler, Quartermaster-General's Journal, op. cit., 16-18.
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at Ismailia shortly before the first locomotive was erected (26 August).
Initially, the work threatened to overwhelm them, as until the beginning
of September only one engine was in operation. By the 6 September, the
landing of two locomotives bought in Alexandria and four from Britain
permitted the running of up to five trains daily to the front.
The haste with which the railway transport was arranged did pro-
duce some minor complications. 	 .lthough a single line ran from the
coast to Zagazig, and. a double one thence to Cairo, it was necessary to
construct a small railroad between the wharf and IRmdlia station.
Laid under Royal Engineer supervision, the rails were so lightly bedded
that they could not carry the engines. To drag the laden trucks over
the mile—long stretch from waterfront to station, recourse had to be
made to horses and mules. A brit..f delay was caused. in the last days of
August when a boiler was damaged and the Engineers had. to find civilian
assistance for the iépairs. 93
 Such technical. hitches were the result
of inexperience, and considering how unpractised the 8th Company were in
railway work, it is remarkable that no worse accidents occurred than the
derailing of a few trucks. 94
 Nonetheless, the military management of
the line brought severe censure from the commissaries, although specific
instances of incompetence are hard to find. Sir k1ward Norris stated
that little reliance could be placed upon the delivery of particular
goods to particular places. According to Edward Sam der, senior
- Commissariat officer with the First Division, the railway system had
"no management about it". Nevertheless, he conceded that his
93. Report of the Select Committee on Coimnissariat Services, op.. cit.,
136 (Sir John Adye), 215 (Wallace).
94. Wallace "Report", op. cit., appendix 2 (details of all accidents,
of which there were eighteen).
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division did not go a single day without rations, though they often
arrived late with certain items in short supply. 95 Discomforts rather
than privations were the lot of advanced troops for the first few days
of the campaign, as this passage from the diary of a disgruntled officer
suggests:
Kassassin, September 3rd - The same old song, waiting for
supplies! Half-rations for man and beast, bad water, and.
canal falling ... You would smile if you saw us tucking
into soup and biscuits, neither very good by themselves,
but very nasty when messed up together and eaten in a most
promiscuous minner. A sort of stew for breakfast, tea or
cocoa for lunch with some biscuit, and then tea or coffee
for diuner, with a fresh stew made from meat or any food
96
wa can raae-
Canal transport, consisting of bargea towed by steam pinnaces,
was organised by the navy with relative ease. 97 These mainstays of
conveyance, railway and. canal, were supplemented by the regimental and.
Commissariat ihn1g, carts, and. waggons. It was with these that the
so-called breakdown of transport occurred. On the 24 August, troops
advancing from the base were issued. with two days' rations. Their
carts, chiefly General Service waggon., proved too few for the stores
and too slow for the troops. During the next few days, tons of
supplies were abandoned and. wagons, overturned, or Iogged in loose
95. Report of the Select Commitee on Commissariat Services, op. cit.,
15 (M.xrris), 108, 196-97 (Saunder).
96. Anon, "A Pew Pacts from the Desert Camp", Army and Navy Magazine
6 ay-Oct. 1883), 370.
97. Butler, Quartermaster-General's Journal, op. cit., 10.
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sand, or with broken axietrees, were strewn alongside the canal from
Ismailia to Kassassin. That is not to imply that the regimental
transport did. not convey the buJ.k of the stores entrusted to it, but
the losses in rations were substantial. These had. to be replenished.
by order of the commissaries, who were thereby obliged, to mortgage
upon their general supplies.?8 over-reliance upon the General
Service waggon, suitable only for conventional roads, was part of
the problem. Universally condemned after the Zulu war, it was still
the standard vehicle for use under all conditions. As Lieutenant-.
Colonel Charles Webber remarked sardonically, attention should have
been paid. "to the experience of wars d"iring which we have used every
kind of vehicle except thoi made at Woolwich". 99 Purthermore, as
no rermanen't regimental transport existed in Britain, officers and
men were generally inexperienced in the management of baggage miiina1s
and vehicles. This point was much discussed after the war.
The overriding feature of the Eptian expedition was its rapidity,
and this helps to set in perspective its opening difficulties. It was
authorised on 21 July, forty days later ten thousand men with their
attendant services were at Ismailia, and fifteen days later Cairo wa
in British hands. General disembarkation was completed by the end of
August, from the 6 September four or five trains ran daily to the front,
and. the victory of Te1-l-Kebir on the 13th permitted the capture of
98. Report by Deputy-Assistant Commis'ary Baker, 1st Brigade, 1st
Division, 21, W.0. 33/42; Report of the Select Committee on Com'riiss-
ariat Services, ocit., 1-17 (Morris), 105 (Saunder); Maurice,
Campai of 1882, 56.
99. "Suggestions on the Transport of the Puture", J.R.tr.S.I. 27(1883), 290. Similarly, see Lieut.-Col. V.P. Butler, Report on Traits-
port Arrangements in Natal, Zululand, etc., 8-9; Capt. Evelyn Martin
to Q.M.G., Horse Guards, 12 March 1880, 9-11; Capt. Arthur Gould. to
Q.N.G., 21 May 1880, 12-13. All W.0. 33/36.
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enemy stores, water supply, and rolling stock, and put an end to supply
shortages. Initial problems were a matter of days. Inadequacy of
regimental transport was a limited, breakdown of a secondary adjunct to
the main lines of communication, whose exploitation by Wolseley was
masterly. The achievement of the Railway Company was remarkable. In
less than. seven weeks, Najor William Wallace, the on]y railway expert
available, had to constitute, train, disembark (twice) his corps of
amateurs, supervise the construction of locomotives, the arrangement
of timetables, the building of two short lines (from Ismailia station
to the wharf and to the canal), and. the transportation o some 9,000
tons of stores to the front. This he did without any breakdown or
serious accident; the explosion and fire at Cairo on the 28 September
occurred after the railway had. been banded over to the Eptian govern-
ment • Wallace' a performance was typical of the campaign. At any
stage things could have miscarried; if the first locomotive bad.
seriously broken down, for instance, or if the enemy bad stood against
Lieutenant-General Sir Gerald Grph,m, at Kassassin or cut off the water_
supply. But Wolseley was taking a calculated, legitimate risk, similar
to that of his night march aM dawn attack at Tel-el-Kebir. After
every qualification has been made, it appears difficult to deny that
this expedition was a model of what could. be
 aenieved. in colonial war-
fare.
Yet, basically, this and the Zulu war were two of a kind. As in
almost all expeditions between the Crimea and. the South African
the home machinery proved capable of dispatching with reasonable
efficiency ample supplies to the base of operations. But in the
actual theatre of wax, we see organisations created for the moment,
and deficiencies of the home contingents rectified by a variety of
external aid. As in the Suakin expedition, equipment for boiling
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and filtering impure water caine from the navy.1
	 When some pipes
in his Alexanilrian engines proved inadequate, Wallace procured re-
placements from the sane source. His own expertise bad. been developed
solely within India, where he had belonged since 1867 to the Indian
Railway department. Finally, both the Erptian and Zulu wars were
campaigns against space and. time more than against man.
Despite its successes, the shortcomings of the Erptian expedition
gave rise to much discussion and. fuelled afresh the debate over Commis-
sariat and transport organisation. With this controversy the ensuing
pages are concerned. Whatever their educational defects, Victorian
officers showed little distaste for argument, and. questions of supply
and transport generated a good deal of it. As me lecturer enthusiast-
ically if perhaps inaccurately remarked: "... we see the congenial
subjects of Strateg and Tactics giving place to the eminently prosaic
but more important point, "How masses of men on the move are to be
supplied with the numerous articles necessary for a modern army- in the
field?"°' Although the extent of Cominissariat powers had been an
important issue for many years, it is justifiable to pick up the story
after the Zulu war, for it is about this time that the concept plainly
emerged of an overall military control of communications. Amongst
those who spoke and wrote on this subject three fairly distinct
100. Liut.-Gen. Sir Gerald Gr}wn to General Lord. Wolseley, 30 May
1885, appendix 2, V.0. 32/6129; Maurice, Campaign of 1882, 57.
101. Naj. W.L. Geddes, "On "Manual" Transport", J.R.U.S.I. 24
(1880), 314.
252.
approaches can be discerned, although it is not asserted that bard.
and fast divisions of opinion existed.
The first approach was military and. traditional. Its proponents
were content to uphold the time-honoured procedure of allowing soldiers
a limited and variable responsibility for transport in wartime, entrust-
ing the Commissariat with independent control of supply, and. minta1iing
no nucleus of regimental transport in time of peace. Little attention
was paid to the line of communications as a whole. A lengthy memora.n-
dum by Sir John Adye on the 1882 campaign exemplified this conservative
and rather complacent outivok; an irenic stance amongst the sharp die--
putes of commissaries and reformers. Adye's own career illustrates
how Victorian officers could. be conservative on some issues and pro-.
gressive on others. As a scientist and artillerist he was one of the
most distinguished. soldiers of the period, and. played the major part in
the reestablishment of a standing committee to examine new advances in
gunnery; the Ordnance committee. 102 Yet he was a leading proponent J
and supervisor of the reversion to muzzle-loading artillery in the 1860s,
a change which Wolseley considered to have been an unmitigated. misfor-
tune. 103 Upon the question at hand Adye was distinctly backward-
looking.
102. the Committee	 into the
in
the Army, 472. P.P. (C.5flb, 1887), 14;
Adye", Proc. R.A7	 27 (1900), 565-69.
103. Brig.-Gen. John Adye, Director of Artillery, 'emorandum on
the Breech-Loading System of Field. Artillery", (April 1870),
W.O. 33/21k; Repert of the Royal Commission. 4ppointed. to Inquire
into the System under which Patterns of Warlike Stores are Adopted,
104 (Wolseley), 186-67 (A&ye) L.. (C .5062 , 1887), 15; Gen. Sir
John Adye, Recollections of a Military Life (Lon.d. 1895), 284-87.
253.
by arguin
In his memorandum, he comxnenced/ that Coinxnissariat and. transport
arrangements in peace and. at home had. been developed upon the
assumption of European conditions. He saw no cause for complaint
in this. To his mind, the diverse circumstances if Britain's small
wars simply should be met as they arose. Thus, testifying before
the 1884 Commissariat enquiry, he adm-ntly opposed the m-intenance
of permanent regimental transport, as a nucleus for one arnr corps,
as uneconomical and. superfluous) 04
 To him, the S'-ptian campaign
confirmed the satisfactory nature of the existing system. Plainly,
he had. little sympathy with those commissaries who harped upon the
defects of military transport in the expedition. IiAeed, his
remarks, tinged with contempt towards the civilian corps, were
remfiiscent of the attitude of the Military Train. As Commissary—
General Henry Reeves complained:
We axe liable to be accosted and. spoken to by officers in
a very different tone and spirit to that used in dealing
with officers of our relative army rank. Having to deal
with a great number of officers of other corps I particularly
105
remarked this.
Similarly, nearly two decades later, staff surveyors protested that,
although they possessed relative rank, their lack of formal military
- titles "subjects them to grave annoyance, and even indignity; and.
that this reacts most detrimentally upon their socia3 position")6
104. Report of the Select Commitee upon Counnissariat Services,
op. cit., 158.
105. Report by Assistant Commissary—General Henry Reeves, Director
of Transport, (Nov. 1882), 20, W.0. 33/42.
106. Committee on Surveyors of the Staff for Engineer Services
(1899), 4, W.0. 33/145.
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Adye's serious contention, however, was that the commissaries
were so absorbed in their departmental concerns that they had no
appreciation of the strategy of the campaign. They failed to see
that the initial deprivations undergone by the troops were a necessary
consequence of Wolseley's strategy of surprise and the need to secure
the railway and water-supply. Their outcry over the breakdown of
regimental transport was a similar case of not seeing the wood for
the trees. (Undoubtedly it also reflected antagon.ism with a fresh
encroachment upon Commissariat functions, in that brigades left Britain
with their regimental transport complete, rather than receiving it from
the commissaries at the front.) Axiiira]. transport, Adye stressed, was
only supplementary to rail..ay and canal and, as supplies at the base
were plentiful, a certain amount of wastage was permissible and. amply
redeemed by success. Clearly, Adye glossed over the imperfections of
the campaign, and viewed the British style of ad hoc preparations with
a complacency bordering upon affection. Nonetheless, be had an over-.
all grasp of the campaign not evident in the remarks and iritings of
most Commissariat officers. 107 In short, Adye felt that, smarting
under the restriction of their powers by Earle's appointment, the
Commissariat was exaggerating the defects of the campaign in order to
advance its departmental interests. On the strategical side of the
question, similar opinFrns were advanced by Sir Arthur Haliburton,
Director of Supplies and Transport, but he seems to have remdned aloof
108from the conflict between soldiers and commissaries.
107. Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Adye, Memoanxluia on the Commissarist and
Transport Arrangements in Egjrpt during the War in 1882, (May ].88o),
preserved in corrected proof amongst the Wolseley Papers. With its
more acerbic expressions removed, the memorandum was laid before the
- Cominissariat enquiry. Also see Adye's evidence: Report of the Select
Coimn.ittee on Cornmissariat Services, op. cit., 131-37, 154-58.
iO8. Memorandum on the Administration of Supply and. Transport Service
(April 1884), 5-6, W.O. 33/42.
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Apart from its view on regimental transport, an important R.U.S.I.
lecture by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Shervinton bears distinct
similarity to Adye's approach. In 1881 Shervinton was a Deputy
Commissary-General, but he was one of the few in his corps of military
origin, having formerly been captain and. then brigade-major in the
Military Train.'09
 The disparity between his views and. those of most
of his colleagues is therefore explicable. In his lecture, he sur-
veyed the fortunes of army transport from the Peninsula war onwards,
applauding those commiders who had placed it under military direction.
The Strathnairn committee of 1867 had. recommended. the formation of a
permanent nucleus of rgimenta1 transport, but this suggestion had. not
been put inbo effect. Shervinton blamed this upon the alleged. self-
assertion of Commissariat officials during the Strathnairn enquiry,
whereby they had successfully defended. their sectional interests.
Thus, Shervinton coiclud.ed, the Commissariat "still retains army
110transport in its grasp ...".
	 But besides sharp and. even bitter
comments upon departmental officers, Shervinton did not have a great
deal to offer. He showed no concern with the lines of communication
as a whole, and, arguing only for the revival of the Train as an
independent body, rejected the principle of an Army Service corps.'11
Reconstitution of the Military Train would, be a sufficient reform and
would serve to limit Couimissariat pretentions. Bearing in mind.
- Shervinton's former position and. the fact that he was on half-pay,
there were perhaps some personal expectations behind. his lecture.
109. "(yn Army Transport", J.R.U.S.I. 25 (1881), l7G-196, chaired by
Wolseley; Hart's Army' List (1856), 86, (1870), 227.
110. Shervinton, t?() Army Transport", op. cit., 179.
111. Thid, 181, and similarly see Maj. E.A. Cosson, "Land and. Water
Transt in the Soudan and. on the Nile", J.ILU.S.I. 32 (1888),
387-404.
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In both public and confidential discussions, the Cominissariat
defended its interests with vigour. Some commissaries expressed
opinions which aligned them with the ref ormers, but most obviously
felt threatened by the expansion of military control, and banded
together to preserve their departmental powers. Their limited
numbers helped to cement their cohesion. Including the Ordnance
Store department, the Commissariat establishment never rose much
above three hundred from the abolition of Control until the creation
of the Arn r Service Corps. 2 Against Wolseley and his supporters
supply officers seem to have felt a speoal m'imus, as they did
against the Royal Warrant of 1880. Much of what they insisted upon
was valid; the intimate connection between supply and. transport, and.
the undesirability of five-year rather than permanent appointments in
arnj services. But their reluctance to contemplate any organisation
other than a Commissariat responsible only to the G0.C., and in full
control of peace and wartime transport, made their position
anachronistic.
Thus, at a significant R.U. S.I. debate shortly after the Zulu
war, Edward tie Ponbianque, an aged. authority on Comxnissariat affairs,
urged tiat transport be committed. once and. for all to the supply
department, and lamented that in South Africa "... we have reverted
to the old system of divided responsibility and decentralization".
-	 Sir Edward Strickland, who had been awarded a K.C.B. for his South
African achievement, spoke at length to the same effect, with an
assertion he had. not fulfilled, in 1879: "I would, not utyself take
the Connnissazriat charge of any troops in the field if there was any
112. "Statement showing the cost of Supply Officers of the Army from
the 1st April, 1868", W.O. 32/6072.
257.
attempt whatever to take from me the thorough command of my transport".113
In the following year, commenting upon Shervinton's lecture, Ponbianque
criticized the speaker for repudiating "the principle which I thought
that all experienced officers, both militaxy and. departmental, have
acknowledged to be quite unassailable, namely, that you cannot separate
Transport from Supply". Other conixnissaries rallied to Fonbianque's
support on this and related issues. It is clear that they were not
opposed to the recent measures to give the corps a military standing,
which they rather welcomed as enhancing their prestige. What they
condeumed were threats to their department's integrity; the five-year
rule and. the proposal to separate transport from supply.114
The Erptian campaign and. the Nile expedition of 1u84-85 gave
additional grounds for dispute. In the latter campaign, Lieutenant-
Colonel George Purse was appointed Director of Transport. His position
gave hi'ti supreme aithority over the variegated modes of conveyance used
in the war; mules, horses, donkeys, camels, Canadian whalers, steamers,
and railways. To him, at least on paper, Cominissariat officers were
directly responsible and were requirad. to request from him their
allotment of transport. The controversy aroused by this arrangement
will be discussed shortly.
113. Maj. Wilkinson J. Shaw, "Army Transport: thc Organization
Tactics of I4ilitaxy Coivoys in War", J.R.U.S.I. 24 (1880), 351
-,(Ponblanque), 352-53 (Strickland).
114. Shervinton, "On Army Transport", op. cit., 192 (Fonbianque),
192-93 (Wellesley Rcbinson), 193-94 (E. Grattan). Siinilar].y see
Lieut.-Col. Clifford. Parsons, "Military Transport", J.LU.S.I. 23
(1879), disc., 813-20.
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In evidence before the 1884 Coinmissariat enquiry, supply officers
variously blamed the defects of the Egy-ptian expedition upon the re-
organisation of 1880, the removal of regimental transport from their
department's control, and the failure to train counnissaries at home in
transport duties. 115 Viewing things from War Office level, Commissary-
General Watt even condemned, the principle of separating commrtd. from
administration. Amidst his uncertain tenses, he clearly implied
that the supply services had skirted disaster in 1882:
the Erptian war brought out more strongly than before
that the separation of the comm2nt of the personnel from
the aiministration of supplies was, and is, fatal to the
efficiency of the Comniissariat of the Army whonever axiy
oanrnaign on a larger scale be undertaken.h16
With this, Sir Edward Morris, senior Commissariat officer on. the staff
.uring the 1882 campaign, heartily concurred. "We have struggled",
he wrote in a diatribe against the recruitment of regular officers
into the corps, "through the campaign in which the efforts of the few
effioien officers have been almost crushed by the ignorance of the
untrained assistants". 117 Immediately after the Egyptian war, a
committee under Watt eri%mined the question of whether the irimi
purchased for the campaign could be nsd to set up a permanent nucleus
-. of regimental transport in Britain. Predictably, the committee
115. Reports by Conunissary-Gen. Sir E. Morris, Assistant Commissary-
Get?. H. Reeves, and. Anon (prob. J. Steevens, senior Ordnance Store Officer
of the 2rILi Division of 1882 expeditionary force). Report of the Select
Committee on Coinmisariat Services, op. cit., 461-71, 476-77, 482.
116. Thid, 717.
117. Report by S.C.O. with Rrpeditionary Force in Egypt, (Dec. 1882),
3, W.0. 33/42.
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judged. it unnecessary to maintain any transport corps outside of the
118Commissariat.
After the Nile campaign, Colonel E. Hughes, a senior Commissary
with Wolseley's force, argued with obvious satisfaction that the
appointment of Purse as Transport Director had proved wholly super-
fluous. Apparently Purse had controlled only the transport of the
station at which he was at any particular time. KLsewhere, orders
as to conveyance came to the local senior commissary, via the station
commiMer, from the Chief of Staff and. the G.O.C., Lines of Coinmunica-
tion. Other reports confirm that all along the communications supply
officers were actively engaged in what was theoretically the Director
of Transport's province. 9 To the commissaries, this disparity
between real and paper organisation showed that it was impossible to
delegate supply and transport to different authorities, when both were
under a supreme head. of communications. In self-defence, Purse
argued that the extraordinary length of communications had. rendered
it desirable to allow comrnders and their senior commissaries as
much latitude as possible. Purthermore, he accused the supply officers
of obdurate uncooperation. His remarks reveal the residue of profes-
sionl antagonism which still remained between soldiers and. the fo:rinerly
civilian supply department:
-	 The assistance rendered to the supply branch at Xorti finds
not a single word of recognition in these reports. During
118. Committee o Transport Animals, (Dec. 1882), V.0. 33/40.
119. Report of the Senior Commissariat Officer of the Nile Expedition-
ary Porce, (Sept. 1885), 125-30; Report by Assistant Coinmissary-Cen..
Naj. N.E. Rainsford, 157-61; Report by Assistant Conniiissaxy-Gen. Naj.
J.A. Boyd, 167-68. All V.0. 33/44.
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the whole time I was at that place I never received a single
requisition for transport from a Commissariat Officer. On
the contrary I, the head of a service, had to go from day to
day to the Coxnznissariat Store to state the number of camels
that I had available, and. to demand. the loads that the
Commissariat desired to have forwarded. It cannot be
adduced in one instance that I ever objected to help the
Supply Officers, as their brother Officers did, though they
tacitly scorned to ask for such help from an outsider.'2°
The reformers in supply and. transport questions, airngst whom
Purse was Wolseley's right-hand, man in the field and. with his pen,
formed an identifiable group. The issue was not merely, they recog-
nized, how far the army was to participate in the traditional functions
of the Connnissariat. They saw the need for a wholly military corps
to discharge all supply duties in the field, and for a system flexible
enough for the great range of conditions in which th British arnr had.
to move and. be
 fed. It took some time for this concept to emerge
fully, and. initially the reformers tended to be nxu.ch preoccupied with
the question of independent a.rmy transport. The title changes of
Purse's successive studies of what remained basically the same stibject
indicate the shift in perspective.121
Purse therefore welcomed. the idea of a single bead, of communica-.
-	 tions as the best way to unravel the "knotty point" as to how far
120. "Remarks by the Director of Transport on the Cominissariat
Officers' Reports", (Jan. 1886), 173-78 (quo. 177), W.O. 33/44.
121. Studies on Military Transport (Lond. 1878); Military Traimport
(Lond. 1882); The Lines of Communications (Lond.. 1883); The
Organization and Administration of the Lines of Communications in War
(Lond.. 1894) (Dedicated to Lord. Wolseley).
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Commissariat powers should extend in wartime. Acceptance of this
principle, he felt, had rendered the supply officers' insistence upon
122
control of transport irrelevant and. out of date. 	 After Shervinto]a' S
lecture, Wolseley spoke at length to similar effect. He emphasised
three points: that a permanent nucleus of transport should exist at
home, that transport and. supply should be kept as distinct as prac-
ticable in war, and. that all communications must be put under one
controlling head. Having rather the best of both worlds, he added:
My own idea is, although I am not at all in favour of copying
foreign systems, rather to copy the system of the Prussian
service ... I have no hesitation in saying the man who
should be held. responsible for feeding an army in front
should be the Officer in charge and. in commmd of the line
oi c mieat4oLa, as it is is Pruasia and. in tarly alL tim
great armies of the world, and that it is only possible in
that way to get over the friction which will always exist
between the various Departments of the
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Wolseley put the last principle into effect during his two
Egy-ptlan campaigns. Over the question of regimental transport, a
matter he pursued energetically until 1888, he was lees successful.
The issue is worth some attention as an example of the attitude
Wolseley and like-mirtied reformers adopted towards the continent.
Shortly before the Nile expedition, Wolseley discussed. the matter
in a long letter to Lord Hartington (secretary of state for war
122. Pre'is of Opinions on the Question of the Union or Disassociation
of the Transport and Supply Services, (March 1884), 7, 17, 18, W.O.
33/42.
123. Shervinton, "On Army ransport", op. cit., 195-96.
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December 1882-June 1885).124 Rartington had evidently opposed the
formation of regimental transport on the grounds that it existed in
no European country. Wolseley's reply indicates the nice balance
of interest in, and detachment from, foreign examples which imperial
reformers sought to achieve. Relying upon Thirse as an. authority,
Wolse].ey pointed out that some form of regimental transport was
maintained in Russia, Italy, Prance, Austria, and. Germany. 125 But,
with reference to Hartington'e argument, Wolseley added:
I don't tMi* that would have been any conclusive reason,
even supposing your informant had been at all correct in
his statements - why Regimental transport should not be
provided for during peace in our little amy, so different
as it is from the european armies in its size, organization,
and the duties., it has to perform in peace and the nature of
the wars it is designed to take part in.
In Prance, however, regimental drivers were trained by the supply
department. An informal War Office committee was currently investi-
gating the possibility of introducing a similar system into Britain,
in the form of a transport school under Conmiissariat authority. The
two supply officers in the committee approved of the idea, and were
supported by Haliburton and. Morris. The military mefoers opposed it.
- Wolseley took their part:
124. Wolseley to Haxtington, 16 Aug. 1883, Wolseley Papers, W/PLB 1.
125. There was, admittedly, some controversy as to the precise
degree of independence given to the various foreign transports.
Wolseley to Hartington, 19 Aug. 1883; Henry Brand. to Hartington,
21 Aug. 1883, Devonshire Papers, 340/1376 and 1377.
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On one side soldiers of varied experience in war all over
our scattered Enpire and men who have made Transport a most
important item in the study of their profession, whilst on
the other you have two Departmental officers entirely ignorant
of the science and practice of war.126
Wolseley continued to urge the formation of regimental transport
until, with the creation of the Army Service Corps, a system of trans-
____	 127port training for the combatant branches was established.
	 This
was preceded by the issue of the first Manual for Regimental Transport
in 1887.
The debate following the Erptian war of 1882 did much to clarify
the issues. n R.U.S.I. lecture of 1883 by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles
Webber, who was the arny's current expert on telegraphy and had worked
closely with Wallace in the E-ptian cazapaigi typifies ref orming
opinion by the early 1880s. Webber enthusiastically supported the
principle of one authority over communications. In this, he saw a
"reuxrection of the spirit of Control", but limited to wartime only.
Thereby the combination of staff and. executive functions in one man
(he Commissary-General) would be ended, and. specialised. functions
could be developed. "If anything has at last become a matter past
diacussion", Webber concluded, "it is, I believe, that the regimental,
medical, and ammunition transport should not in future be a Commissariat
organization in the British
126. Wolseley to Eartington, 16 Aug. 1883. I know of this committee
only fror Wolseley's letter; no record of it seems to be preserved
in the War Office Piles.
127. "Volunteer Regimental Transport", (m.s. memorandum, March 1886);
minute on the state of the army, 15 Sept. 1886; Wolseley Papers,
W/NEM 1.
128. Lieut.-Col. C.E. Webber, "Suggestions on the Transport of the
Future", J.R.tT.S.I. 27 (1883), 298, and 289-3 , passini.
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Thus, when Wolseley proposed the appointment of a Quartermaster-
General over all transport and supply services, he found a favourable
response from reformers. Wolseleys aim was, in effect, to establish
a permanent domestic counterpart to the generals who would direct
communications in theatres of war. prom Commissary-General Sir
Edward Morris, however, his suggestion met with a categorical rejec-
tion, Morris took issue with Wolseley on several grounds, and hii
remarks reflect the way in which the paths of reform in this period
were complicated by differing assumptions as to the arys role.
Such a Q.N. G., Morris insisted, would lack the relevant specialised.
experience. He pointed out that in the German etappen, a supply
officer at headquarters &rected the provision of food supplies under
thA immediate authority of the G.O.C. This regulation, according to
Morris, was based upon the need for expert guidance in that planned
exploitation of resources in the invaied. (ami civilised) territory.
British supply organisation should be based upon precisely the same
principle. Morris therefore mi(ntained that preoccupation with war-
fare iii "barren lands against savages" had. clouded the minds of Lord
Wolseley and those who supported bin, and 'wrote:
The primary object for which (the British Army) is
equipped, organized and. kept up, is to operate in civilized
countries against the armies of civilized nations.
Whatever may have been the employment of our forces
during the past ten years, it is but reasonable to assume
that the regulations for the Arnr should. be prepared on a
basis calculated to meet the requirements of civilized
nations.
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To Norris, therefore, commissaries had to be ready to fulfill their
traditional role as those who cominindeered as well as distributed
supplies. What he wanted was a supply department with as much power
as possible in war, and. a bead at the right hand. of the cornminder-in-
129
chief with no intermediate authorities.
George Purse, however, was delighted with Wolseley's proposal.
He saw it as the chance to give supply and. transport administration a
proper military standing. Norris's objections, he argued, were a
typical commissary's mistrust of delegated authority, and in any case
were based upon a false premise:
all we have to copy from the German Army is the working
out of a proper system for the Line of Communications. Our
wars differ so essentially from the wars carried ott by
Contin'ntaL rrm4 that wa shoul& not hre t a servile
imitation of their systems, but we should originate one of
our own which may be in consonance with our requirements.
Our wars are not carried over the frontier into an enemy's
country, neither can we live on the resources of the invaded
territory, and are therefore dependent on England. for nearly
all that we need during the course of operations. The
duties of our Cominissariat Officers, therefore, differ
very essentially from those of the Commissariat Officers
130
of the German and. other armies.
There could. have been no clearer statement of the imperial reforming
standpoint, although, doubtless for rhetorical puiposs, Purse seems
129. Memorandum of 11 Jan. 1886, 1-4: "Observations on a reply by
Colonel Purse to a memorandum of the Coimnissaxy-General on the Proposed
revise of the Regulations for the Lines of Communications", (March
1886), 9-12 (quo., 9). Both V.0. 33/45.
130. "Observations upon the Proposed Regulations for the Organization
of the Line of Communications", (15 Jan. 1886), 5-8 (quo., 5),
V.0. 33/45.
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to have greatly underestimated the extent to which German supply
organ.isation for war was dependezit upon the home base.
In response to Wolseley's proposal, a committee was formed. within
the War Office to discuss the creation of a new Q.M.G.'s department.
The committee, whose members included Wolseley, Evelyn Wood, Buller,
Haliburton, Ralph Knox and the mounted. infantry reformer U. Ald.erson,
recommended. the appointment of a iartermaster-Genera1 for the home
amy, charged with the direction of all services connected with the
feeding, moving and. quartering of troops. His department was to be
divided into two sections, a,mhiistrative and executive. A Q.M.G. of
high rank was to be included on the s gaff of any exp3ditionaxy force,
and. to have the same role in the theatre of war as the permanent
Q.LG. had. for the entire home army. During a campaign, the Surveyor-
General of the OrThrce was to correspond with. the C.O.C. via his
Q.M. C., rather thazi directly. Commmd of troops and. a&ainistration
of supplies and transport would therefore form a matrix of interlocking
131
responsibilities. 	 After some further debate as to the details of
the proposed reform, it received. the approval of Stanhope, the then
secretary of state. Major-Genera]. Ridvers Buller was appointed
Quartermaster-General at headquarters in October 1887, end. his duties
officially defined by order in Council the following February.'32
131. Report of the Committee appointed, to consider the Regulations for
the Organization of the Lines of Communication, (March 1887) W.O. 33/47.
132. Memo, of April 1887 by Haliburton, of 22 May 1887 by Thiller, of 3
June 1887 by Haliburton, all W.O. 33/55; G.O. (1887), no. 85; A.O.
(1888), no. 57; order in council of 21 Feb. 1888, repr. Report of His
Majesty's Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the War in South Africa,
appendiw 41, 27].. P.P. (C.1792, l9O4), 42. The order in council was
phrased:
The Quartermaster General.
Is charged with supplying the Army with food, forage, quarters,
transports, and remounts; with the movement of the troops, and.
with the distribution of their stores and. equipment. He will
administer the Commissariat and. Transport Corps, the Pay Department,
and the Establishments employed. on the above sewices; and will
deal with sanitary questions relating to the Army.
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In his history of supply and. transport in the British army, Sir
John Portescue regarded the formation of the Army Service Corps as
the work of one man, Redvers Buller. 133
 Certainly, Buller's was the
guiding hand, but the creation of such a corps was the natural sequel
to the years of preceding experience and discussion. Despite the
recent reforms, friction between departmental and. military officerc
persisted. The basic problem which Haliburton had delineated. some
years earlier remained:
We have doctored the Departments generally, patched. them here,
and strengthened theia there, but we have never done the one
thing needful to remedy the standing evil which paralyses them.
We have never established a community of interest, a sympathy
and. fellow feeling between the Army and the Departments created
for its supply and maintenance.134
Upon his appointment as .M.G., Bu].ler resolved to remedy this situation.
The system established in 1880 he judged to be reprehensible,
because it neither permitted officers a stable career in the Commissariat
and Transport Corps nci gave them a proper military standing. Buller's
aim, in comparison, was both to encourage permanent specialisation and.
to end. the quasi-military standing of supply officers. The 1880 reform
had been intended not only to phase out civilians but to create a reserve.
In this respect, the measure had been a signal failure. The Corps had
neither the intrinsic appeal of a combatant arm nor offered stability
133. The Royal Arojy Sei'vice Corps A History & Transport and. Supply
in the British Army (C.U.P. 1930), I, 213-28.
134. Memo, by Arthur Haliburton, (n.d., prob. 1875), 6, W.0. 32,'6071.
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and. the emoluments attached to steady promotion. Thus, at the close
of 1887, while the official Coinmissariat and. Transport establishment
was 244, only 224 officers were actually serving. The latter was the
precise figure the current inobilisation tables laid. down as necessary
for the lines of communication and base of two army corps. After
allowing for the requirements of home and. foreign stations, Buller
estimated that only 113 would remin available for the expeditionary
force. Virtually no reserve existed. His solution to these problems
was the formation of an Army Service Corps of a purely military statue
and of sufiicient size (after calling out of the reserve) to provide
for defence at home and abroad and for a striking force of some 70,000
troops. 135 it is interesting to see how even so simple a standard as
the two corps requirement helped to clarify the aims of reformers.
Within the War Office, Buller's proposals met with immediate
approval. St. John Brodrick (Financial Secretary 1886-92), Stanhope,
and the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury all looked. favourably upon
the scheme. George Lawson (Assistant Under-Secretary from l89), saw
it as a revival of Control in a military guise and. a regimental form
suited to British traditions.136 Reasons for its ready acceptanoe
are not far to seeks Since the Crimea, attempts had been made to give
the supply department a military standing. For nearly a decade,
reformers had. been agreed that a unified and. wholly military organ!-
sation was needed. for the lines of communication in modern war.
Buller's scheme appealed to soldiers in a way that Control never had.
135. Buller to the Military Secretary (Sir George Harmon), 17 Nov.
1887; ms. memoranthn of 27 July 1888, WO. 32/6072.
136. Minute by Brodrick, 9 Feb. 1888; ma. memo. by Lawson, 25 Nov.
1887; minute by Stanhope, 23 April 1888; R. Welby to Brodrick, 18
Sept. 1888 (conveying opinions of Lords commissioners); W.L. Jackson
to Brodrick, 11 Dec. 1888 (conveying Lords Commissioners' approval
of draft warrant for an A.S.C.). All WO 32/6072.
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(An official who could announce himself as "Your Controller, air",
tended to generate reactions from traditional generals which gave rise
to many apocryphal stories.) Fin-1ly, the Treasury was delighted, as
regimental pay was less than the departmental rates enjoyed by supply
officers. The difference was considerable. When the A.S.C. was
set up, all new officer recruits were to be placed on one scale (a
third higher than. infantry rates), while all Commissariat and. Transport
Officers who had. joined the Corps before the 30 January 1880 were to
remain on departmental rates until retirement. On the first scale,
a major earned 18/- daily; on the second, 30/-. A captain earned
15/.- on the first and 25/- on the second. Actuaries estimated an.
annual saving of £17,958 from the new scheme, and the Lords Cominis-
sioners promptly agreed to support it.137
With remarkably little fuss, considering the significance of the
change, the Army Service Corps was established by Rcya]. Warrant in
December 1888, as a wholly military body to perform all executive
duties of supply and transport. It was to comprise both officer and.
other ranks, it was to be drilled, paraded, and armed like an ordinary
army unit, it could recruit direct from the R.LC., and its senior
138officers were to be eligible for appointments on the general staff.
The publication of the Army Service Corps Journal symbolized its
establishment as a regular arm of the service, and. the articles
therein testify to the esprit de corps which developed after Buller's
ref .,rms.
137. Actuaries' ieport of 3 Nov. 1883, V.0. 32/6072; Royal Warrant
of 17 Dec. 1888, repr. A.O. (1889), 15 (pay scales).
138. Royal Warrant repr. A.O. (1889), 9-21; Regimental Standing
Orders for the Army Service Corps (1890).
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In succeeding years, the role of the Army- Service Corps in war
was worked out with some precision. Regulations for war were based
upon the concept of articulation. An arnr in the field was to be a
connected whole, its advanced forces wholly dependent upon the base,
aM joined to it via a series of intermediate basesr the depots.
The axny's lifelines, its communications, were to form one commsnd
and. to be organised by one service, the Angy- Service Corps. Regi-
mental transport was to be distributed at the outset of a campaign
anti to be retained by the units for its duration. On the eve of the
South African war, the official supply anti transport org.u,isation for
an army- corps in the field was as follows. The first line of trans-
port was composed of A.S.C. sections who accompanied the advancing
troops and. carried small quantities of stores; that is, the regimen-
tal transport. The second was composed of the A.S.C. with the supply
waggons and carts, the baggage waggons, and. the forges, and. the third
line of the A.S.C. with the advanced depots and the depots on the line
of comnxunications. 139
 When the expeditionary force was sent to South
Africa in 1899 and 1900, this system was set up and. worked with adm.tr-
able efficiency until, as Dr. Page has shown, it was dirnntled by
Kitchener anti replaced with the system of column transport. 14° In
effect, the organisation of an aimy corps in the field reflected in
miniature the supply system of the empire. Through the navy, the
network of imperial contracts antI the developing storage centres, and.
the direction of the Woolwich and. Whitehall authorities, a small
expeditionary force could be sent to, and maintained in, any part of
139. Meut.-Col. H.M.C. Brunker, Chart of an Army Corps and. Caval:
Brigade (1899); Report of His Majesty's Commissioners Appointed t
Inquire into the War in South Africa Minutes of evidence, 216-17
(Gn. Sir Red.vers Thiller), P.P. (C.1791, 1904), 41.
140. Andrew Page, "The supply services of the British Anny in the
South African war", (Oxford D.Phil. thesis 1977), 135-42.
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the world.
In closing, the importance of this subject to the late Victorian
army's development may be stressed. On every band reformers advocated
military specialisation in preparation for war, and this entailed the
extension of military control into army services in the field.
Reformers seized upon experiences in colonial warfare in order to
buttress their arguments. To Sir Edward Morris, the railway operations
had made it obvious that a civilian establishment should have been sent
to Egypt. To Major Wallace, they had. proven the need for a peinanent
military railway corps) 4' Lieutenant-eneral Sir Andrew Clarke drew
the same conclusion from the Suaicin expedition of 1884. Condemning
the presence of civilian railway contractors within the theatre of war,
he wrote: "Harmony of action and a sciertific employment of resources
can be attained only by an organisation drawn up on ii1itaxy lines . ,,142
In every sphere of the late Victorian army, examples of similar attitudes
can be adduced. A committee examining Royal Engineer organisation,
for instance, would, brook no distinction between "professional" and
military duties. As Colonel E. Wood put it: "Before everything else
we must fully realise that we are soldiers first and engineers after-
,143wards'.	 Supply and. transport organisation wa. an important aspect
of the considerable, if slow aitd erratic, growth of military profes-
sionalism in the late nineteenth century. At the beg4niing of this
141. Report of the Select Committee on Commissariat Services, 2.•
cit., 16, 221.
142. "Minutes on the Report of Major-C-enera3. Ewart, C.B., ].ata
General Officer Commanding Base and. Line of Communications, Suakin
Field Force", (11 July 1885), W.O. 33144. Clarke was Inspector'-.
General of Fortifications June 1882-July 1886.
143. Report of a Committee on the Organisation of Royal Engineers
(1891), W.O. 33/51; Col. E. Wood, "The Duties of Royal Engineers
in the Field", P.P.R.E. 15 (1889), 71.
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period, the Coininissariat was in name and reality almost wholly civilian.
By its close, transport aM supply had been drawn into a single service,
an integral part of the army both on paper and. in personnel.
Finally, this subject illustrates the kind, of synthesis which
imperial reformers tried to achieve once the first wave of intense
admiration for Germany had. passed. Whatever in foreign systems seemed
to be suited to a scat ered army constantly engaged in irregular war-
fare, they were happy to import. They therefore were exposed to
criticism on two counts, for being seduced by foreign examples or over—
preoccupied with the trivial deTnnLis of small wars. The preceding
discussion has shown, it is hoped, thab these did not exert a wholly
conservative influence, as some contemporaries believed and some
historians have argued. Moreover, in the operational sphere, facing
formidable logistical problems, obliged to improvise and bound by the
demntIs of economy, Victorian soldiers could be qaite capable of
exploiting local resources with intelligence and, foresight, aM
discharging swiftly and. effectively the aims of policy.
CONCI1U$IOI
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The preceding study has shown the deep interest in foreign military
systems amongst Victorian arnr reformers. It has also emphasized that
many became preoccupied with two related themes: the differences
between European and imperial warfare, and the relevance of foreign
examples to a small volunteer arny-. Debate on these lines produced a
school of thought which argued that Great Britain should develop an
imperial system of thought, organisation, and trirtfng.
It was not difficult to accept this in principle. It was quite
another matter to put the principle into practice. Similarly, for the
student, it is not hard to discern the schools of opinion in the literr-
ture; it is a more taxing task to assess their practical effect. None-.
theless, in the attempt to do so, the documents have provided a good many
answers.
Mobilisation schemes were initially inspired by the speed with which
Prussia had marshalled its military forces in 1866 atid. 1870. But, until
1886, British mobilisation was the form without the substance. It was
Henry Brackenbury's achievement to make it real. In his and subsequent
schemes, planning for war was based upon actual resources and worked
into the existing axnr structure. After Stanhope's policy statement,
mobilisation was understood to embrace the needs of two contingencies:
'I
first, of an expedition outside continental Europe in support of an ally,
and, second, a major cdonial war. A chief defect of the scheme, and
of the Cardwell system itself, was its failure to provide for the re-
current demands of imperial policing. Throughout the period, reformers
stressed that small wars should be conducted without disruption to the
whole system. Only towards the century's close did their views find a
x'espc'nse iii law.
Lessons from the great continental wars had a profound impact upon
British tactical doctrine. It was further modified by rerormers who
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were critical of some foreign theorists and felt that the cult of the
offensive and the massed attack were being taken too far in continental
armies. Cautionary guidelines laid. down for British manoeixvres -
established in direct response to foreign examples - seem to have been
part of this development. The sense of a British and. imperial tradi-
tion was plainly reinforced by colonial campaigning. Whether this had.
amy immediate effect upon tra1niiig has been impossible to ascertain.
Nonetheless, experience of imperial warfare led. to the formation of two
new services, machine-gun corps and mounted infantry.
The rise of higher education in the Royal Artillery was a clear
instance of observation of foreign armies leading tc reform in Britain.
The system 3f education in this arm became the most advanced in the
army. But the drag of conservatism and financial exigencies nsured
that, in comprehensiveness, it lagged behind. its foreign counterparts.
The issue of artillery organisation was rather more complicated. Both
conservatives and some progressives argued that a unified service was
more suitable to an imperial army. Because Wolseley advocated divi-
sion of the arm, however, those who opposed him seemed. to be supporting
the status quo for its own sake. Moreover, reformers who proposed
division for imperial reasons also tended to advocate it on the grounds
that modern gunnery demanded professional specialisation. The needs
of impc'ial defence, as seen by Wolseley and. those of like mind, corn-
bined with the growing professionalism of the arm to provide a further
reform.
At the outset of the period, Britain's supply and transport
system, at least in its ajmiistration, was modelled upon the rench
Intendance. The central theme of subsequent developments was the
concept of articulation, derived in principle from the German army but
t.ventually fitted into the British regulations for war. Interwoven
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with this theme was the lon'-stan].ing antagonism between the combatant
aims and. the civilian Coinmissariat. Colonial warfare contributed
directly to both aspects of supply and. transport reform. It was a
school of experience which helped to rectify the deficiencies of home
training. Conceptually, the supply network of an imperial war exem-
plified. articulation in its grandest form. Debate concerning the
logistics of colonial wars fii1ly bore fru.it in the creation of the
Army Service Corps, whereby civil/military friction in the supply
services was obviated.
The Victorian axiiw was not transformed during the period under
review, but it was substantially altered. Many elements were involved
in this process, but it has seemed useful to choose one leading theme,
and to trace it through a number of major iasueb affecting each of the
nMn services. In the aspects erunined, the army was well on. the way
to modernization by th end of the century. Finally, what has been
shown has highlighted how much more we need to know about the Victorian
ariy. The exact structure of military ai1miifstratioia, the social
composition of the officer corps, the links between War Office arid
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